The Fourth Bite at the Apple: A Study of the Operation and Utility of the Social Security Administration\u27s Appeals Council by Koch,, Charles H., Jr. & Koplow, David A.
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 17 | Issue 2 Article 1
Winter 1990
The Fourth Bite at the Apple: A Study of the
Operation and Utility of the Social Security
Administration's Appeals Council
Charles H. Koch, Jr.
Marshall-Wythe School of Law
David A. Koplow
Georgetown University Law Center
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Disability Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Charles H. Koch, Jr. & David A. Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple: A Study of the Operation and Utility of the Social Security
Administration's Appeals Council, 17 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 199 (2017) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol17/iss2/1
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 17 WINTER 1990 NUMBER 2
THE FOURTH BITE AT THE APPLE: A STUDY OF THE
OPERATION AND UTILITY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION'S APPEALS COUNCIL
CHARLES H. KOCH, JR. AND DAVID A. KOPLOW
The Social Security Administration's Appeals Council performs the
fourth and final administrative evaluation of appealed disability
claims. Very little information about the Appeals Council has been
available to claimants and their representatives, even though
claimants must request Appeals Council review before filing an
appeal in federal court. In response to criticism and controversy
surrounding this obscure branch of the Social Security
Administration, the Administrative Conference of the United States
(ACUS) asked Professors Koch and Koplow to study the Appeals
Council's effectiveness in disability claims and adjudication. In this
Article, the authors examine Appeals Council operations and the
Council's relationship to the administrative and judicial disability
claims procedure and make recommendations for streamlining and
improving the claims process. These recommendations, originally
presented in a report to the A CUS, were evaluated and substantially
adopted by A CUS and are presently being considered by the Social
Security Administration.
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THE FOURTH BITE AT THE APPLE: A STUDY OF THE
OPERATION AND UTILITY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION'S APPEALS COUNCIL
CHARLES H. KOCH, JR.* AND DAVID A.KOPLOW**
T HE APPEALS Council provides the final administrative review
of benefit claims under the purview of the Social Security Admin-
istration (SSA).I As a central unit in the adjudicatory bureaucracy, the
Council reviews the work of an immense and diverse network of fed-
eral and state adjudicators and handles a wide variety of cases. 2
Recently, however, the operation and the very existence of the Ap-
peals Council have become highly controversial. Indeed, SSA claim-
ants' representatives have argued that "serious consideration should
be given to eliminating the Appeals Council or severely limiting its
* Woodbridge Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William
And Mary; B.A., 1966, University of Maryland; J.D., 1969, George Washington University;
L.L.M., 1975, University of Chicago.
** Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Director, Center for Applied
Legal Studies, Georgetown University; B.A., 1973, Harvard University; J.D., 1978, Yale Uni-
versity.
1. This Article derives from a study undertaken during the summer and fall of 1987 under
the auspices of the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS), which provided
valuable support and assistance. The ACUS evaluated the study and prepared its own recom-
mendations, which were adopted December 18, 1987 and codified at I C.F.R. § 305.87-7 (1987).
See also REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 625 (1987).
The authors are indebted to a number of people for their extraordinary support and assistance
in this project. Special appreciation is due to Jeff Lubbers of the Administrative Conference of
the United States, Gil Fisher of the Social Security Administration, Bill Taylor and Burt Berkley
of the Appeals Council and Eileen Sweeney of the National Senior Citizens Law Center, who
were exceptionally generous with their time and attention throughout the project. In addition,
our thanks go to Mariam Naini, our research assistant, and Karen Bouton, our typist.
2. Existing studies of intermediate administrative appellate bodies include the following:
C. KOCH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE §§6.71 to .79 (1985); Cass, Allocation of Author-
ity Within Bureaucracies: Empirical Evidence and Normative Analysis, 66 B.U.L. REV. 1 (1986)
[hereinafter Allocation of Authority]; R. CASS, BACKGROUND REPORT FOR RECOMMENDATION 83-
3: AGENCY REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES' DECISIONS, REPORTS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 115 (1983) [hereinafter 1983
ACUS REPORT]; E. ELLIS, REPORT IN SUPPORT OF DISCRETIONARY REVIEW OF DECISIONS OF PRE-
SIDING OFFICERS: SUBPARAGRAPH I(B) OF RECOMMENDATION No. 6, 1 REPORTS AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 155 (1971); J. FREEDMAN,
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON AGENCY ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE IN SUPPORT OF INTERME-
DIATE APPELLATE BOARDS: SUBPARAGRAPH I(A) OF RECOMMENDATION No. 6, 1 REPORTS AND RE-
COMMENDATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 125 (1971).
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functions," 3 while members of Congress, 4 neutral scholars,' federal
judges, 6 and Reagan administration officials7 have criticized the Ap-
peals Council, questioned its mandate, and called for its abolition. As
a result, the Administrative Conference of the United States, at the
behest of the SSA, requested us to study the Appeals Council. In this
Article, we discuss the operation of the Appeals Council and its rela-
tionship to the rest of the adjudicatory bureaucracy and the courts.
We also make recommendations for improvements.'
We have been struck repeatedly by the lack of information available
to the public about the internal organization and operation of the Ap-
peals Council. Despite the importance of the Appeals Council and its
central position in the SSA network, little has been written about the
Appeals Council. Most outside commentators, even those who focus
on the hearings and appeals process, have devoted their attention else-
where. We discern important costs in this "invisibility" and hope that
dissemination of our findings through the Administrative Conference
and the Florida State University Law Review can aid in the process of
restoring the prominence and effectiveness of the Appeals Council.
This Article is organized into three basic sections: "Background,"
"Goals," and "Findings and Recommendations." The "Back-
ground" section provides an overview of federal disability law, out-
lines the SSA's claims adjudication process, and describes the
organization and operation of the Appeals Council and the precise
standards and procedures for case handling. The "Goals" section
identifies six institutional objectives for the Appeals Council and de-
scribes the overlapping and partially conflicting imperatives facing the
SSA bureaucracy and the Appeals Council. It then evaluates the suc-
cess of the institution in attaining these goals, and concludes that the
3. Current Problems in the Social Security Hearings and Appeals Process: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Social Security of the Comm. on Ways and Means, House of Representatives,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. (Mar. 18, 1986) (statement of Eileen Sweeney, Staff Attorney, National
Senior Citizens Law Center) [hereinafter 1986 Hearing].
4. See H.R. 2117, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (introduced by Rep. Archer).
5. See D. COFER, JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND THE QUESTION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY
OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION HEARING PROCESS 12, 13 (1985). "The arguments are
persuasive that the $18 million a year expense of the [Appeals Council] could be put to better
use." Id. at 190.
6. See Sailing v. Bowen, 641 F. Supp. 1046, 1058-59 (W.D. Va. 1986).
7. Lambro, Ritualism in Social Security, The Commercial Appeal (Apr. 16, 1981).
8. We received an extremely high level of cooperation from the Appeals Council, other
components of the SSA, and outside commentators. We found these sources to be frank, con-
structive, and generous with their time.
Although our numerous sources spoke freely and generally without restrictive attribution
rules, we have elected not to quote them directly or cite them by name. In an already heavily
footnoted Article, citation of individual interviews would excessively burden the text.
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overwhelming crush of cases (currently close to 50,000 cases per year
for the twenty members of the Appeals Council) precludes the com-
plete accomplishment of any of these goals. The "Findings and Re-
commendations" section offers suggestions on how to defeat this
"tyranny of the caseload." Our primary concern is to redirect the Ap-
peals Council from focusing exclusively on individual cases toward us-
ing its unique perspective to develop, promote, and implement
streamlined proposals that make the claims process more accurate,
uniform, efficient, and acceptable to the public.
I. BACKGROUND
This section contains an overview of federal disability law, the SSA
disability claims adjudication process, and the organization and oper-
ation of the Appeals Council.
The federal disability overview section focuses on the financial and
medical criteria that a claimant must satisfy in order to be eligible for
the programs, the standards of proof required for a finding of eligibil-
ity, and the available benefits.
The section on claims adjudication reviews each stage in the proc-
ess, from initial application to judicial review. This section also con-
tains observations about the claims process and the nature of SSA
disability cases.
Finally, the Appeals Council section provides a detailed review of
the Appeals Council, including the legal authority for its existence, its
history, its composition and its staff. This section also contains a de-
tailed review of the adjudication process at the Appeals Council level,
a review of other Appeals Council functions and a review of the costs
of the Appeals Council.
A. Federal Disability Programs
This Article encompasses the disability provisions of two basic fed-
eral public benefits programs: Retirement, Survivors, Disability, and
Health Insurance (RSDHI); 9 and Supplemental Security Income
9. Certain portions of the Retirement, Survivors, Disability and Health Insurance
(RSDHI) program are also known as Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI).
These were enacted as Title II of the Social Security Act and are codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 to
433 (Supp. 1986) (see §§ 423 to 425 for the disability portions). Implementing regulations are
located at 20 C.F.R. § 404 (1986). The Health Insurance provisions of RSDHI are contained in
Title XVIII of the Social Security Act and are now largely administered by the Health Care
* Financing Administration of the Department of Health and Human Services. The health insur-
ance provisions are codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1982).
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(SSI). 10 As of 1987, the disability components of these two programs
together accounted for approximately $29 billion of annual disburse-
ments to seven million recipients, 1" making them the Western world's
largest income support program for people unable to engage in sub-
stantial gainful activity. 2
A variety of other specialized disability programs exists in the
United States. 3 These include state workers' compensation pro-
grams, 4 Veterans' Administration programs," and private insurance
10. The SSI program (also known as Title XVI of the Social Security Act) is codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1381 to 1383c (1982). Implementing regulations are located at 20 C.F.R. § 416 (1986).
11. Statistics on program size:
RSDHI DISABILITY SSI DISABILITY
Number of Total
Recipients Payments
Number of Total
Year workers others workers others Recipients Payments
1987(est.) 2.8m 1.3m $17.5B $2.4B 2.9m $9.2B
1986 2.7m 1.3m $17.1B $2.4B 2.8m $8.5B
1985 2.7m 1.2m $16.3B $2.4B
1984 2.6m 1.2m $15.4B $2.3B
1983 2.6m 1.2m $15.2B $2.4B
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 1987 ANNUAL REPORT TO TE CO NORESS 29, 31 (1987) [here-
inafter 1987 SSA REPORT TO THE CONGRESS].
12. In 1986, 417,000 workers and 341,000 of their dependents were added to the disability
rolls. This was the largest number of new awards of any year in the 1980s, but was significantly
below the 1975 peak, when 592,000 new awards were made to disabled workers alone. Sherman,
Fast Facts and Figures about Social Security, 1987, 50 Soc. SECURITY BULL. 5, 10 (May 1987).
For a comparison of social insurance programs (covering disability as well as other support de-
vices) in other nations, see SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD-1983 (1984); D. STONE, THE DISABLED STATE passim (1984).
13. For comparisons among various categories of disability programs, see F. BLOCH, FED-
ERAL DISABIUTY LAW AND PRACTICE passim (1984) (discussing RSDHI, SSI, veterans' benefits,
federal civil service benefits, and black lung benefits); D. Swansburg, The Relationship Between
Pain and Disability Benefits: A Literature Survey (Oct. 1985) (background paper prepared for
the Commission on the Evaluation of Pain); Social Security Programs in the United States,
1987, 50 Soc. SECURITY BULL. 5 (Apr. 1987) (describing RSDHI, SSI, unemployment, workers'
compensation, and numerous other programs); Johnson, Disability, Income Support, and Social
Insurance, in DISABILITY POLICIES AND GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS 87 (E. Berkowitz ed. 1979).
14. Workers' compensation programs, created and administered by state governments, vary
substantially. In general, they provide compensation for partial or total disabilities arising during
the course of employment. Price, Workers' Compensation: Coverage, Benefits and Costs, 1983,
49 Soc. SECURITY BULL. 5 (Feb. 1986). The disability may be permanent or temporary, but reha-
bilitation, rather than an expectation of long-term receipt of benefits, has been stressed as the
rationale for the program. D. Swansburg, supra note 13, at 20-29.
15. The Veterans' Administration (VA) manages a disability compensation program for
service-connected partial or total disability, as well as a program for non-service-connected total
disability. In addition to cash benefits, the VA provides medical treatment, rehabilitation serv-
ices and other programs. D. Swansburg, supra note 13, at 14-19; F. BLOCH, supra note 13, at
320, 328-31.
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plans.1 6 Additionally, various federal programs have been established
to aid, for example, "black lung" victims, 7 retired railroad workers, s
and federal employees.' 9 RSDHI and SSI, however, are uniquely im-
portant, not only because of their huge volume of disbursements and
recipients, but also because of the heavy administrative burden this
volume places on the SSA. The Appeals Council, as stated earlier, is
particularly burdened by this volume.
Federal disability law is as complex as it is important.20 Part of this
complexity results from the piecemeal fashion in which legislation for
these two programs was enacted. 21 Although the Social Security Act
was passed in 1935,22 it was not until 1956 that Congress made support
available to workers disabled prior to retirement age. 23 By 1958, bene-
fits were extended to the dependents of disabled workers.24 In 1960,
the previous age restriction, limiting benefits to disabled workers over
16. Private insurance carriers offer an array of individual or group disability insurance poli-
cies. These vary widely in their terms, cost, and coverage. C. SOULE, DISABILITY INCOME INSUR-
ANCE: THE UNIQUE RISK passim (1984); D. Swansburg, supra note 13, at 30-37.
17. Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (The Black Lung
Benefits Act), 30 U.S.C. §§ 901 to 945 (1982), provides federal benefits to coal miners who
become totally disabled by pneumoconiosis, or "black lung" disease, as a result of inhaling coal
dust in mines. The program was originally administered by the SSA, but has been transferred to
the Department of Labor, effective with applications filed in 1973. F. BLOCH, supra note 13, at
499-589.
18. The Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, 45 U.S.C. § 231 (1982), established a federal
pension program for retired and disabled railroad employees. The Railroad Retirement Board
administers the program. F. BLOCH, supra note 13, at 19-25; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1401 to .1413
(1986).
19. Prior to January 1, 1984, federal employees were exempt from most of the RSDHI
program but were eligible for disability benefits under the Civil Service retirement program.
Newer employees are now included in SSA programs. F. BLOCH, supra note 13, at 427-96.
20. Berkowitz, The American Disability System in Historical Perspective, in DISABILITY
POLICIES AND GOVERNMENTAL PROGRAMS 21 (E. Berkowitz ed. 1979).
21. Liebman, The Definition of Disability in Social Security and Supplemental Security In-
come: Drawing the Bounds of Social Welfare Estates, 89 HARV. L. REV. 833 (1976). Liebman
identifies three costs of the disjointed political process that has generated disability law: it is
difficult for the public to comprehend the system and its fair application; de facto delegation of
authority from Congress to diverse judicial and administrative bodies leads to inconsistent re-
sults; and complex compartmentalized programs lead to rigidity in the system, with resistance to
comprehensive evaluation and change. Id. at 834.
22. See Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 301 to 1397f (1982)).
23. See Social Security Amendments of 1956, ch. 836, 70 Stat. 807, 815-24. The 1954
amendments had provided a freeze for a disabled worker's earnings record, ensuring that the
worker's ordinary retirement pension would no longer be reduced due to having paid little or no
FICA tax during a period of disability. Social Security Amendments of 1954, ch. 1206, 68 Stat.
1052, 1080. "FICA" stands for Federal Insurance Contributions Act. I.R.C. ch. 21 (1986).
24. See Social Security Amendments of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-840, 72 Stat. 101; F. BLOCH,
supra note 13, at 8-9.
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age fifty, was repealed.2 5 In 1974, the current SSI program was estab-
lished, superseding prior state-run welfare and disability programs
partially funded by the federal government. 26 Other significant legisla-
tive modifications in the disability programs occurred in 1977,27
1980,2 1984,29 and 1986.30 Minor adjustments have been made almost
annually, and the SSA issues new regulations or internal instructions
with great frequency."
1. Financial Eligibility
Currently RSDHI and SSI have two eligibility requirements: one fi-
nancial and one medical.12 A claimant must satisfy both to be eligible
for benefits under either program.3 As elaborated below, however,
the medical criteria for the programs are identical.14 Additionally, al-
though the financial eligibility tests of the two programs are very dif-
ferent, a claimant may satisfy both programs' definitions. Therefore,
a disabled person may be eligible for RSDHI, SSI, or both. 5
a. Financial Eligibility-RSDHI
The RSDHI program is essentially an insurance plan. A person ob-
tains coverage by working in employment "covered" by the SSA.
25. See Social Security Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-778, §§ 401(a), 402(a), 403(b),
74 Stat. 924, 967, 969.
26. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 to 1383c (1982).
27. Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, §§ 101, 201, 331, 91 Stat.
1509, 1510, 1514, 1541. The 1977 amendments raised payroll taxes and reduced benefit levels to
protect the financial integrity of the RSDHI disability trust fund. W. ACHENBAUM, Social Secu-
rity: Visions and Revisions 67-68 (1986).
28. Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-265, § 304, 94 Stat.
441, 453. The 1980 amendments provided for a more frequent and searching review of approved
claims, improved work incentives, and limitations on benefit levels. See id.
29. Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-460, 98 Stat.
1794. The 1984 Act modified many disability provisions, including those regarding assessment of
medical improvements in continuing disability review cases, assessment of pain, consideration of
multiple impairments, and evaluation of mental impairments. Sweeney, New Disability Legisla-
tion Enacted, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 819 (1984).
30. The Employment Opportunities for Disabled Americans Act, Pub. L. No. 99-643, 100
Stat. 3574 (1986), made permanent what had been experimental SSI provisions for continuing
benefits (and Medicaid eligibility) for people who engage in substantial gainful activity. It also
continued Medicaid for people whose earnings caused their income to exceed the financial eligi-
bility criteria for SSI, provided they had not medically recovered from the disabling conditions.
31. See, e.g., [Regulations volume] Social Sec. Report Serv. (W) (1983) (containing nearly
1500 pages of regulations). "Frequent" issuance of regulations, of course, does not necessarily
equate with "timely" issuance. In a number of instances, the SSA has been very slow to promul-
gate regulations regarding emerging areas of law.
32. LEGAL COUNSEL FOR THE ELDERLY, DISABILITY PRACTICE MANUAL FOR SOCIAL SECURITY
AND SSI PROGRAMS 1 (1983) [hereinafter PRACTICE MANUAL].
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See id.
19901
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Premiums, in the form of FICA taxes,3 6 are automatically deducted
from the worker's payroll check and are matched by the employer." If
a worker earns a sufficient amount in wages3 8 in a given quarter of a
calendar year, the worker is deemed to have paid enough premiums to
earn a "quarter of coverage" for purposes of calculating RSDHI eli-
gibility.3 9
Financial eligibility for RSDHI disability benefits requires that the
worker earn a sufficient number of quarters of coverage and that the
quarters of coverage be relatively "recent" with respect to the onset
of the disabling impairment.40 For most claimants, these standards re-
quire forty quarters (ten years) of work in covered employment at any
time during the worker's life, twenty of which must be earned within
the forty-quarter period immediately prior to disability.4 1
Thus, RSDHI disability coverage lapses if a worker voluntarily
leaves covered employment for a significant time before the onset of a
disabling impairment. If the impairment is determined to have become
disabling prior to a lapse in coverage, the claimant will be eligible to
36. I.R.C. ch. 21 (1986). Self-employed workers are also embraced by RSDHI, although the
procedures for remitting the taxes are different. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1065 to .1096 (1986). Monies
received from these premiums are pooled into four independent trust funds (one for disability, a
second for the retirement and survivors account, a third for hospital insurance, and a fourth,
somewhat different account for supplementary medical insurance) from which benefits are paid.
37. As of 1987, Social Security covered 125 million workers in the United States, which
accounted for 95% of the entire labor force. 1987 SSA REPORT TO THE CoNGREss, supra note 11,
at Introduction.
38. RSDHI coverage is earned by working, not by paying the FICA tax, so even if the tax is
erroneously not withheld, the worker may still accumulate quarters of coverage. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1001 to .1096 (1986). The amount of earnings necessary to qualify for a quarter of cover-
age is adjusted annually by an automatic statutory index. Id. § 404.143(a)(2). In 1987, earning at
least $460 in covered employment during one calendar quarter of the year would qualify a
worker for one quarter of coverage. 52 Fed. Reg. 8247 (Mar. 17, 1987) (to be codified at 20
C.F.R. Appendix to Subpart B). In 1986, the required minimum was $440. U.S. Dep't of Health
and Human Services, Press Release (Oct. 23, 1986).
A worker earns one quarter of coverage (up to a maximum of four quarters per year) for each
multiple of the basic amount earned, even if all the work and all the income occurred in only one
quarter. 20 C.F.R. § 404.143(a) (1986). Thus, a worker who earned at least $1840 (4 x $460) at
any time during 1987 would be credited with four quarters of coverage for the year.
39. Regulations for calculating quarters of coverage are located at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.140 to
.146 (1986).
40. Earning a sufficient number of quarters of coverage results in obtaining what the SSA
calls "fully insured status," a threshold of eligibility for any RSDHI program. Id. §§ 404.110 to
.115. Earning sufficient recent quarters of coverage results in "disability insured status"; this is
the special test for the disability portion of RSDHI. Id. §§ 404.130 to .133.
41. Special rules apply to younger workers who may not have had a full opportunity to
accumulate an adequate number of quarters of coverage prior to becoming disabled. These spe-
cial rules generally require the claimant to have earned quarters of coverage equivalent to one-
half the number of quarters between age 21 and the time of disability, with a minimum of six
quarters of coverage. Id. §§ 404.110(b)(2), 404.130(c).
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receive permanent monthly disability checks.4 2 If the disability occurs
after coverage expires, no RSDHI disability benefits will be granted.4 3
b. Financial Eligibility-SSI
In contrast to RSDHI, SSI is a means-based welfare program, not
an insurance program. Therefore, no "quarters of coverage" calcula-
tion is necessary, and the claimant need not ever have worked." In-
stead, the focus of the SSI financial eligibility inquiry is on the
claimant's level of need, considering both income and resources.4 1
For SSI purposes, income is defined broadly to include earned as
well as unearned income and "in kind" support such as subsidized
room or board.4 6 Certain exclusions, however, are allowed.4 7 For ex-
ample, a flat amount for work-related expenses and a percentage of
other receipts can be deducted.48 The SSI "resource test" is a ceiling
on the value of assets that a person may own without losing eligibility.
Again, certain items are excluded (for example, a car or a residence), 49
but the maximum allowance, after exclusions, is low: $1800 for an
individual or $2700 for a couple as of 1987.50
42. RSDHI disability benefits are not really permanent. For example, subject to certain
exceptions, if a claimant's impairment diminishes, allowing resumption of work, disability bene-
fits will be terminated. Pub. L. No. 98-460, § 2(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (1982) (amending 42 U.S.C.
§ 223(f)); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1588 to .1598 (1986). Various rehabilitation incentives-including a
provision for a "trial work period" allowing a disability benefits recipient the opportunity to
attempt re-entry into the work force without losing benefits-support the process of recovery. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1592, .2101 to .2127; 416.992, .2201 to .2227 (1986); see also DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERV. COMM'N ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN, REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE EvAL-
UATION OF PAIN 19-21 (1986) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN];
Rocklin & Mattson, The Employment Opportunities for Disabled Americans Act: Legislative
History and Summary of Provisions, 50 Soc. SECURITY BULL. 25 (Mar. 1987) (describing the
section 1619 provisions through which Pub. L. No. 99-643 (1986), extended programs designed
to support employment attempts of SSI disability recipients, by providing special SSI payments
and Medicaid coverage).
Moreover, at age 65, a Title II disability recipient is automatically transferred from the "disa-
bility" portion of RSDHI to the "retirement" account. 20 C.F.R. § 404.316(b)(2) (1986).
A claimant may also be awarded a "closed period of disability," which is a determination that
the claimant is entitled to benefits for a period of time but is no longer disabled. Benefits are
then payable for those months in which the claimant was under a disability. Id. §§ 404.320 to
.322, 416.992a.
43. However, under these circumstances, the worker may be eligible for retirement or survi-
vors coverage.
44. SSI is financed out of general federal tax revenues, not out of the RSDHI trust funds.
45. PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 32, at 5.
46. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1102 (1986).
47. Id. § 416.1103.
48. Id. §§ 416.1100 to .1112.
49. §§ 416.1201 to .1266.
50. 50 Fed. Reg. 38,982 (1985) (codified at 20 C.F.R. § 416.1205 (1986)).
1990]
210 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:199
2. Medical Eligibility-RSDHI and SSI
Although the programs use different tests for financial eligibility,
they employ the same standard of medical eligibility5 and virtually
identical statutory definitions of "disability": "inability to engage in
any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determina-
ble physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than [twelve] months." 52
The mechanism for assessing a claim against this standard is the
SSA's "sequential evaluation process,"" a multi-step inquiry into sev-
eral key variables.14
Step 1: Substantial Gainful Activity
The first inquiry is whether the claimant is engaged in "substantial
gainful activity." "Substantial" activity is that which involves signifi-
cant physical or mental duties, 5 and "gainful" activity embraces all
work ordinarily done for pay or profit.5 6 Earnings in excess of a cer-
tain amount are presumed to indicate substantial gainful activity, and
51. The regulations governing RSDHI medical assessment, 20C.F.R. §§ 404.1501 to .1599
(1986), are substantially identical to the corresponding sections for SSI. See id. §§ 416.901 to
.998.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1982) ("inability to enage in"); cf. id. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) ("un-
able to engage in").
The Act also specifies that an individual:
shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment
or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work
but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other
kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of
whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific
job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.
Id. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c (a)(3)(B).
53. By regulation, the sequential evaluation process has governed disability adjudications
since 1979. See 44 Fed. Reg. 18,170-71 (1979) (codified at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404(P), 416(I)). It is
incorporated into SSA publications and into decisional documents sent to claimants.
54. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (1986). If at any stage of the sequential evaluation, it is
determined that the claimant is or is not disabled, the evaluation proceeds no further. PRACTICE
MANUAL, supra note 32, at 7. Two special disability categories do not fit neatly into the sequen-
tial evaluation process but may be important to a particular claimant. One grants benefits to a
claimant who has only a marginal education and work experience of 35 years or more doing
arduous physical labor, and who is no longer able to perform that type of work due to a severe
impairment. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1562, 416.962 (1986). The other special category grants benefits to
a claimant who is of advanced age, has a limited education, and has no work experience. S.S.R.
82-63 (1982). For an illustration of the SSA's "seqential evaluation process, see Chart 1, infra
page 320.
55. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1572(a), 416.972(a) (1986).
56. Id. §§ 404.1572(b), 416.972(b).
1990] APPEALS COUNCIL
preclude eligibility. 7 However, even if the claimant is paid less than
this amount and is working only on a part-time basis with reduced
responsibilities, the performance of such work may indicate a latent
ability to perform substantial gainful activity, unless the work has tri-
fling importance or requires unusual supervision or support. 8
Step 2: Severity
The next inquiry is whether the claimant's impairment is "se-
vere"-i.e, whether it significantly limits the claimant's physical or
mental ability to engage in basic work activities, 9 and satisfies the
statutory twelve-month duration requirement. 60 This particular step in
the sequential evaluation has caused much turmoil. Several circuit
courts had invalidated the "severity" test, finding either that it was
facially inconsistent with the Social Security Act or that the SSA had
regularly misapplied it by transforming a de minimis preliminary
screening process into a much more powerful barrier justifying per-
emptory denials of large numbers of substantial cases. 61
The Supreme Court recently upheld the logic of the "severity" step,
finding it consistent with the enabling statute, allowing the SSA to
pose some sort of threshold screening test. 62 However, the Court did
57. Id. §§ 404.1574(b)(2)(vi), 416.974(b)(2)(vi). Different monetary cutoff levels are appli-
cable to blind persons, who are not presumed to be engaged in substantial gainful activity until
their earnings rise to a significantly higher level. Id. § 404.1584(d). Different rules are also appli-
cable to self-employed persons. Id. §§ 404.1575, 416.975.
58. See id. §§ 404.1571, 416.971. Activities such as taking care of oneself, pursuing seden-
tary hobbies, etc., do not ordinarily constitute substantial gainful activity. See id. §§
404.1572(c), 416.972(c).
Under the section 1619 program of Pub. L. No. 99-643 (1986), 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (1982), the
question of substantial gainful activity will remain relevant at the initial application level of an
SSI claim, but will not be used in SSI continuing disability review cases.
59. "Basic work activities" include walking, standing, seeing, hearing, understanding, us-
ing judgment, responding appropriately to co-workers, etc. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521, 416.921
(1986). The severity regulation provides:
If you do not have any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly
limits your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, we will find that you
do not have a severe impairment and are, therefore, not disabled. We will not consider
your age, education, and work experience.
Id. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c).
60. Id. §§ 404.1509, 416.909. The duration requirement is not really a part of any single
step of the sequential analysis. The claim must be assessed for duration at all stages, but discus-
sion of it fits most logically into this segment of the analysis. See S.S.R. 82-52 (1982).
61. "[AIII 11 Regional Federal Courts of Appeals have either enjoined the Secretary's use
of the step 2 [severity] regulation or imposed a narrowing construction upon it." Bowen v.
Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 156 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see, e.g., Baeder v. Heckler, 768
F.2d 547 (3rd Cir. 1985); McDonald v. Heckler, 624 F. Supp. 375 (D.Mass. 1986); McDonald v.
Heckler, 629 F. Supp. 1138 (1986), aff'd in part, vacated in part, and remanded sub. nom.
McDonald v. Secretary of HHS, 795 F.2d 1118 (1st Cir. 1986); Pratt v. Heckler, 629 F. Supp.
1496 (D.D.C. 1985).
62. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 154.
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not reach the question of whether the severity step, as applied in prac-
tice by the SSA, was a valid exercise. 63 In the interim, the SSA has
issued a Social Security Ruling on severity, again defining it as a bar
to only the weakest cases. 64
Step 3: Listings
The next step in the sequential evaluation is to determine whether
the claimant's impairment meets or equals one or more of the pre-
sumptively disabling medical conditions defined in the regulations'
"Listing of Impairments. ' ' 6s If the claimant's abnormalities, singly or
together, meet or equal" a listed criterion, benefits will be awarded
without further inquiry into the impairment's effects upon the clai-
mant's life.67
The listings contain more than 100 precisely defined medical condi-
tions, organized by thirteen body systems (e.g., musculoskeletal, car-
diovascular, neurological). 68 Each listing specifies the impairment and
the tests required to diagnose its presence and severity. 69 Approxi-
63. Id. at 154 n.12. The concurrence (Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Stevens) noted
that statistics tended to support the allegation that the severity step had been molded into a
substantial barrier. Id. at 157. Prior to the current severity regulation, only 8% of disability
claims had been denied as nonsevere; later, 40076 were eliminated at that stage. Id. After circuit
courts began invalidating the regulation, the nationwide rate of "nonsevere" denials fell to 25%.
Id. Three dissenters, led by Justice Blackmun, agreed with Justice O'Connor that the validity of
the severity step as applied remains problematic. Id. at 179.
64. S.S.R. 85-28 (1985) states in part:
An impairment or combination of impairments is found "not severe" and a finding of
"not disabled" is made at this step when medical evidence establishes only a slight
abnormality or a combination of slight abnormalities which would have no more than
a minimal effect on an individual's ability to work even if the individual's age, educa-
tion, or work experience were specifically considered (i.e., the person's impairment(s)
has no more than a minimal effect on his or her physical or mental ability(ies) to
perform basic work activities).
Id. at 22.
65. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1525, 416.925 (1986); id. § 404 subpart P, app. 1.
66. Id. §§ 404.1526, 416.926. The "equals" option applies to impairments (or combinations
of impairments) which are not listed, but which are "medically equivalent" to a listing and
impinge upon the ability to perform basic work activities in a manner equivalent to a listed
impairment. In recent years only 8% to 9076 of disability awards have been based on "equaling"
a listing. In 1976 this standard was responsible for over 45% of the awards. HousE COMM. ON
WAYS AND MEANS, 100TH CONG., 1ST SEss. BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS
WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 36 (Comm. Print 1987)
[hereinafter 1987 BACKGROUND MATERIAL].
67. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d) (1986).
68. See id. § 404 subpart P, app. 1. A separate set of listings exists for the evaluation of
impairments of persons under the age of 18, where the progression or effects of the disease may
be different from those for adults. Id. §§ 404.1525(b)(2), 416.925(b)(2).
69. See id. § 404 subpart P, app. 1. For example, the first listed impairment, rheumatoid
arthritis, is defined as follows:
1.02 Active rheumatoid arthritis and other inflammatory arthritis.
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mately three-quarters of disability awards are based on these listings.10
Step 4: Past Relevant Work
If the claimant's condition does not meet or equal a listing,7 the
next question in the sequential evaluation is whether the previous em-
ployment performed by the claimant could be resumed despite the
claimant's impairments.72 If resuming the former job is possible, the
claim will be denied. 73
With both A and B.
A. History of persistent joint pain, swelling, and tenderness involving multiple ma-
jor joints (see 1.00D) and with signs of joint inflammation (swelling and tender-
ness) on current physical examination despite prescribed therapy for at least
three months, resulting in significant restriction of function of the affected
joints, and clinical activity expected to last for at least twelve months; and
B. Corroboration of diagnosis at some point in time by either.
1. Positive serologic test for rheumatoid factor; or
2. Antinuclear antibodies; or
3. Elevated sedimentation rate; or
4. Characteristic histologic changes in biopsy of synovial membrane or subcu-
taneous nodule (obtained independent of Social Security disability evalua-
tion).
Id. part 404 subpart P, app. 1, part A, § 1.02.
70. The irregularity in basis for disability awards is suggested by the following chart:
Basis for disability
Allowance: 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1986
Meets listing 70076 52076 39% 29% 62% 6770
Equals listing 200o 32% 43076 4507o 14% 900
Vocational factors 10% 1606 18% 2606 24% 247o
D. STONE, supra note 12, at 226; SOCIAL SECURITY DisABrLITY INSURANCE PROGRAM: Hearing
Before the Comm. on Finance, U.S. Sen., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 111 (Aug. 18, 1982). 1987 BACK-
GROUND MATERIAL, supra note 66, at 36.
71. Widows, widowers and surviving divorced spouses claiming RSDHI disability benefits
based upon the work record of a deceased spouse are eligible for disability benefits only based
on the listings. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1577, .1578 (1986). These claimants do not traverse the same
sequential evaluation process as others, and are not evaluated within the context of the voca-
tional factors of the "grids." See id. Similarly, children under age 18 claiming SSI disability
benefits are eligible only based on the listings. Id. § 416.924.
Allegations have been made that the SSA and Disability Determination Services (DDS's) have
systematically circumvented the legal standards of the sequential evaluation process by effec-
tively terminating the analysis after step three. See City of New York v. Heckler, 578 F. Supp.
1109 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'dsub nom. Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467 (1986). Claim-
ants-especially those alleging mental impairments-who did not win benefits at the listings
stage were sometimes categorically denied, without individualized examination of vocational fac-
tors. Id.
72. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e) (1986).
73. Id. In investigating the possibility of a claimant returning to past relevant work, the
SSA looks at work that (a) constituted substantial gainful activity, (b) lasted long enough for the
claimant to learn the job, and (c) was performed within the past 15 years. Id. §§ 404.1565(a),
416.965(a); S.S.R. 82-61 (1982); see also Lauer v. Bowen, 818 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1987). It is
assumed that gradual changes may occur in the standards and requirements of most jobs, so
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Step 5: Grids
If a claimant cannot resume the former job, the next inquiry is
whether the claimant can perform other substantial gainful activity
despite all impairments. 74 The primary mechanism for this assessment
is the "Medical-Vocational Guidelines" or "grids, ' 75 a series of
charts designed to consider four key variables affecting ability to
work. These variables are: (a) "residual functional capacity," a meas-
ure of how much basic work activity (standing, walking, lifting, carry-
ing, etc.) the claimant can still do; 76 (b) age; 77 (c) education; 7 and (d)
previous work experience and transferability of acquired skills. 79
Each variable is reduced to a few categories. For example, residual
functional capacity is clustered as "sedentary," "light," or "me-
dium," depending upon the level of exertional capability. 0 The grids
combine all the variables into eighty-two "rules," each deemed "disa-
bled" or "not disabled."'" If a claimant's medical-vocational coordi-
previous work experience gained in the distant past is no longer considered vocationally relevant.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1565(a), 416.965(a) (1986).
"Past relevant work" is not confined to the demands of the job as it was actually performed
by the claimant. Rather, the SSA directs its inquiry into the functional demands and job duties
of the occupations as they are generally required by all employers throughout the national econ-
omy. S.S.R. 82-61 (1982).
74. PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 32, at 22.
75. 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, app. 2 (1986). Unlike the listings, which assess the
claimant based on "medical" criteria alone, the grids also incorporate the principal "voca-
tional" factors. In so doing, the grids take "administrative notice" of the existence of jobs in
the national economy that could be performed by a person of defined vocational characteristics.
This notice procedure replaces the pre-1978 reliance upon the testimony of vocational experts,
and obviates the necessity of identifying the specific job categories that each individual claimant
could satisfy. See id. Use of the grids for this purpose was endorsed by the Supreme Court.
Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983). See generally Capowski, Accuracy and Consistency in
Categorical Decision-Making: A Study of Social Security's Medical- Vocations Guidelines-Two
Birds With One Stone or Pigeon-Holing Claimants?, 42 MD. L. REv. 329 (1983) (analyzing ef-
fectiveness of grids in promoting sound decisions).
76. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945 (1986).
77. Id. §§ 404.1563, 416.963. The age categories are: approaching retirement age (60-64),
advanced age (55-60), closely approaching advanced age (50-54), and younger (18-49). The cate-
gories are not to be applied mechanically in a borderline situation. See id.
78. Id. §§ 404.1564, 416.964. The education categories are: unable to communicate in Eng-
lish, illiterate, marginal (completed sixth grade or less), limited (completed 7th- Ilth grade), high
school and above. See id.
79. Id. §§ 404.1568, 416.968. The categories for previous work experience are: unskilled,
semi-skilled, and skilled. Skills may be categorized as transferable or nontransferable. See id.
80. Id. §§ 404.1567, 416.967. Residual functional capacity may also be classified as capable
of heavy or very heavy work, but these categories are not used on the grids. See id.
81. Id. part 404, subpart P, app. 2, tables 1-3. For example, a person (a) with the residual
functional capacity for light work, (b) closely approaching advanced age, (c) of limited or less
education, and (d) who is skilled or semi-skilled with skills not transferable, would be found
"not disabled" under Rule 202.11 of subpart P. If the person is of advanced age, however, with
all the other variables unchanged, a finding of "disabled" would be made under Rule 202.02 of
subpart P. Id.
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nates fall squarely on a grid rule, then that outcome determines the
case.1
2
Step 6: Off The Grids3
Some claimants do not fall squarely onto the grids, either because
no combination of rules precisely describes their situation, or because
the alleged impairment is "non-exertional." 4 In such cases, the grids
are merely advisory. 5 The claim procedure then turns on the presence
or absence of a substantial number of job categories that the claimant
could perform.16 This final step in the sequential evaluation process
thus recapitulates the disability inquiry in toto: Considering all of a
person's medical and vocational limitations, could the person perform
job functions in a competitive economy?
3. Standards of Proof
The burden of proving eligibility for disability benefits generally
rests with the claimant.87 Social Security regulations recognize three
categories of medical evidence: signs, symptoms and laboratory find-
ings. 8 "Signs" are anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnor-
malities observable by trained professionals using medically
acceptable clinical diagnostic techniques.8 9 "Symptoms" are the clai-
82. Id. §§ 404.1569, 416.969.
83. The regulations do not identify this as a separate step in the sequential evaluation pro-
cess, considering it to be simply a variation of step 5 and the focus on the medical-vocational
grids. However, because the substantive standards and the procedures of evaluation are signifi-
cantly different when the case is not evaluated within the strength limitations context of the
grids, it seems more compelling to denominate a sixth step in the analysis. Compare Capowski,
supra note 75, at 359 (describing the provisions regarding nonexertional impairments as an "es-
cape clause" from the grids).
84. 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, app. 2, § 200.00(h) (1986); S.S.R. 83-12 (1983). The
claim of an individual who was unable to perform the "full range" of work would not be de-
cided directly by the grids. S.S.R. 83-12 (1983).
85. 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, app. 2, § 200.00 (1986).
86. Id. §§ 404.1561, 416.961. The test of ability to work is whether a significant number of
jobs exist in the national economy (not necessarily in the claimant's region) that the claimant
would be able to perform. Id. §§ 404.1566, 416.966.
87. Id. §§ 404.1512, 416.912. Courts have shifted the burden of coming forward with the
evidence from the claimant to the SSA at step 5 of the sequential evaluation process because the
government is more knowledgeable than individual claimants about the job categories and de-
mands in the national economy. E.g., Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987); Torres v.
Schweiker, 682 F.2d 109 (3rd Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 (1983); Tennant v. Schwei-
ker, 682 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1982). This burden shifting is not mentioned in the regulations, but is
"consistent with SSA policy and practice." Assoc. Comm'r Frank Smith, Memorandum on Cir-
cuit Court Case Study 7 (June 17, 1986). The original decision creating the shift was Kerner v.
Flemming, 283 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1960).
88. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1528, 416.928 (1986). Regulations also specify the acceptable sources
and preferred contents of medical evidence. Id. §§ 404.1513, 416.913.
89. Id. §§ 404.1528, 416.928.
216 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITYLAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:199
mant's own descriptions of physical or mental impairments. 9° "Labo-
ratory findings" are the results of x-rays, blood tests, and other
medically recognized tests.9 '
The SSA must consider all of these categories in making a disability
determination. 92 The most compelling evidentiary category, however,
is that of "objective" reproducible tests and findings. 93 The regula-
tions specify that without professional corroboration, symptoms alone
are insufficient to prove the existence of an impairment. 94 Similarly,
conclusory statements from a medical examiner, such as a claimant's
doctor's writing that the claimant "is unable to work," will not carry
much weight unless buttressed by additional evidence explaining the
conclusion.95
The definition of disability embodied in the Social Security Act and
its regulations is extremely strict. 9 Unlike many other disability pro-
grams, the Social Security Administration Act is designed to redress
only the most catastrophic medical losses-those associated with near-
total and near-permanent inability to work. Individuals who readily
meet the medical criteria of other types of disability programs are fre-
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. §§ 404.1512, 416.912.
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5) (1982) and Pub, L. No. 98-460, § 3(a)(1)-(2); see also Note,
Proving Disabling Pain in Social Security Disability Proceedings: The Social Security Adminis-
tration and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, 22 Duo. L. REV. 491, 505-06 (1984); Goldham-
mer & Bloom, Recent Changes in the Assessment of Pain in Disability Claims before the Social
Security Administration, 35 ADMIN. L. REv. 451 passim (1983); D. STONE, supra note 12, at 79
(concluding that insistence upon objective criteria evidencing disability served to enhance the
strictness of the eligibility criteria and the restraints upon program growth). However, the SSA's
preference for objective evidence does not authorize it to overlook testimony from a claimant or
others regarding subjective conditions such as pain. See Avery v. Secretary of HHS, 797 F.2d 19
(1st Cir. 1986); Foster v. Heckler 780 F.2d 1125 (4th Cir. 1986); Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d
1320 (8th Cir. 1984) and 751 F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1984).
94. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1528(a), ,1529; 416.928(a), .929 (1986).
95. Id. §§ 404.1527, 416.927; Weinstein, Equality and the Law: Social Security Disability
Cases in the Federal Courts, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 897, 931 (1984). The opinion of a treating
physician, who has observed the claimant repeatedly over time, is ordinarily entitled to greater
weight than the opinion of a consultative physician, who may have seen the claimant only once.
Aubeuf v. Schweiker, 649 F,2d 107, 112 (2d Cir. 1981); Davis v. Califano, 599 F.2d 1324 (5th
Cir. 1979); Hephner v. Matthews, 574 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1978), Nevertheless, it is the logic and
the supporting evidence of the physician, rather than a conclusory opinion, that is compelling.
S.S.R. 82-48c (Cum. Ed. 1986); see also Schisler v, Heckler, 787 F,2d 76 (2d Cir. 1986); Stieber-
ger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1343-50 (S.D. N.Y. 1985), vacated 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986).
96. NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, COMM. ON PAIN, DISABIITY,
AND CHRONIC ILLNESS BEHAVIOR, PAIN AND DISABILITY: CLINICAL, BEHAVIORAL, AND PUBLIC POL-
ICY PERSPECTIVES 22-23, 33 (1987) [hereinafter INSTITUTE1 Of MEDICINE]. Heaney, Why the High
Rate of Reversals in Social Security Disability Cases?, 7 HAMLINE L. REV. 1, 4 (1984).
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quently denied by the SSA 97 and must be extremely sick or injured to
qualify for disability benefits under RSDHI or SSI.
4. Benefit Levels
RSDHI monthly disability benefits are calculated using a complex
formula. The claimant's prior annual average earnings in covered em-
ployment are adjusted for inflation by comparison to the national av-
erage wage level for the corresponding years. 98 In 1988, the average
RSDHI benefit paid to a disabled worker was $491 per month; the
average for a disabled worker with dependents was $905 per month,99
In general, consistent with the insurance plan nature of RSDHI, the
higher the claimant's prior covered earnings, the higher the payments
the claimant receives. An SSI monthly disability check is designed to
bring the claimant's income up to the established federal support
level. 100
5. Other Benefits
A disabled worker's spouse, children, divorced spouse, or survivors
may also be eligible for certain types of RSDHI assistance, regardless
of whether they are disabled."°0 SSI benefits are payable to an eligible
individual and spouse only, but in rare cases an eligible person's sti-
pend may be increased if an "essential person" (e.g., one who helps
care for the disabled person) is part of the household. 102 Additionally,
an individual who has been entitled to RSDHI disability benefits for
tweaty-four months is also eligible for Medicare benefits, 03 and an
individual who is entitled to SSI disability benefits is also thereby enti-
tled to Medicaid coverage in most states.'14
97. D. Swansburg, supra note 13, passim; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1504, 416.904 (1988). Part
of the disparity occurs because some of the other programs such as VA and workers' compensa-
tion are authorized to pay benefits for partial and temporary disability, whereas the SSA targets
exclusively those suffering from complete, long-term impairments.
98. 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart C (1986).
99. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 1988 ANNuAL REPORT TO THE CONGREss 18 (1988).
100. The support level benefit amount is reduced by the amount of the claimant's countable
income as determined under 20 C.F.R. part 416, subpart K (1986); id. part 416, subpart D.
Forty-eight states and the District of Columbia voluntarily provide to at least some SSI reci-
pients a small supplementation above this minimum federal level. 1987 SSA REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS, supra note 11, at 2, These supplementations may be "voluntary" or part of a mandg-
tory "pass through" required for state receipt of Medicaid funds. Oklahoma v. Schweiker, 655
F.2d 401 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
101. 20 CF.R. § 404, subpart D (1986).
102. Id. §§ 416.220 to .223.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 426(b)(2)(A)(i) (1982).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 appropriates funds to be distributed to medical assistance plans for
individuals and families meeting certain requirements, including those qualifying for SSI disabil-
ity benefits. Id. § 1396(a)(10)(A)(i).
1990]
218 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 17:199
6. Timing of Benefit Payments
RSDHI benefits differ from SSI benefits in two respects. First, a
statutory waiting period of five calendar months after the onset of
disability applies before the first RSDHI check is issued; 105 SSI pay-
ments can start immediately. 106 Second, RSDHI benefits may apply
retroactively, enabling the claimant to receive benefits for the twelve
months preceding the filing of the application if a prior date of onset
of the disabling impairment is proven; 10 7 SSI eligibility, on the other
hand, does not provide any compensation predating the application
filing date. 108
B. Disability Claims Process
Both RSDHI and SSI applications are handled through the same
claims network. 109 The process involves both federal officials and state
agencies operating under the supervision of the SSA."10
105. Id. § 423(c)(2); 20 C.F.R. § 404.315(d) (1986).
106. 20 C.F.R. § 416.501 (1986). An SSI claimant who is "presumptively eligible" (i.e., who
presents strong evidence of the likelihood of meeting the financial and medical eligibility criteria)
can be awarded up to three months of disability benefits before a final determination of eligibil-
ity is made. Id. §§ 416.931 to .934.
107. Id. § 404.621(a)(1). The number of months of retroactive RSDHI disability benefits is
maximized if the onset of disability is 17 months prior to the date of application. The first five
of these months will then be allocated to the waiting period and 12 months of back benefits will
be payable. An onset date further back in time will not increase beyond 12 the number of
months of retroactive award.
108. Id. §§ 416.340 to .350, .501. A claimant may be eligible for both RSDHI and SSI con-
currently. This could occur, for example, if the individual worked for a sufficiently long time in
Social Security-covered employment to establish RSDHI entitlement, but if the individual's
wages were relatively low, so that current resources and income are beneath the SSI ceilings. A
monthly RSDHI benefit check does count as income for SSI purposes, so unless the individual's
prior earnings (and, hence, monthly RSDHI disability payment) were low, the SSI disability
payment would be low or zero.
109. The SSA provides separate application forms for RSDHI and SSI, and a claimant who
applies for both will receive parallel responses, again on separate forms. The procedures for
investigating and administering the medical aspects of the two programs are identical, however,
and concurrent applications are handled largely in tandem. For samples of the applicable forms
and SSA notices, see PRACTICE MAu.AL, supra note 32, at 51-73.
110. 42 U.S.C. §§ 421(a), 1383(a) (1982); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1503, 416.903 (1988). Prior to
1980, the relationship between the SSA and the state agencies was contractual. In the 1980
amendments, Act of June 9, 1980, Pub. L. no. 96-265, 94 Stat. 441, Congress changed the
relationship to a regulatory one.
The federal part of the claims bureaucracy is organized as follows. The SSA (headed by a
Commissioner) is one of five principal operating units of the Department of Health and Human
Services. The SSA has four deputy commissioners (for Management and Assessment, Policy and
External Affairs, Operations, and Programs). Each of these oversees one or more associate com-
missioners. The network of local SSA district offices is organizationally placed directly under the
Deputy Commissioner for Operations. The Office of Disability Operations is located under the
19901 APPEALS COUNCIL
1. Initial Application
A claimant begins the process by filing an application at one of the
SSA's district or branch offices. "1 ' The district office begins a two-
part initial determination by first investigating the claimant's financial
eligibility for RSDHI, SSI or both." 2 If the claimant is found finan-
cially ineligible, a notice of denial is mailed.
If the claimant satisfies the applicable financial eligibility tests, the
file is forwarded to another office for the second half of the initial
determination, which pertains to medical eligibility. This office is part
of a state government agency (usually within the state's vocational re-
habilitation service) operating as a federally funded Disability Deter-
mination Service (DDS) under the SSA's regulation." 3 The DDS
develops the medical file by soliciting records and other documents
from the claimant's physicians, hospitals, clinics, etc." 4 The DDS may
also obtain additional medical assessments by ordering a "consulta-
tive examination," in which a physician under contract with the DDS
performs specified tests or measurements." 5 A two-person team com-
posed of a medical consultant and a disability examiner makes the
DDS decision regarding medical eligibility."16 The process consumes,
Deputy Commissioner for Operations and the Associate Commissioner for Central Operations.
The corps of Administrative Law Judges (ALJ's), the Appeals Council, and the Office of Ap-
peals Operations are all located under the Deputy Commissioner for Programs and the Associate
Commissioner for Hearings and Appeals. See Chart 2, infra page 321.
Ill. 20C.F.R. §§ 404.611, 416.325 (1986).
112. Id. §§ 404.902 to .905, 416.1402 to .1405 (1988). For RSDHI claims, the local district
office obtains a copy of the wage earner's earnings record (showing all SSA-covered income and
quarters of coverage) from the SSA's Office of Operational Policy and Procedures. For SSI
cases, the Office of Central Operations and the local district office investigate the claimant's
income and resources.
113. Id. part 404, subpart Q; part 416, subpart J. The 1980 amendments made it possible for
the SSA to replace the DDS in a particular state, and perform the medical evaluation itself,
where the DDS fails to conform to SSA standards. 42 U.S.C. § 421(b) (1982).
114. The DDS may pay reproduction costs for obtaining these records. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1514, 416.914 (1988). If the DDS is not as vigorous as it should be in collecting medical
records, the shortage of such documentation usually disadvantages the claimant, who bears the
burden of proof of disability. See id. §§ 404.705, 1516, 416.916; Weinstein, supra note 95, at
931.
Apprehensions about the adequacy of DDS workups of the medical file have been exacerbated
recently as SSA budget cuts have reverberated in reduced DDS staffing and services. See letter
from Reps. Rostenkowski, Pickle & Jacobs to SSA Comm'r Hardy (Feb. 3, 1987).
115. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1517 to .1518, 416.917 to .918 (1986). The quality and sufficiency of
typical DDS consultative examinations have become controversial issues. See COMM. ON GOV'T
OPERATIONS, CONSULTATIVE EXAMINATIONS INVESTIGATION, H.R. REP. No. 981, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. passim (1986); F. BLOCH, supra note 13, at 234, 273-76; D. STONE, supra note 12, at 121-
24. A claimant's failure to cooperate with a consultative examiner is grounds for denial of the
claim. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1518, 416.918 (1988).
116. These officials conduct a paper review only; they do not meet with the claimant. The
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from application to notification, approximately eighty days." 7 Ap-
proximately 1.5 million initial determinations in disability cases are
made each year; forty percent are granted." 8 If the decision is not
"fully favorable," the claimant has sixty days to appeal. 19
An initial determination is also made when benefits are periodically
reviewed. These "Continuing Disability Reviews" (CDRs) are under-
taken to assess possible improvement in the claimant's condition and
to remove from the disability rolls people who are no longer eligible
for benefits. 20 The CDRs, and the standards and procedures for con-
ducting them, have been controversial in recent years and were sus-
pended from 1984-86, pending the enactment and implementation of
new statutory standards.' 2 '
disability examiner or specialist ordinarily does the bulk of the work on the application. The
medical consultant is a physician employed part-time or full-time by the DDS to evaluate medi-
cal conditions beyond the expertise of the disability examiner and assess the claimant's residual
functional capacity. These two officials may also be assisted by a vocational expert. F. BLOCH,
supra note 13, at 235; see also REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN, supra note
42, at 23.
117. Average DDS processing time for initial RSDHI applications rose from 63 days in Sep-
tember 1985 to 89 days in February 1986, then fell to 80 days in September 1986. Similarly,
average SSI disability case processing time rose from 55 days in September 1985 to 85 days in
February 1986 and declined to 79 days in September 1986. Part of the overall rise is attributed to
the learning process required in implementing the new regulations concerning mental impair-
ments and medical improvements. 1987 SSA REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 11, at 14.
118. 1987 BACKGROUND MATERIAL, supra note 66, at 41.
119. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.909, 416.1409 (1988). In this instance, as with all succeeding time
limits described below, the 60-day period runs from the date of the claimant's receipt of the
decision, and the SSA assumes (until evidence to the contrary is presented) that the claimant
receives the notice five days after it is dated. Id. §§ 404.901, 416.1401. The SSA allows extension
of the time period for good cause. Id. §§ 404.909(b), .911; 416.1409(b), .1411.
120. CDR procedures vary somewhat from the initial sequential evaluation process. They
focus on the extent to which the claimant's condition has improved or been mitigated by new
medical techniques, and whether any improvement affects the claimant's ability to work. Cases
fall into three categories according to the initial likelihood of subsequent medical improvement,
and the frequency of review varies from once every six months to once every seven years. Id. §§
404.1590, .1594; 416.990, .994; see also General Accounting Office, Social Security: Adjusting
Continuing Disability Review Priorities (Oct. 1986) (critiquing the selection of types of cases for
early CDRs); Sweeney, The New 'Medical Improvement' Standard in Social Security and SSI
Disability Cases passim, (Mar. 1986).
121. LEGAL COUNSEL FOR THE ELDERLY, DISABILITY PRACTICE MANUAL FOR SOCIAL SECURITY
AND SSI PROGRAMS 12-34, (Supp. 1987) [hereinafter DISABILITY PRACTICE MANUAL, SUPP. 1987].
The 1980 legislation provided for a review of current beneficiaries, and this process was
greatly accelerated by the Reagan administration. Approximately one million cases were then
reviewed, and almost half of them were terminated, producing huge financial savings for the
SSA. However, over half of those terminations were later. reversed on appeal, and the standards,
the seemingly brusque CDR procedures, the often improper CDR practices, and the prolonged
delays occasioned by the skyrocketing caseloads alienated many people. See, e.g., STAFF REPORT
OF SOCIAL SECURITY SUBCOMM., HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, DISABILITY LEGISLATION
1983: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES (Comm. Print 1983); 1987 BACKGROUND MATERIALS, supra note
66, at 43; D. COFER, supra note 5, at 116; Weaver, Social Security Disability Policy in the 1980's
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Prior to claimant notification, a sample of DDS decisions is sub-
jected to "Quality Assurance Review" by regional and national SSA
appraisers who have authority to reverse state agency determinations
or to remand them for correction.' 2
2. Reconsideration
A dissatisfied claimant may request "reconsideration."' ' 21 Under re-
consideration, the same procedures are followed as in making an ini-
tial determination, but different people within the respective offices
make the assessments. 12 4 For example, if the initial denial was based
and Beyond, in DISABILITY AND THE LABOR MARKET 29 (1986); SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY IN-
SURANCE PROGRAM: Hearing Before the Comm. on Finance, U.S. Sen., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 47-
64 (Aug. 18, 1982); Report from Secretary of HHS Margaret Heckler to the Congress Regarding
Pub. L. No. 96-265, 94 Stat. 441, at 67-72 (Jan. 4, 1985).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 421(c) (1982); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1503(d), 416.903(d) (1988).
The SSA reviews the work of the DDS according to two distinct sampling programs. Under
one, 65076 of all DDS awards are reviewed, prior to effectuation, by regional and national tiers
of SSA officials. In fiscal year (FY) 1986, this amounted to 250,000 decisions, of which only
0.2507o were returned to the DDS for correction or collection of additional evidence. The other
review program selects 5% of all DDS decisions-a total of 83,000 cases in FY 1986, divided
equally among favorable and unfavorable actions-for review by SSA regional offices. The SSA
Central Office then reviews 10,000 of the regional offices' cases to promote consistency across
the nation. Through these reviews, the SSA has concluded that DDS disability decisions were
highly accurate, being correct 96.6% of the time for initial determinations and 95.5% of the time
for reconsideration actions. 1987 SSA REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 11, at 13.
On the other hand, in some instances DDS offices have distorted their accuracy records by
removing erroneous cases from the supposedly random sample of files to be sent to the SSA
quality assurance reviewers and substituting correctly-decided cases. Report of Thomas W.
Hayes, Auditor General, State of California (Feb. 17, 1987).
Historically, the degree of SSA review of DDS decisions has varied substantially. Before 1972,
up to 70% of state disability allowances were routinely reviewed by the SSA prior to effectua-
tion. Later, to save administrative costs, the SSA sampled only 5% of the awards, and only for
post-effectuation analysis. Under the 1980 amendments, Congress required an increasing per-
centage (15% in FY 1981, 350o in FY 1982 and 650 thereafter) of DDS allowances to be re-
viewed by the SSA before payment. SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, S. REP. No. 408, 6th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1283-84 (1979), reprinted in 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADIN. NEWS, 1277, 1290-1312 (1980)
[hereinafter S. REP. No. 408]; D. COFER, supra note 5, at 114; 1987 BACKGROUND MATERIAL,
supra note 66, at 37.
123. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.907 to .922, 416.1407 to .1422 (1986). No reconsideration has taken
place in SSI or concurrent SSI/RSDHI continuing disability cases. An SSI recipient whose bene-
fits were to be cut off would proceed immediately from an adverse initial determination to an
ALJ hearing. Id. §§ 404.907, 416.1407 (1988). This procedure, however, has been altered with
the institution of "disability hearings" at the reconsideration stage in all RSDHI and SSI CDR
cases. See infra note 124.
124. Id. §§ 404.915, 416.1415 (1986). The SSA has promulgated new regulations, implement-
ing a requirement of the 1984 amendments authorizing face-to-face "disability hearings" before
a DDS disability examiner at the reconsideration stage in cases where benefits are being termi-
nated due to a claimant's medical improvement. These disability hearings will address only the
question of the claimant's medical condition; other issues (SSI income level, performance of
substantial gainful activity, etc.) will continue to be handled in the ordinary reconsideration
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on financial eligibility grounds, a new person within the SSA district
office will review the files; if the original determination was based on
a finding of medical ineligibility, a new two-person team at the DDS
will examine that aspect of the case. The claimant may submit addi-
tional evidence at this time, but ordinarily does not appear in person
before the SSA or DDS decisionmakers. 25
Again, the claimant is notified by mail of the decision, and again
accorded sixty days tor appeal. 12 6 Approximately 380,000 reconsidera-
tion decisions were issued in 1986, of which seventeen percent were
favorable. 127 The reconsideration process typically takes a minimum
of two months. 128
3. Administrative Law Judge Hearing
Should the claimant choose to appeal, the next step is a de novo
hearing before a federal administrative law judge (ALJ). 129 This hear-
ing ordinarily affords the claimant the first opportunity to meet face-
to-face with the person who makes a decision on the claim. It is also
the first occasion to take sworn testimony from other witnesses and
typically the first stage at which the claimant obtains legal or other
representation.' 30
The ALJ may order additional consultative examinations before or
after the hearing,'31 call vocational or medical experts to testify,,3 2 and
process. Id. §§ 404.914 to .918, 416.1414 to .1418 (1988); DIs~atuITY PRACTICE MANUAL, SupP.
1987, supra note 121, at 7-11; Memorandum from Eileen Sweeney, Nat'l Senior Citizens Law
Center, to Legal Services Advocates and Members of the Private Bar Representing Social Secu-
rity and SSI Beneficiaries in Cessation Cases (Feb. 5, 1986).
125. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.933, 416.1433 (1986). Pilot projects have provided for face-to-face
meetings between the claimant and decisionmaker at the DDS reconsideration level in new appli-
cations. D. COFER, supra note 5, at 184.
126. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.933, 416.1433 (1986).
127. 1987 BACKGROUND MATERIAL, supra note 66, at 41.
128. The time required for reconsideration is comparable to that for an initial determination
and is subject to the same types of delay.
129. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(b)(1), 1383(c)(1) (1986); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.929 to .965, 416.1429
(1986). These decisionmakers were originally designated as "hearing examiners" until Congress
changed the designation in 1972 in an effort to upgrade the stature and autonomy of the posi-
tion. D. COFER, supra note 5, at 65-66.
130. At the ALJ hearing approximately 6506 of the claimants have legal representation and
1806 have non-attorney representation. 9 Soc. SECURITY F. 7 (Mar. 1987). ALJs are often
charged with a special responsibility to help an unrepresented claimant. See Heckler v. Camp-
bell, 461 U.S. 458, 471 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring).
131. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.929 to .965, 416.1429 to .1465 (1986). The classic description of a
non-adversarial SSA administrative hearing is that the ALJ must "wear three hats," executing
simultaneous responsibility for (1) ensuring that the claimant-especially when appearing pro
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question the claimant and any other witnesses.133 The claimant (or a
representative) may submit additional medical records and a brief, de-
liver opening and closing remarks, and question all witnesses. Hear-
ings are non-adversarial, and the level of formality varies. 3 4 A hearing
is tape recorded and lasts an average of thirty to sixty minutes.'35
The volume of disability cases decided by ALJs has fluctuated
widely in recent years.3 6 The SSA's Office of Hearings and Appeals
has undertaken a number of controversial measures to enhance the
productivity of ALJs. These measures include "reconfiguring" the lo-
cal hearing offices by "pooling" the staff attorneys and hearing assis-
tants who had previously been assigned to specific ALJs, setting
national "targets" for case processing speeds, arranging peer counsel-
ing for low-producing ALJs, and attempting direct job discipline.
Most of these measures have been bitterly resented by ALJs and
se-puts forward the strongest case possible, (2) developing the record fully and critically, and
(3) deciding the case.
132. Id. A vocational expert (VE) appears in approximately 20% of the ALJ hearings, most
often when the issues concern non-exertional impairments or the level and transferability of the
claimant's skills. 9 Soc. SECURITY F. 7 (Mar. 1987). Usage of VE testimony has increased over
the past several years, but is still substantially below the level experienced in the late 1970s, prior
to implementation of the "grid" rules. Id. at 8; see also OHA OPERATIONAL REP. 30 (Sept. 30,
1986).
133. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.944, 416.1444 (1986). No SSA advocate opposes the claimant in the
hearing. An experiment in selected locations, with "government representatives" who would
develop an advocacy position, cross-examine claimants' witnesses, etc., has been terminated. 52
Fed. Reg. 88 (1987) (ending the experiment); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.965, 416.1465 (1986).
134. See J. MASHAW, C. GOETZ, F. GOODMAN, W. SHWARTZ, P. VEaKUM & M. CARROW,
SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS (1987) (a study for the National Center for Adminis-
trative Justice) [hereinafter NAT'L CENTER STUDY]. For a critical description of the ALJ hearing
process, see id. at 64-99.
135. Hearings in which the claimant is unrepresented are typically much shorter (e.g., 20 to
30 minutes); hearings with counsel, and especially with multiple witnesses, may run beyond two
hours. OHA OPERATIONAL REP. 4 (Sept. 30, 1986).
The claimant is often the only witness in the case. However, a spouse, a friend, or an expert
frequently appears as well. In FY 1986, the percentages of involvement in hearings were: claim-
ant involved 97076 of the time; family or friend, 34%; vocational expert, 21%; medical advisor,
10%; translator, 4%; and claimant's physician, 1%. 9 Soc. SECURITY F. 7 (Mar. 1987).
136. Moratoria on CDR cases are responsible for a large part of the recent fluctuation. Data
regarding ALJ hearing workload are as follows:
Fiscal Number Cases Average Average Process
Year of Cases Cases Pending ALJs Disposed Time
(Oct.) Received Disposed (end of) on duty per ALJ (days)
1982 320,680 296,548 152,896 754 34 174
1983 363,533 342,998 173,431 797 37 184
1984 271,809 337,459 107,781 763 37 185
1985 245,090 245,829 107,042 730 29 167
1986 230,655 220,313 117,384 703 27 172
OHA KEY WORKLOAD INDICATORS (July 1987).
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claimants' representatives as official attacks upon ALJs' decisional in-
dependence,.'1 7 an independence guaranteed by the Administrative
Procedures Act.1 38
Approximately three months after the hearing, the claimant will be
notified, by mail of the ALJ's decision and accorded a further sixty-
day appeal opportunity.r3 9 The ALJ stage, from the time of request
for a hearing through the date of a decision, typically takes six to
seven months. ,40
4. Appeals Council
A claim denied at the ALJ stage may be appealed to the SSA Ap-
peals Council. The Appeals Council is described in detail in the suc-
ceeding subsection.
5. Judicial Review
A claimant dissatisfied with the final agency determination141 may
appeal within sixty days to a federal district court. 42 The statutory
137. D. COFER, supra note 5, passim.
138. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 3105, 7521, 5362, 3344, 1305
(1982).
139, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.968, 416.1468 (1986). Of the 220,313 cases taken to the ALJ stage in
FY 1986, 173,675 went to a hearing. Of these, 106,385 (61%0) resulted in an award of benefits. In
FY 1986, 46,638 cases (21.1% of the total presented to ALJs) were dismissed without a hearing,
including 20,198 mental impairment eases that were returned to DDSs for further proceedings.
The FY 1985-86 figures are unusual and reflect that, when the SSA issued the new mental im-
pairment listings in August, 1985, thousands of cases had to be returned for review under the
new standards. Dismissal rates in prior years were significantly lower: 12.4%0 in FY 1985, 15.1%
in FY 1984, 9.7% in FY 1980. In a typical year, most of these dismissals arise when a claimant
abandons the matter or when time deadlines are not met. An ALJ may also award benefits,
without conducting a hearing, if the documentary record is sufficient.
Based on the entire ALI caseload (including dismissals), ALJs awarded benefits in 48.3% of
the cases in FY 1986, 50.9% in FY 1985, 51.6% in FY 1984, and 55.8% in FY 1980. Excluding
dismissals, the allowance rates were 61% in FY 1986, 58% in FY 1985, 61% in FY 1984, and
62% in FY 1980. OHA OPERATIONAL REP. 24-26 (Sept. 30, 1986).
140. OHA KEY WORKLOAD INDICATORS (July 1987). At the start of FY 1986, the Associate
Commissioner established the goal of 155 days average processing time for hearings. Actual
performance averaged 172 days. OHA OPERATIONAL REP. 4 (Sept. 30, 1986).
The expanding ALJ caseload over several years generated huge backlogs and extraordinary
delays pending an ALJ hearing. Some courts intervened to establish or require fixed time limita-
tions ori SSA actions. E.g., Blankenship v. Secretary of HEW, 587 F.2d 329 (6th Cir. 1978). The
Supreme Court, however, in Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104 (1984), ruled that district courts did
not have the legal authority to create such timeliness standards on a broad class-wide basis, and
could continue to do so only within the context of individual cases. Id. at 119.
141. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is required before a claimant may pursue a claim
in federal court. 42 U.S,C. § 405(g), (h) (1982); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975). How-
ever, where the Secretary or the court deems it appropriate, the exhaustion requirement may be
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standard of review followed in judicial appeals upholds the Secre-
tary's findings of fact if they are supported by "substantial evi-
dence.' ' 43 The court will also review the case for errors of law,
although this is a less common basis for appeal.'" The reviewing court
may affirm, modify, reverse, or remand the Secretary's decision.145
Reversals occur when the Secretary's decision is not supported by sub-
stantial evidence and the claimant satisfies the burden of proof of dis-
ability. 146
waived. Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467 (1986).
An expedited appeals process is available to bypass the ALJ or Appeals Council stages and
proceed directly from reconsideration to federal court when the claimant and the SSA stipulate
that the only issue remaining in the case is the alleged unconstitutionality of a provision of Social
Security law. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.923 to .928, 416.1423 to .1428 (1986); OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND
APPEALS HANDBOOK 5-38-18D (1984) [hereinafter OHA HANDBOOK].
142. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481 (1986). Federal court jurisdiction is founded upon 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982). It is noteworthy that appeal of SSA decisions, unlike those of most other
administrative agencies, lies with the federal district court, rather than directly with the court of
appeals. The volume of the cases, and their orientation to facts rather than law, probably com-
pel this level of review.
Many federal courts now routinely channel disability cases for consideration by a U.S. magis-
trate, rather than the district judge. The magistrate may hear the case (often proceeding more
quickly than the court could) and make a recommended decision for the judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636
(1982). The district judge will review the magistrate's recommendations (and the parties' com-
ments thereon) and retain power to affirm, reverse or modify them. Matthews v. Weber, 423
U.S. 261 (1976). By consent of the parties, a magistrate may be authorized to conduct all pro-
ceedings and enter a final judgment, with no review by the district judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)
(1982).
In FY 1985, 394 cases were appealed to circuit courts. (This was 7.5% of the cases denied or
dismissed by district courts.) That year, the circuit courts ruled in favor of claimants in 21 01o of
the cases. The Supreme Court rarely takes cognizance of disability cases, hearing none in FY
1985. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 96, at 48-49.
For a critical assessment of the operation of judicial review, see NAT'L CENTER STUDY, supra
note 134, at 125-50.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982). Substantial evidence is defined as "more than a mere scin-
tilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co.
v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
Critics have argued that district courts often ignore the substantial evidence test and engage in
making de novo factual determinations. H.R. SOCIAL SEcUarr DISABILITY AMENDMENTS OF
1980, H.R. CONT. REP. No. 944, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADM N. NEws 1409.
As early as 1960, SSA Commissioner Mitchell argued: "Nevertheless, in some cases, courts
have not followed the 'substantial evidence' rule and have made their own assessment and ap-
praisal of the facts." Report to the Secretary from SSA Commissioner Mitchell 3 (Sept. 6, 1960).
144. A federal court does not show the same deference to the administrative conclusions of
law as it does to findings of fact. Ridgely v. Secretary of HEW, 345 F. Supp. 983, 988 (D. Md.
1972), aff'd, 475 F.2d 1222 (4th Cir. 1973); Ferran v. Flemming, 293 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1961).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982). A federal district court also holds equitable power to issue
injunctions in SSA disability cases. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979).
146. Simpson v. Schweiker, 691 F.2d 966 (11th Cir. 1982); Patti v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 582
(9th Cir. 1982); Wander v. Schweiker, 523 F. Supp. 1086 (D. Md. 1981).
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Remands to the Secretary occur in a variety of circumstances. A
court may order a remand for a new hearing or new decision if an
improper legal standard or procedure was adopted, 47 if the adminis-
trative record was incomplete,148 or if the SSA failed to accord proper
weight to the evidence. 49 Additionally, a remand may also be ordered
on the Secretary's motion, to allow SSA to review or correct an AU
decision denying benefits. 50 The Secretary's motion must be made be-
fore an answer is filed and must be based on good cause. 5'
The number of new federal district court cases filed against the SSA
in disability matters each year fluctuates widely: roughly 9000 cases
were filed in 1981; 13,000 in 1982; 27,000 in 1983; 26,000 in 1984;
19,000 in 1985; 9000 in 1986; and 4000 in the first five months of
1987.152 The reversal rate has fluctuated similarly: 20°%0 in 1982, 30%
in 1983, 57% in 1984, 46°7 in 1985, and 38% in 1986. s3 Throughout
this period, 40,000 to 50,000 SSA disability cases have been pending
in the federal courts at any given time.
Even beyond the quantity of cases reviewed, the federal judiciary
has had a major impact on the disability programs, shaping the proce-
dures and standards adhered to by the SSA, and generally nudging the
system in the direction of expanded eligibility. 54
147. See, e.g., Aubeuf v. Schweiker, 649 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1981).
148. Diabo v. Secretary of HEW, 627 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
149. Camp v. Schweiker, 643 F.2d 1325 (8th Cir. 1981).
150. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982). Prior to the 1980 amendments, the Secretary had an absolute
right to have the case remanded for further administrative consideration. This unqualified au-
thority arguably reduced the SSA's incentive for developing the case properly on its first oppor-
tunity. F. BLOCH, supra note 13, at 308; S. REP. No. 408, supra note 122, at 58.
151. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982).
152. Calendar year data provided by Don Gonya, Chief Counsel for the SSA (June 24,
1987). Of the total of SSA cases, 99% involved claims for disability benefits. In FY 1986, 10,716
new cases were filed in federal courts appealing SSA denials. Of these, 10,700 (9600) concerned
disability: 5930 on the disability portion of RSDHI, 1255 on SSI and 2885 concurrent. OHA KEY
WORKLOAD INDICATORS (July 1987).
153. Gonya, supra note 152. These figures do not include court remands. The annual num-
ber of court remands is large and irregular (17,711 in FY 1985; 11,993 in FY 1984). Many of
these were mandated by the 1984 legislative changes in medical improvement standards and by
the resolution of major class actions.
In FY 1986, 8604 final court decisions were reached in SSA disability cases, resulting in 4212
affirmations, 3308 reversals, and 1084 dismissals. In addition, court remands totaled 9143 in FY
1986. At the end of FY 1986, 47,334 disability cases were pending in federal courts. 1987 SSA
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 11, at 33.
154. Weinstein, supra note 95, passim; see also Social Security Hearings and Appeals: Pend-
ing Problems and Proposed Solutions, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Social Security of the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter 1981 Hearings]; D.
STONE, supra note 12, at 152-61; Liebman, supra note 21, at 845 (asserting that court's freedom
to ignore the operation of disability program as a whole and the aggregate financial conse-
quences of expanding eligibility standards, inclines judges toward allowances). Contra J. MAS-
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6. Observations
From the preceding description of the standards and procedures for
handling RSDHI and SSI disability claims, the following observations
may be made.
(a) The SSA disability mechanism is responsible for receiving, docu-
menting, and adjudicating a staggering number of claims each year.
At every step of the appeals process, the volume of cases drives SSA
procedures. The DDS apparatus must cope with almost two million
initial application and reconsideration actions each year, and the SSA
ALJs collectively render more decisions annually than the entire fed-
eral article III judiciary. 55 The federal courts have become the final
resting place for 10,000 claims each year. 156 No other administrative
agency processes anywhere near the same number of cases as the
SSA. 5 7 Moreover, while the surge in the disability caseload may have
crested, the powerful economic, social, and medical factors that cre-
ated it remain operative.'S
Concomitant with the volume of cases is the proliferation of the
SSA decisionmaking units, including 19,000 staff members in more
than 1300 district offices, 4300 disability examiners in 111 DDS
branches, and 700 ALJs in 132 hearing offices. 159 Establishing any de-
HAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS 186 (1983)
(asserting that judicial review has had only minor impact on the bulk of administrative deci-
sions); Liebman & Stewart, Bureaucratic Vision, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1952, 1959 (1983) ("the
ALJs and the judges reverse particular denials, but do not make the law of the system").
155. Weinstein, supra note 95, at 900. Of the 1003 ALJs that were employed by the federal
government as of July 21, 1987, 673 (67%) were in SSA. Letter from William Taylor, Appeals
Council Member (July 31, 1987) (on file with authors).
156. In 1986, Social Security cases represented 21 % of the federal courts' civil docket where
the United States was a party. This load was 5% of the federal courts' total civil docket. (Com-
parable figures for 1984 were 37% and 12%7 respectively.) Gonya, supra note 152.
This volume of cases has prompted numerous proposals to establish a dedicated "Social Secu-
rity Court" (or a "Disability Court") with jurisdiction over all disability appeals from a final
order of the Secretary of HHS. Advocates of this institution claim that it would free the district
courts from a substantial burden and promote national uniformity in the implementation of
disability law. Opponents assert that the true burden on the federal judiciary is overstated, be-
cause disability cases tend to be resolved relatively quickly and easily, and that recourse to a
"generalist" district court is an important safeguard for claimants, whose interests would be less
searchingly protected by "specialists" on a disability bench. Ogilvy, The Social Security Court
Proposal: A Critique, 9 J. OF LEGIS. 229, 238-40 (1982); Rains, A Specialized Court for Social
Security? A Critique of Recent Proposals, 15 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1 (1987); An Address by
Justice Antonin Scalia, United States Supreme Court, 34 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 252 (July-Aug.
1987); 1981 Hearings, supra note 154, at 13-14; Pear, New Court Sought for Benefit Cases, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 9, 1986, at 1, col 5. But see Arner, The Social Security Court Proposal: An Answer
to a Critique, 10 J. OF LEGIS. 324 (1983).
157. 1983 ACUS REPORT, supra note 2, passim.
158. Weinstein, supra note 95, at 904.
159. REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN, supra note 42, at 49.
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gree of consistency and national uniformity among such diverse and
widespread individuals is a daunting task.
(b) Typical disability cases are different from most other adminis-
trative matters because disability cases are extremely fact-based. De-
spite a dense thicket of statutory, regulatory, and case law, SSA
adjudicators generally feel that their sole task is to apply known law
to new facts, not to make policy, extrapolate decisions in unforeseen
areas, or enlarge the various slots into which cases are pigeonholed.
To the extent that one can describe bipolar models of agency deci-
sionmaking,l 60 the SSA is structured to follow the "judicial" style of
neutral adjudication based upon an objective determination of de-
scriptive facts, rather than the "political" style of focusing upon the
identity of interested parties and the intensity of their respective con-
cerns. This is not to imply that the SSA is above politics,' 6' but the
nature of the typical disability case necessarily tilts the system in the
direction of fine-grained attention to the intimate facts on the record,
rather than to the reform of social policy.
(c) In addition to being grounded largely in fact, rather than law,
the SSA disability caseload exhibits other unusual characteristics.
First, it tends to be quite complex, requiring the adjudicator to be
familiar with a wide range of medical and vocational sources and con-
cepts, as well as a substantial body of statutes, regulations, SSA rul-
ings, and SSA implementing policies. The decisionmaker must
ordinarily master a substantial file of medical records replete with re-
ferences to obscure impairments and arcane scientific jargon, and
must be able to apply medical, including psychiatric, evidence to a
vocational setting. In short, the fact that each case is of relatively lim-
ited scope does not mean that the overall body of jurisprudence is
easy to comprehend. 62
Second, although each individual case may be insignificant from a
societal viewpoint, 163 each is terribly important to the particular claim-
160. 1983 ACUS REPORT, supra note 2, at 117.
161. Frequent proposals have been made to take the SSA out of the Department of Health
and Human Services and make it an independent agency, as well as to remove it still further
from the unified federal budget. Advocates contend that these restructurings would insulate the
SSA from the caprice of economic and political factors properly affecting the rest of the govern-
ment. See Koitz, Social Security: Legislation to Create an Independent Agency, Congressional
Research Service, Library of Congress, Issue Brief No. IB86120 (Aug. 18, 1986); see also J.
MASitAW, supra note 154, at 58, 71.
162. D. STONE, supra note 12, at 166 (quoting former Commissioner Ball as stating that the
medical criteria of the listings are "so necessary to the program but give us the most trouble"
and paraphrasing former Commissioner Cardwell that the vocational criteria are "impossible to
specify but we do it anyway").
163. In 1987, for example, the average RSDHI claimant received $488 per month. An SSI
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ant, because the disability benefits often provide the barest cushion
against destitution. Moreover., SSA benefits (at least for the RSDHI
program) are not seen as social welfare, but as an "earned entitle-
ment" that the worker has paid for over a lengthy period of time.'1
6
The claimant appears as a party to a contract, not as a supplicant for
the dole, 65 and the cases are typically contested vigorously. 166 Many
claimants have little to lose by filing or appealing a case, and have a
powerful incentive to do so.
A third characteristic of SSA disability cases is their inherent sub-
jectivity. It may be impossible to judge another person's impairments
objectively; certainly many of the most compelling and damaging dis-
abling conditions-pain ,167 for example-elude outside measure-
ment.168 Social Security disability law explicitly eschews judgments
made on the ""average person" basis; instead, each claimant is entitled
to individualized case-by-case analysis .169 SSA decisionmakers, there-
fore, must judge credibility in every case.
Because face-to-face confrontation between claimant and adjudica-
tor takes place only at the AU stage, this credibility judgment be-
recipient received substantially less. On the .other hand, these figures can add up quickly on an
actuarial computation, so that the total present value cost of awarding permanent monthly berie-
fits to a worker disabled at age 50may exceed $10000. REoRT OF THE COMM'N ON THE EvALu-
ATION OF PAIN, supra note 42, at 165. in addition, the value of associated services (Medicare,
rehabilitation) may be substantial.
164. Liebman suggests a continuum of social welfare programs, from those generally consid-
ered most legitimate (such as RSDHI) to those carrying more stigma (such as SSI). Disability
programs are typically seen as being further toward the "honorable" end of the spectrum-as
having been "earned" or at least having eligibility beyond the manipulating control of a victim
of medical disaster. Liebman, supra note 21, at 857.
165. In addition, many reviewing courts use standard language to the effect that the Social
Security Act is a remedial statute and must be construed liberally. See, e.g., Damon v. Secretary
of HEW, 557 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1977); Mandrell v. Weinberger, 511 F.2d 1102, 1103 (o0th Cir.
1975).
166. One unfortunate but probably common exception to the generalization about vigorous
pursuit of a claim occurs when one symptom of the claimant's impairment, such as a disabling
mental condition, operates by itself to prevent the claimant -from engaging in such focused, goal-
oriented behavior, or even from retaining (and cooperating effectively with) a representative to
pursue the matter. Similarly, an uneducated or illiterate individual may be intimidated by the
SSA bureaucracy and by the rigor and complexity .of its rules, and cowed into dropping a meri-
torious case.
167. See REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN, supra note 42, passim; INSTI-
TUTE OF MEDICINE, sup-a note 96, passim.
168. Liebman & Stewart, supra note 154, at 1957 ("lilt is doubtful that there can be any
'correct' disposition of individual cases presenting such Idisability] questions"); Weaver, supra
note 121, at 49 (comparing the difficulty of determining the occurrence Of the insured contin-
gency in the disability program and the retirement and survivors programs).
169. D. STONE, supra note 12, at 159; Capowski, supra note 75, at 349 <criticizing grids for
departing from individualization and -adopting ",the average man" concept). The listings, too,
are at least in part .directed to the impact of a condition upon an "average" person, independent
of the actual effects upon a particular claimant.
230 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:199
comes even more difficult to make. In many instances, a disability
case turns upon the decisionmaker's subjective sense of the expertise,
reliability, and credibility of a treating physician, consulting examiner,
or other expert whose opinion appears only in unsworn documents.1 70
Ironically, the disability programs have traditionally been presented to
the public, and "sold" to Congress, as incorporating exclusively "ob-
jective" "medical" assessments.l7 1 In reality, the definition of disabil-
ity necessarily embraces a variety of vocational, economic, social, and
political considerations, making close cases frequent and ineffably
complex. 17
2
(d) The SSA claims adjudication structure is also procedure-laden.
A claim may traverse four administrative and three judicial decision-
making levels (not counting possible remands) before running its
course over two or more years. Claimants are given numerous "bites
at the apple," including three explicitly de novo stages.
Moreover, a profound variation exists in the award rates of the var-
ious tiers of review, with the probability of success fluctuating as one
climbs the appellate ladder.7 3 The process tends to reward persever-
170. Some judgments required of SSA decisionmakers are usually straightforward: in the
typical case, assessments of a claimant's age and education, for example, are elementary, and
many of the listings are defined with a level of detail that leaves relatively little scope for individ-
ual flexibility. Other listings, however (e.g., those defining mental impairments or substance
abuse), and the assessment of an individual's "residual functional capacity," often require sub-
jective opinions.
171. See D. COFER, supra note 5, passim.
172. Liebman, supra note 21, at 850 (inability to work may truly be attributable to a combi-
nation of medical handicaps and adverse labor market conditions).
173. Variability exists within each tier of review and across tiers. At the initial determination
level in 1986, for example, 52.6% of the claims in Massachusetts, and 52.2% in Connecticut,
were allowed, while comparable award rates for Louisiana and West Virginia were only 28.3%7o
and 28.6% respectively. Allowances at the reconsideration level ranged from a high of 31.50%0 in
Massachusetts to a low of 6.9% in Mississippi. ALJ award rates ranged from 71.7% in Hawaii
and 71.607o in Montana to 45.5076 in Michigan, Iowa, and Alaska. Finally, federal court allow-
ances varied from 50.9% (for Region VII-owa, Kansas, Missouri and Nebraska) to 24.8%
(Region VI-Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma and Texas). DISABILITY ADVISORY
CoUNctL BRIEFING BOOK, reprinted in 9 Soc. SEcuurTY F. 7, 7-8 (May 1987).
Some of the variability in award rates may be due to the record remaining open throughout
the early stages of administrative appeal, so the ALJ is typically dealing with a much more
comprehensive set of medical records and other documents than is available to the DDS. Simi-
larly, the Appeals Council may be provided with materials that were not before the ALJ.
However, a great deal of the variability is also due to the different attitudes, procedures or
"mind sets" of the various decisionmakers. In one SSA study, three different sets of reviewers,
from DDS, ALJ and SSA Office of Assessment groupings, came to very different results even
when confronted with the same cases. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVICES, REPORT ON
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 304(G) OF PUBLIC LAW No. 96-265, passim (known widely as
the BELLMON REPORT in recognition of the senator whose amendment to the Social Security Disa-
bility Amendments of 1980 resulted in the study) [hereinafter BELLMON REPORT]; NAT'L CENTER
STUDy, supra note 134, at 3.
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ance, fostering the notion that a claimant who has the endurance to
battle the system may eventually fare better than a more disabled but
less tenacious counterpart.
(e) Less obvious from the foregoing background is the fact that the
SSA programs (and the disability programs no less than others) have
become a hotly, often bitterly contested battleground. On the national
level, alarms are regularly sounded about the programs and their re-
spective trust funds being "in crisis. ' 174 Within the program units, es-
pecially the Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA), ALJs and others
have resisted what they see as policymakers' attempts to compromise
their decisional independence under the guise of promoting efficiency
and productivity. 75 The SSA was once commonly cited as "an agency
at war with itself."'17 6 The skirmishes have now abated or been driven
underground, but a substantial reservoir of mutual suspicion and hos-
tility still lingers. 77
C. The Appeals Council
Review by the Appeals Council is the "fourth bite at the apple" for
SSA claimants. The Council's order is a final decision of the Secretary
of Health and Human Services (Secretary) that exhausts all adminis-
trative remedies.
1. Legal Authority
No explicit statutory requirement supports the Appeals Council; the
only even implicit statutory mandate for further post-ALJ administra-
tive review of a disability claim provides that "[t]he Secretary is fur-
ther authorized, on his own motion, to hold such hearings and to
174. REPORT OF THE NAT'L COMM'N ON SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM (Jan. 20, 1983); D. STONE,
supra note 12, at 186-92; W. ACHENBAUM, SOCIAL SECURITY: VISIONS AND REVISIONS (1986).
175. A number of studies and several lawsuits have examined the tensions inside OHA, par-
ticularly between the ALJs and the series of associate commissioners. In many instances, the gist
of the controversy is how far OHA leadership may proceed in administratively organizing and
streamlining the handling of cases without impermissibly compromising the quality and inde-
pendence of the ALJs. This is an exceptionally difficult line to draw, and controversy has
reigned since at least 1975. D. COFER, supra note 5, passim; 1981 Hearings, supra note 154,
passim; Rosenblum, Contexts, and Contents of "For Good Cause" as Criterion for Removal of
Administrative Law Judges: Legal and Policy Factors, 6 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. passim (1984);
Chassman & Rolston, Social Security Disability Hearings: A Case Study in Quality Assurance
and Due Process, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 801 (1980).
176. 1981 Hearings, supra note 154.
177. The various components of the OHA (policymakers, ALJs, members of the Appeals
Council, the union of OAO analysts, etc.) appear to be on somewhat more harmonious terms
than they were, for example, during the height of the CDR caseload explosion. In our inter-
views, however, we still found a substantial amount of latent distrust.
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conduct such investigations and other proceedings as he may deem
necessary or proper for the administration of this subchapter." 178
The Appeals Council was created by rulemaking procedures and is
now governed by a handful of regulations. 79 These regulations gener-
ally define the circumstances under which the Appeals Council will
review a case, 80 the procedures to be followed before the Appeals
Council,' 8' and the claimant's recourse to federal court after a final
adverse decision of the Secretary.8 2 The Appeals Council is also gov-
erned by norms inferior to the statute and regulations. These include
"Social Security Rulings" (SSRs), which are interpretive statements
based upon statutes or recent decisions by the courts, SSA policymak-
ers, ALJs, the Appeals Council, and others.'83 The SSA generates and
disseminates SSRs and collects them quarterly and annually but does
not publish them in the Federal Register. 8 4 The status of these rulings
is therefore ambiguous. The SSA claims that rulings "do not have the
force and effect of the law or regulations but are to be relied upon as
precedents in determining other cases ' ' 85 and that a ruling "is binding
on all components of the Social Security Administration."' Many
ALJs, on the other hand, do not consider rulings binding upon them
178. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(b)(1), 1383(c)(1) (1982). The statute also warrants the Appeals Council
performing the final agency review function for the Secretary: "The Secretary is authorized to
delegate to any member, officer or employee of the Department of Health and Human Services
designated by him any of the powers conferred upon him by this section .... " Id. § 405(1).
SSA review of a number of ALJ awards is required under the Bellmon Amendment, § 304(g)
of Pub. L. No. 96-265, 94 Stat. 411, but even this review would not necessarily have to be
performed by the Appeals Council; the function could be delegated elsewhere.
Another statutory provision guiding the work of the Appeals Council is section 557(b) of the
Administrative Procedure Act. This section establishes the standards for agency review of a
hearing decision, and states that in its review the agency retains "all the powers which it would
have in making the initial decision." 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (Supp. III, 1985).
179. Regulations governing RSDHI are located at 20 C.F.R. § 404.967 (1986). For regula-
tions governing SSI, see id. at § 416.1467. For additional Appeals Council procedures see id. at §
422.205.
180. Id. §§ 404.970, 416.1470 (1986).
181. Id. §§ 404.976, 416.1476 (1988).
182. Id. §§ 404.981,416.1481.
183. SOCIAL SECURITY RULINGS ON FEDERAL OLD-AGE, SURVIVORS, DISABIITY, SUPPLEMEN-
TAL SECURITY INCOME, AND BLACK LtmG BENEFITS at iii (Cum. Ed. 1986) [hereinafter SOCA.L
SECURITY RULINGS]. A Ruling may also be based on opinions of the Office of the General Coun-
sel, Commissioners' decisions, and "other interpretations of the law and regulations." Id.
184. The SSA has used "Policy Interpretation Rulings" (formerly called "Program Policy
Statements") as a vehicle to inform SSA adjudicators quickly about clarifications or interpreta-
tions in an operational policy. These rulings or statements were eventually published in the quar-
terly rulings. However, the use of Policy Interpretation Rulings has been discontinued because
SSA has decided to publish the Rulings as frequently as necessary, instead of quarterly.
185. SOCIAL SECURITY RULINGS, supra note 183, at iii,
186, Id; see also 20 C.F.R. § 422.408 (1988).
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because SSRs are not promulgated under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act's (APA) notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures.I1"
The SSA also maintains the Program Operations Manual System
(POMS), which collects standard policies and operating procedures
for internal SSA use. The POMS, which is not "published" under
APA standards but is generally available for public review at SSA of-
fices, is designed to provide interstitial guidance to district offices and
DDSs where the statute and regulations are incomplete. It supplies
step-by-step guidance for developing a claims file, helping to ensure
national uniformity in the implementation of SSA practices. By its
own terms, POMS is not directly applicable to the ALJs or the Ap-
peals Council, but its contents help shape the case file that may be
presented for appellate review. Although the POMS statements are in-
tended to be interpretive only,'88 controversy has arisen in instances
where POMS might be read as imposing new, unpublished substantive
standards restricting eligibility for benefits. 89
The SSA Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) also maintains an
OHA Handbook'9° that, like the POMS for the DDDs, offers proce-
dural guidance to ALJs and the Appeals Council. As with the POMS,
the avowed purpose of the handbook is to implement, not to alter,
187. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982). ALJs frequently consider themselves bound by statute, case law
and published regulations only, and conclude that SSRs, at least those that are "substantive",
rather than merely "interpretative," are not law. The Appeals Council and the SSA are equally
adamant that SSRs are binding on all components of the agency.
There is a complex history regarding the applicability to SSA of APA standards regarding
rulemaking. HHS and SSA, like other federal agencies, have always been within the ambit of the
APA, but the exception in section 553 of the act, covering "public property, loans, grants, bene-
fits, or contracts," tended to exempt much of HHS (especially SSA) rulemaking from the re-
quirements of notice and comment. In 1971, Secretary of HEW Eliott Richardson had the
department voluntarily eschew that exception. 36 Fed. Reg. 2532 (Feb. 5, 1971).
188. F. BLOCH, supra note 13, at 225.
189. E.g., Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785 (1981) (the SSA claims manual has no legal,
binding force); Salling v. Bowen, 641 F. Supp. 1046, 1052-53 (W.D. Va. 1986); F. BLOCH, supra
note 13, at 225; D. COFER, supra note 5, at 125. The 1984 Disability Act requires the SSA to
publish all major disability policies under the APA's notice-and-comment procedures. Beyond
that, the Congressional Conference Committee that considered the 1984 amendments noted
"[wihile it is not required in the legislation, the conferees urge the Secretary to publish under the
APA public notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures all OASDI and SSI regulations which
relate to benefits." 130 CONG. REc. H9831 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1984).
190. OHA HANDBOOK, supra note 141, at introductory note. The OHA HANDBOOK com-
prises a multi-volume series of loose-leaf binders, Part five of which is applicable to the Appeals
Council. Its contents have been irregularly updated by issuing replacement or additional insert
pages. Part five has fallen into disuse; very few updates have been issued during the past five
years despite substantial alteration in the operation of the Appeals Council. Various staff memo-
randa and circulars have filled the void. Reportedly, a revision of the OHA HANDBOOK is under-
way. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS, PLANNING AND INNOVATION, OFFICE OF APPEALS
OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT SURVEY REPORT 36 (Dec. 1986).
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basic disability law; again, however, the dividing line between those
two functions is not always bright.
The SSA does not accord precedential value to its previous deci-
sions in disability cases, whether reached by a DDS, an ALJ, or the
Appeals Council. The OHA does circulate noteworthy decisions in the
OHA Law Reporter, published quarterly; this reporter, however, "is
not to be considered an authority which can be cited, but rather an
informative aid which may lead to individual research."' 91 Selected
administrative cases are displayed with identifying details removed.
Finally, it should be noted that the SSA's posture vis-a-vis decisions
of federal courts remains controversial and largely outside the scope
of this Article. Under prior policies, the SSA would accept as binding
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, but also asserted
the authority to "non-acquiesce" in an adverse decision of a circuit
court of appeals. In a non-acquiesence situation, the SSA would im-
plement the adverse order in the case at bar, but would decline to give
it prospective applicability in other cases even within the same cir-
cuit. 92 In June and December of 1985, the SSA changed its policy to
one of "acquiesence." Now, if a circuit court decision is at variance
with an agency policy, the SSA issues an "Acquiesence Ruling," ad-
vising agency adjudicators and claimants within that circuit about
how the SSA will implement the court's decision. Of course the SSA
reserves the right to appeal the issue, or to relitigate it in the same or
other circuit courts. 193
2. History
The Appeals Council was established in January 1940 by the Social
Security Board, which at that time administered the provisions of the
191. 11 OHA Law Reporter 1, unnumbered preface page (Jan. 1987). The OHA Law Re-
porter publishes selected Appeals Council decisions and remands, ALJ decisions, federal court
cases, Appeals Council minutes, Social Security Rulings, Federal Register Notices, and other
materials. It carries a disclaimer that "material herein does not necessarily represent the official
policy of the Office of Hearings and Appeals, the Social Security Administration or the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services." Id.
192. The SSA's non-acquiesence practice had been criticized as a flagrant violation of judi-
cial authority, and defended as a necessary concomitant of a national program which (as with
the Internal Revenue Service or the National Labor Relations Board) used non-acquiesence to
promote uniformity. Lauter, Disability-Benefit Cases Flood Courts, 6 NAT'L LAW J. at 1 (Oct.
17, 1983); Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1351-74. (S.D.N.Y. 1985); (non-acquies-
cence policy violates separation of powers and due process), vacated on other grounds, 801 F.2d
29 (2d Cir. 1986); Heaney, supra note 96, at 9.
193. Interim Circular No. 185 (June 3, 1985) (for inclusion in OHA HANDBOOK); SOCIAL
SECURITY RULINGS, supra note 183, at iii.
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Social Security Act.194 The original charter established a three-person
Appeals Council with responsibility for directing and supervising ref-
erees (later, ALJs) and for reviewing their decisions.195
When the Social Security Board was abolished in 1946, its functions
were transferred to the administrator of the Federal Security Agency
(FSA), who in turn delegated most of those powers to the Commis-
sioner of Social Security. The administrator of the FSA, however, re-
tained authority over the Appeals Council, and thus began the
tradition under which the Appeals Council receives its mandate di-
rectly from the Secretary (or head of the Department) rather than
from the Commissioner. 196
In 1953, the FSA was folded into the new Department of Health,
Education and Welfare, 197 and the Appeals Council became a part of
the Office of the Commissioner of the SSA. 19 Authority over hearings
and appeals, however, continued to flow from the Secretary directly
to the Appeals Council. 1'
Even today, the Associate Commissioner for Hearings and Appeals
exercises only "administrative direction" over the Appeals Council,
and members are to exercise independent judgment with "complete
decisional authority for all programs within the jurisdiction" of the
194. BASIC PROVISIONS ADOPTED BY THE SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD FOR HEARINGS AND REVIEW
OF OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE CLAIMS (Jan. 1940) [hereinafter BASIc PROVISIONS]. This
document elaborated 14 provisions regarding the procedures and structures for adjudicating
claims, long before the enactment of the disability programs. Provisions 9 through 11 dealt with
the Appeals Council, establishing it as the supervisory structure for referee (ALJ) proceedings.
195. Id. at 38.
196. For an outstanding early history of the hearings and appeals structure, see C. Horsky &
A. Mahin, The Operation of the Social Security Administration Hearing and Decisional Machin-
ery 293-312 (1960) (mimeograph on file with authors).
197. Id. at 296.
198. 20 Fed. Reg. 1997, § 8.10 (1955), superseded by 22 Fed. Reg. 1050, § 8.10 (1957). In
effect, the Appeals Council was merely reorganized as the Office of Hearings and Appeals in
August, 1959. That is, instead of putting a previously independent Appeals Council under an
Associate Commissioner who already had other responsibilities, the real reform was to merge
additional duties into the Appeals Council. The head of the Appeals Council became an office
director, not a subordinate to one. Only later did the "other" duties of the Associate Commis-
sioner overwhelm those associated with the Appeals Council. DEP'T OF HEW, BRIEFING PAM-
PHLET FOR THE BUREAU OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 9 (June 30, 1971); Letter from Alvin M.
David, Director, Division of Program Evaluation and Planning, to Eugene J. Keogh (July 3,
1964) (responding to Congressional inquiry regarding the rationale for placing the Appeals
Council under the Commissioner instead of within the Office of the Secretary).
199. 20 Fed. Reg. 1997, § 8.20(b) (1955). Among the express delegations from the Secretary
to the Appeals Council are: 33 Fed. Reg. 5837 (1968) (authority to review Title II and Title
XVIII hearings); 34 Fed. Reg. 6985-86 (1969) (same); 35 Fed. Reg. 7033-34 (1970) (black lung
cases); 38 Fed. Reg. 15,648 (1973) (SSI cases); 39 Fed. Reg. 27,746 (1974) (same); 40 Fed. Reg.
21,062 (1975) (Medicare); 40 Fed. Reg. 25,080 (1975) (same); 40 Fed. Reg. 27,506 (1975) (same);
43 Fed. Reg. 26,615 (1978) (same).
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Appeals Council," This bureaucratic relationship between the Secre-
tary, the Commissioner, and the Appeals Council is a factor fre-
quently cited by members in underscoring the Appeals Council's
status and autonomy. 201
The Appeals Council has grown irregularly in size, from its original
complement of three members in 1940, to six in 1956, eight in 1959,
seven in 1960, and nine in 1975.202 In 1976, the Council was increased
to fourteen members; by 1983 it had grown to twenty members. 23
To date, the Appeals Council has received relatively little critical
public scrutiny, as most observers have focused attention on more vis-
ible aspects of the bureaucracy, such as the DDS or ALJ. The Appeals
Council remains, therefore, a subject of confusion and uncertainty
among outside observers, 204 including many who are intimately famil-
iar with other aspects of the SSA process.
3. Composition
In addition to its twenty members, the Appeals Council has an As-
sociate Commissioner for Hearings and Appeals, who serves as Chair
of the Appeals Council,20 5 and a Deputy Associate Commissioner,
who is an ex officio member. 206 One other member is designated the
Deputy Chair and manages the day-to-day operations of the Appeals
Council 207
200. C. Horsky & A. Mahin, supra note 196, at 300; OHA HANDBOOK, supra note 141, at 5-
10. Because the Associate Commissioner serves in a dual capacity as director of the Office of
Hearings and Appeals and chair of the Appeals Council, the Associate Commissioner provides
only administrative direction in the former capacity, while retaining the right to exercise greater
substantive leadership in the latter role.
The Appeals Council, and all of the OHA, have been somewhat aloof from the other compo-
nents of the SSA. As recently as 1985-86, the OHA was accorded a special status, reporting
directly to the Commissioner, until it was again placed within the jurisdiction of the Deputy
Commissioner for Programs. Even today, however, there is strikingly little contact between the
Appeals Council members and other related offices.
201. This factor was mentioned often in our interviews with Appeals Council members.
202. C. Horsky & A. Mahin, supra note 196, at 311-12.
203. Letter from William Taylor, Appeals Council member, supra note 155.
204. This generalization has two conspicuous exceptions. See NAT'L CENTER STUDY, supra
note 134; J. MAsHAw, supra note 154 (providing searching reviews of the operation of the Ap-
peals Council). Nat'l Organization of Social Security Claimants' Representatives, SOCIAL SEcu-
RITY PRACTICE GUIDE § 15.04 (MB) (1986), is also helpful. Most other analysts simply
summarize the applicable regulations concerning the Appeals Council. See, e.g., F. BLOCH, supra
note 13, at 246-47, 287-91; PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 32, at 50-54.
205. The Associate Commissioner ordinarily is occupied with other duties and does not regu-
larly participate in the work of the Appeals Council.
206. The degree of "hands-on" involvement in the work of the Appeals Council varies
among deputy associate commissioners.
207. Only two persons have held the operational deputy chairs of the Appeals Council, Irwin
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The selection process for new members begins with the posting of a
"merit promotion vacancy announcement. ' 208 The job description re-
quires that an applicant have seven years of increasingly responsible
experience as a member of the bar, involving the preparation, presen-
tation, or hearing of formal cases before courts or governmental regu-
latory agencies. 20 9
A "Best Qualified" list of applicants who possess the minimum cre-
dentials is then reviewed by the Deputy Chair, who interviews some
applicants, checks references, and makes a recommendation to the
Associate Commissioner of the OHA. Although this recommendation
must ultimately be approved by both the Commissioner and the Dep-
uty Commissioner for Programs, in practice it is the Deputy Chair,
with a varying degree of involvement by the Associate Commissioner,
who makes the selection.
The selection process has been characterized by strikingly little par-
tisan politics; we know of no instances where pressure was applied to
appoint political cronies or to exclude applicants because of political
persuasions. Numerous sources confirm that the selection process is
traditionally based on merit among career civil servants, rather than
on loyalty to a particular person or ideology. 210 Similarly, we discov-
ered no instances where a member has been forced, or even asked, to
resign from the Appeals Council. 21' As of 1987, members of the Ap-
peals Council included six women, three blacks, and one Hispanic.
A. Friedenberg from 1976 to 1980 and Burton Berkley from 1980 to the present. Prior to 1976,
when the caseload and the Appeals Council itself were smaller, the Associate Commissioner
(then called a Bureau Director) or the Deputy Associate Commissioner provided the day-to-day
leadership of the Appeals Council.
208. The vacancy announcement may be advertised only inside the SSA, within the entire
Department of Health and Human Services, or even more broadly. The wider the search field,
the longer the search. In early 1987, in the interest of filling two vacancies expeditiously, the
Appeals Council advertised only within HHS.
209. Prior to 1976, the standards for appointment as a member of the Appeals Council did
not require that the appointee be an attorney. At the time of our original report all members of
the Appeals Council were attorneys.
The original philosophy of the SSA procedures was that attorneys were not necessary in order
to assure fairness, and that their presence might make the enterprise more formal and adversarial
than it should be. It was deliberate, therefore, that seven of the original referees (ALJs) and one
of the first three members of the Appeals Council had no legal training. Aty General's Comm.
on Admin. Proced., Monograph No. 16, at 37-38; SOCIL SECURITY BOARD (Apr. 1940).
210. One former SSA policymaker advised us that political influence in the selection of Ap-
peals Council members was unlikely for practical reasons: a GS-15 employee is simply so far
down the government ladder that grand political machinations are not brought into the appoint-
ment process.
211. Even the location of the Appeals Council reflects its independence. The Appeals Coun-
cil sits in Arlington, Virginia, substantially removed from both the SSA headquarters in Balti-
more and the HHS headquarters in Washington, D.C. (Other components of the OHA,
including the Associate Commissioner and the national Chief ALJ, are also in Arlington.)
19901
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In hiring new members of the Appeals Council, candidates from
within or near OHA are preferred. At the time our original report was
prepared, five of the members had been ALJs immediately prior to
appointment to the Appeals Council, seven had been in the HHS Of-
fice of the General Counsel, four had been branch chiefs within the
Office of Appeals Operations, and four had held other positions,
mostly within the SSA. 212
The turnover among members is low. As of 1987, seven current
members had been on the Appeals Council more than ten years, six
had served from five to ten years, and seven had served less than five
years .211
The training of a new member varies, depending on previous experi-
ence and knowledge. Sometimes a new Appeals Council member will
attend the same training course that new ALJs attend. 214
Members of the Appeals Council are compensated at the GS-15
level, the same grade as ALJs. 215 Although the Deputy Chair's posi-
tion has been approved for inclusion in the federal Senior Executive
Service, the SSA has not yet dedicated a slot for this purpose.
Unlike ALJs, Appeals Council members are not protected by the
APA. 2 6 Members participate in the "merit pay" system and receive
performance evaluations from the Deputy Chair. 217 In principle, this
arrangement allows the OHA policymakers a substantial degree of au-
thority over Appeals Council members, but that authority has not
been exercised, at least not directly. Members have consistently re-
212. Letter from William Taylor, supra note 155. Obviously, in a period of high caseloads,
the Appeals Council benefits by bringing on board new members who will not require extensive
background training before they can assume a full complement of cases.
213. Id.
214. A new member might also receive additional "on the job training," such as having the
Deputy Chair or a particular designee serve as the second member on the new member's early
cases.
215. See NAT'L CENTER STUDY, supra note 134, at 41-42.
216. As noted, ALJs enjoy virtually lifetime tenure and are exempt from any substantial
system of performance evaluation and compensation. See Rosenblum, supra note 175, passim.
217. Appeals Council members are evaluated on the timeliness and quality of their work.
Timeliness has recently been quantified, as the new computer tracking system allows a numerical
assessment of each member's compliance with the case handling goals noted below. See infra
note 258. Quality is harder to assess; the Deputy Chair samples the decisional documents of each
member and judges them for conformity to the applicable law, clarity of explanation, and ap-
parent basis upon substantial evidence. The Deputy Chair asserts that he does not take into
account the frequency with which a member grants or denies review, and he does not calculate
how often each member allows or denies a claim. Members are then rated on a five point scale:
unsatisfactory, minimally satisfactory, fully satisfactory, exemplary, and outstanding. In a typi-
cal year perhaps two-thirds of the members are rated "exemplary" and the rest "fully satisfac-
tory." Performance evaluations affect members' eligibility for merit pay increases, as well as
end-of-year bonuses, and can have a substantial financial impact.
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ported that no associate commissioner has ever tried to intervene in
the work of the Appeals Council by pressuring members to deny or
allow more claims in general or any claim in particular. 2
11
Several other observers agree that, even without formal guarantees,
members of the Appeals Council enjoy a high degree of de facto pro-
tection, and no instances of abusive political pressure have come to
light. Some have expressed concern, however, that SSA policymakers
nevertheless are able to create an adjudicative climate that subtly and
indirectly inclines the Appeals Council toward more or fewer
awards, 219 noting that the Appeals Council always reflects, to some
extent, the interests and style of the OHA Associate Commissioner.
Some have expressed the view that the Appeals Council is still per-
ceived in some quarters as an even more partisan "arm of the Secre-
tary."
The members of the Appeals Council are organized into four geo-
graphic groups, each with responsibility for all cases arising in three
designated judicial circuits. 220 Within each geographic group, the
members divide the cases randomly and equally. For example, mem-
ber William Taylor is ordinarily assigned one quarter of all the cases
from the first, second, and eleventh circuits; he receives all of those
cases in which the last three digits of the claimant's Social Security
number are 500 through 749.221 This means, in general, that each
218. In principle, a member of the Appeals Council could be subject to discipline, including
poor performance evaluation or reduced pay, for failure to adhere to the Secretary's policies.
ALJs, on the other hand, are subject to discipline only through the more cumbersome process of
the Merit Systems Protection Board, which, as a practical matter, provides a high degree of
insulation. See 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (1982).
219. It is difficult to test empirically the existence and strength of any SSA-imposed adjudi-
cative climate, because the statutory role-and consequently the caseload and the results of the
Appeals Council-have been so different during the Reagan administration from the Carter ad-
ministration. The entire disability system, moreover, has undergone so many changes that it is
impossible to identify any stable baseline from which to make comparative judgments.
In a survey of the SSA's ALJs, however, 70.1076 (339 of 484 respondents) agreed with the
statement that "[t]acit agency pressure is placed upon the SSA's ALJs to hand down fewer
,reversals' during times of national governmental economic retrenchment." D. COFER, supra
note 5, at 211, 223. On the other hand, members of the Appeals Council deny feeling any direct
or indirect pressure on cases, but one member told us that obviously members can "see which
way the wind blows."
The Appeals Council does not ordinarily keep statistics that note the various members' respec-
tive award rates, and there seems to be no general awareness of which members are relatively
"tough" or "generous." Members do seem to know, however, which other ones are more likely
to take a generally skeptical or a sympathetic approach to selected types of cases.
220. See Chart 2, infra page 321.
221. One purpose of the geographic groupings is to provide stability and consistency, ena-
bling each member to learn the personalities, strengths, and idiosyncracies of a particular set of
ALJs, district courts, OAO analysts, and others. When the geographic groupings are shifted to
equalize the number of cases assigned to each member, as they were in June 1987, the sense of
continuity is disrupted.
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member receives two or three dozen new cases on a typical work
day.
222
4. Staff
Each member of the Appeals Council has an administrative assis-
tant who performs clerical functions. In addition, an office manager
and other staff serve the Appeals Council as a whole. The main sup-
port, however, comes from the Office of Appeals Operations (OAO),
a companion unit within the Office of Hearings and Appeals. OAO is
housed in Arlington, Virginia, with most staff members working in
the same complex, though not necessarily in the same building as the
Appeals Council itself.223
OAO is divided into five case-handling divisions224 and then into
thirty-two branches, each responsible for cases coming from a defined
geographic location. 225 OAO houses some 320 analysts. These analysts
perform the primary review function and make recommendations that
the Appeals Council members accept in the vast majority of instances.
OAO analysts are usually non-lawyers, compensated at GS 11-13
levels. Most have backgrounds of prior employment within the SSA as
222. The workload of the Appeals Council fluctuates dramatically. Statistics for individual
members' workloads have only recently been maintained by computer, so the figures are uncer-
tain. Members reported that caseloads ran approximately 300 cases per member during February
1987, rising to almost 600 cases per member by May 1987.
223. A proposal has been presented to consolidate into one building all the OHA units,
which are currently dispersed among five buildings. If the plan is approved and funded by the
Office of Management and Budget, the reshuffling will occur in approximately two years.
224. Divisions I, II, and III handle RSDHI and SSI disability appeals where the primary
issue is the claimant's medical eligibility. Division III also handles health insurance issues. Divi-
sion IV handles the RSDHI and SSI appeals where the issue is other than medical, such as
relationship or dependency for RSDHI claims, or income or resources for SSI claims. Division
V, the Division of Civil Actions, is responsible for all cases in which the claimant has filed a
complaint in federal court after an adverse decision by the Appeals Council. The OAO is now
experimenting with a system of "modules," in which the branch which handled the case initially
will maintain responsibility over it even after the case leaves the Appeals Council and is filed in
federal court, instead of automatically transferring all those cases to the Division of Civil Ac-
tions. OHA OPERATIONAL REP. 18 (Sept. 30, 1986). A Division of Support Services, with four
branches, provides varying types of assistance to the case handling division of the OAO.
225. For example, Branch 18 (within Division III) is responsible for all appeals from the
state of Alabama. A branch may handle one or a few states (or, in states which produce a large
number of claims, a portion of a state).
A branch is the basic work group for the analysts. Consultations or transfers with analysts in
other branches are somewhat unusual. However, if one branch is excessively burdened with
work, some of its overflow may be shifted to other branches.
Currently, the OAO branches do not parallel the Appeals Council members' four geographic
groupings. Thus, a particular analyst might send files to several different members, and a partic-
ular member might receive files from 30 or more different analysts. OHA is now in the process
of revising this structure, in order to provide greater familiarity and continuity.
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claims representatives in a district office, as DDS employees, or as
examiners from the Office of Disability Operations. 226 Normally, ana-
lysts perform only a paper review and have no personal contact with
the ALJ, the claimant, or a representative. An OAO analyst typically
reviews approximately twenty-five cases per month, although some
handle twice that many, and the competitive selection process for pro-
motion to GS-13 tends to emphasize the volume of cases produced. 227
To assess analysts' productivity, each type of case is assigned a
Standard Time Value (STV), taking into account its complexity and
the variety of tasks it will require. For example, a dismissal of a re-
quest-for-review 228 is assessed as requiring three hours of analyst
work; processing a denial requires 3.25 hours; and reversing an ALJ
decision requires five hours. Among the more time-consuming func-
tions, processing a supplementary review case is ranked at eight hours
and working through an initial action on a court remand is graded at
six hours. These standard time values were scheduled for in-depth re-
view and revalidation at the time of our original study. 229
The purpose of grading analysts according to STVs (rather than
simply counting the number of cases on a one-for-one basis) is to pre-
vent the emergence of perverse incentives that might incline analysts
to improve their productivity ratings by tilting in the direction of pre-
ferring quicker types of case actions, which are usually adverse to the
claimant.
OAO production goals establish four levels of performance for the
analysts, and promotion possibilities are largely governed by these
measures of output. The numerical scoring concentrates on quantity;
no objective measurement of the quality of the analyst's work and no
numerical scoring of accuracy exist. 230 Quality of an analyst's work is,
226. Analysts are selected by an intensely competitive merit selection process. Because an
analyst's job would be a promotion for many SSA employees, when OAO posts an announce-
ment for 30 to 40 new positions, it can expect approximately 1200 applications.
Most OAO analysts have five years of prior experience within the SSA. Approximately 40%o
are women and 20% minority.
A new analyst receives four weeks of classroom training regarding the medical problems of the
human body, the SSA appeals process, and the documentation of a disability case file. Training
Program: Hearings and Appeals Analysts (Feb. 14 - Mar. 9, 1983). Each new analyst is also
assigned a senior analyst mentor or reviewer who provides on-the-job training and feedback. The
senior analyst provides feedback on all of the new analyst's cases for three months, and reviews
all work on court cases for a further six months.
227. Analysts' promotions from GS- I1 to GS-12 are non-competitive and relatively routine.
Promotion to GS-13 and the status of "senior analyst," however, is quite competitive.
228. See infra text accompanying notes 234-47 (discussing request-for-review).
229. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS, PLANNING AND INNOVATION, OFFICE OF APPEALS
OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT SURVEY REPORT 23 (1986) [hereinafter OMAPI REPORT].
230. See OFFicE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS, PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR HEARINGS AND
APPEALS ANALYST (1983).
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however, assessed more subjectively and is a factor in evaluation for
promotion.
The Office of Appraisal does perform some quality assurance re-
view of the work of analysts, and OAO branch chiefs and Appeals
Council members are in a position to review at least some of the prod-
ucts of the analysts they oversee. In FY 1986, the Office of Appraisal
sampled 2140 analyst recommendations and found they contained the
correct substantive decision 9607 of the time.2 1'
In addition to OAO's analysts, Appeals Council members have ac-
cess to a small Medical Support Staff composed of three full-time
physicians and a few dozen part-time consulting specialists. This staff
is employed by the Appeals Council to inspect files when some aspect
of the medical record is unclear.23 2 Additionally, a one-person Voca-
tional Staff is responsible for hiring vocational experts and coordinat-
ing their activities in the field.
5. Appeals Council Caseload- Types of Cases
The Appeals Council deals with claims in three different settings: at
the "review level," immediately after the ALJ tier; in a "new court
filing," after a denied claimant has initiated a civil action in federal
district court; and for "court decisions," after a district judge has is-
sued a final decision or has returned the case to the SSA with orders
for a new hearing or other administrative processing.233
231. OHA OPERATIONAL REP. 8 (Sept. 30, 1986).
232. OHA HANDBOOK, supra note 141, at 5-37-10. The Medical Support Staff is used pri-
marily where new evidence is presented to the Appeals Council or where the ALJ did not under-
stand the medical record. If the opinion of the medical staff is relied upon by the Appeals
Council for its decision, a copy of the medical staff opinion should be provided to the claimant
for comment, and it is to be entered into the administrative record. Association of Admin. Law
Judges v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1139 (D.D.C. 1984).
233. The volume of activity in each of these three categories is indicated by the following
OHA estimates of workload for the Office of Appeals Operations:
Receipts Dispositions
Review level cases
FY 1986 51,100 52,000
1987 73,500 70,500
1988 81,500 79,500
New court cases
FY 1986 11,850 11,860
1987 15,850 15,850
1988 17,350 17,350
Court remand cases
FY 1986 18,400 7,250
1987 10,700 20,350
1988 10,200 13,750
(Review level figures exclude Bellmon cases) OMAPI REPORT, supra note 229, at 24.
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a. Review Level Cases
Review level cases fall into two primary categories: "requests-for-
review" in which a claimant denied by the ALJ seeks reversal by the
Appeals Council and "own-motion review" in which the Appeals
Council reviews cases in the absence of any claimant appeal.
1. Request-for-Review. A claimant who is denied in whole or in
part 23 4 at the ALJ stage may request review by the Appeals Coun-
cil. 235 This request may be initiated by an SSA form or another writ-
ten statement. 236 A brief or a letter of contentions stating specific
objections and citing arguments for reversal may be filed simultane-
ously or later.2 7 Current regulations do not afford the claimant a
"right" to Appeals Council review; 23 the claimant merely makes a
request, which the Appeals Council may dispose of in several
ways. 239
The Appeals Council has three options upon receiving a case: dis-
miss it, deny review, or grant review.2 40 The Appeals Council will
dismiss a case if the request is filed late and no extension has been
granted, or if the claimant later requests dismissal. 241 The Council
234. A partially favorable decision may be issued, for example, when the ALJ determines
that the claimant is disabled, but that the disability commenced at a later date than the claim-
ant asserts; or, for a "closed period" case, that the disability terminated at an earlier date
than the claimant asserts. Another type of partially favorable decision is one in which an ALJ
finds the claimant disabled and financially eligible for one program (e.g., SSI) but not finan-
cially eligible for the other.
235. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.967, 416.1467 (1986).
236. A claimant filing a request for Appeals Council review of an ALJ's decision is enti-
tled to a copy of all pertinent documents in the case file, a transcript of the tape recording of
the ALJ hearing, and a period of time to comment. Id. §§ 404.974, 416.1470.
237. Id. §§ 404.968, .975; 416.1468, .1475.
238. Id. §§ 404.970, 416.1470.
239. The vocabulary of Appeals Council activities can be confusing. When a claimant "re-
quests review," the Appeals Council investigates the file to determine whether the case should
be considered for possible changes. This screening involves examining the complete file, read-
ing all the exhibits, and sometimes playing a portion of the tape recording of the hearing. This
process, however, is not termed "review"-that label is reserved for the action of the Appeals
Council after it has decided to accept the case.
240. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.967, 416.1467 (1986). Technically, the term "grant review" is
overly broad here. The Appeals Council "grants" a claimant's request-for-review, but it
"takes" review of Bellmon cases on its own motion. See infra text accompanying notes 281-
86. For convenience, "grants" is generally used in this section to refer to both types of ac-
tions. For an illustration of the review-level process, see Chart 3, infra page 322.
241. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.971, 416.1471 (1986). A claimant may request dismissal of the ap-
peal upon second thoughts about the strategic desirability of appealing adverse portions of a
partially favorable ALJ decision, when the Appeals Council might reverse the favorable por-
tions.
One court has ruled that where a claimant requests review of a partially favorable ALJ
decision, the Appeals Council may not disturb the favorable portions unless it has taken own-
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will deny review if it determines that the AL's decision and order
are correct. It will grant review if a defect appears in the AL's
work. 242
If review is granted, the Appeals Council has four options: re-
verse, remand, modify, or affirm. 24 3 A reversal is used to alter the
AL's decision when the ALJ has done an adequate job in develop-
ing the factual record but has misstated or misapplied the law, and
the Appeals Council needs no further fact finding in order to make a
legally correct decision. A remand sends the case back to the ALJ 24
for an entirely new hearing, for the collection of additional evidence,
or for the rewriting of an opinion. 4 1 (An ALJ, however, may protest
the remand.) 24 6 The Appeals Council may modify an ALJ order by
motion review of the case within the 60-day period. Powell v. Heckler, 783 F.2d 396 (3d Cir.),
amended opinion, 789 F.2d 176 (3rd Cir. 1986). Contra Delong v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 266 (7th
Cir. 1985).
242. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.970, 416.1470 (1986). In FY 1986, the Appeals Council disposed of
44,621 cases; of these, it dismissed 5273 (11.80o7), denied review in 28,906 (64.8%), and
granted review in 10,442 (23.401o). See OHA OPERATIONAL REP. 27 (Sept. 30, 1986).
243. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.979, 416.1479 (1986).
244. The Council has three main options for remanding cases to an ALJ: (1) remand to
the ALJ who heard the case initially, on the principle of judicial economy, because an ALJ
familiar with the case may require less time to correct it, and on the principle that the ALJ
who made the error should have the responsibility for, and can directly learn by, correcting
the mistake; (2) remand to a different ALJ, on the principle that the original ALJ may have a
fixed impression about the case and be less objective; or (3) rotate remands among the ALJs
in the local office without regard to whether a particular ALJ had previously been involved.
Most recently, the SSA has returned to the general practice of assigning a remanded case to
the ALJ who issued the original decision, unless (a) unfairness has been alleged at the first
hearing; (b) the Appeals Council has some special reason to specify that a new ALJ should be
used; or (c) administrative factors in the local office make it more convenient or efficient to
designate a new ALJ.
245. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.979, 416.1477 (1986). Recently, the Appeals Council departed from
its prior "harmless error" policy by granting review over more ALJ decisions in which the
correct outcome was reached, but the hearing process or the written opinion was flawed. 8
Soc. SECURITY F. 1 (Feb. 1986). In such cases the Council rewrites the decision itself or re-
mands to the originating ALJ with instructions, not necessarily to change the result, but to
write a better opinion. It is reasoned that a longer, more detailed ALJ opinion will be more
informative to the claimant and more defensible in court. Memorandum from Frank V.
Smith, III, Assoc. Comm'r of OHA, on "Circuit Court Case Study-Action" (June 17, 1986)
(advising ALJs and Appeals Council members on the results of a study of 800 circuit court
decisions, reflecting judicial policies and preferences); OHA OPERATIONAL REP. 6 (Sept. 30,
1986).
In some instances, the Appeals Council has effectively rewritten ALJ decisions, bolstering
the expressed rationale for a denial and putting the strongest face on a case that may go to
court. Memorandum from Edwin Semans, Jr., Director of OAO (Jan. 30, 1986); S.S.R. 82-13
(Cum. Ed. 1982); Note from Edwin Semans, Jr., to Executive Secretariat (Dec. 30, 1986)
(describing how the Appeals Council frequently remands cases to ALJs to correct errors, even
when the ultimate decision to deny benefits is not disturbed and how the Appeals Council also
frequently rewrites the decision)
246. An ALJ may protest a remand decision by complaining to the Appeals Council (or to
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altering part of the decision or opinion without a remand. An af-
firmance leaves the AL's decision intact, reflecting a conclusion
that the issues prompting the Appeals Council to grant review have
now been resolved and no correction is necessary. 247
2. "Own-Motion" Review. The Appeals Council also considers a
number of cases on its "own motion. ' 248 Own-motion review has a
checkered history. Before 1975, the Appeals Council staff reviewed
all AU awards and most denials. 249 From 1975 to 1980, as caseloads
rose, the Appeals Council stopped taking own-motion cases and
heard only request-for-review cases.2 10  Since 1980, the Bellmon
Amendment 25 ' has again required the Appeals Council to take a sub-
stantial number of own-motion review cases.
the Associate Commissioner for OHA) that the remand is unnecessary, its terms are unclear,
etc. If this protest is initially made informally or orally (e.g., in a telephone call), the Appeals
Council practice is to suggest that the ALJ file a motion for clarification of the remand order,
with a copy to the claimant. The issue may then be dealt with on the record, rather than ex
parte. ALJs rarely proceed with this formal process.
247. In FY 1986, the Appeals Council granted review in 10,442 cases. It reversed the ALJ
in 2434 (23.307o), remanded 6782 (650%o), and affirmed 1226 (11.7076). When compared to the
total number of cases appealed (44,621 in FY 1986), rather than to the number of cases actu-
ally reviewed, only 5.50%o were reversed, 15.207o were remanded, and 2.50% were affirmed.
OHA OPERATIONAL REP. 27 (Sept. 30, 1986).
248. 20C.F.R. §§ 404.969, 416.1469 (1986).
249. Own-motion review was held to a strict standard and could overturn an ALJ's award
only in instances of "gross error." The Appeals Council reversed only 17o of the ALJ disabil-
ity awards in 1963, and 1.30 in 1964. Own-motion reversals in non-disability cases were con-
siderably more common, largely because the eligibility criteria there were more objective and a
"gross error" deviation would be more evident; the disability standards were sufficiently sub-
jective that an award would be upheld, even if the Appeals Council deemed it somewhat erro-
neous. Memorandum from Joseph E. McElvany, Director, Bureau of Hearings and Appeals,
to Robert M. Ball, SSA Commissioner (Nov. 17, 1964).
250. As requests for ALJ hearings mushroomed in 1975-1980, analysts from the OAO who
ordinarily assisted the Appeals Council were dispatched to hearing offices around the country
to assist ALJs in conducting hearings and writing opinions. This stopgap measure ameliorated
the pressures on ALJs, but deprived the Appeals Council of the ability to consider own-mo-
tion cases. When own-motion review was not reinstated administratively by 1979, the Con-
gress required it in 1980. See 1981 Hearings, supra note 154, at 10.
251. Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-265, § 304(g), 94
Stat. 441 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 421(c) (1982)) [hereinafter Disability Amendments of 1980].
In 1980, Congress was concerned about what it perceived as a too-generous application of
disability standards, particularly by ALJs. At the instigation of Senator Bellmon, Congress
enhanced quality control and instructed the Appeals Council to create a more balanced over-
sight structure for ALJs by reviewing both ALJ awards and denials.
The statute did not require the Appeals Council to review a particular number of ALJ
awards but merely to consider taking them for a review. Thus, a case randomly selected for
own-motion review may be disposed of by an OAO analyst rather than forwarded to a Coun-
cil member if the case contained no errors. Request-for-review cases, on the other hand, must
be seen by at least one member, even if the analyst finds no error. R. FRANCIS, SOCIAL SECU-
RITY DISABILITY CLAIMS: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 9:03 (1983).
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The Appeals Council now receives for own-motion consideration a
randomly selected sample of 10% to 15%252 of ALJ awards-ap-
proximately 300 to 400 cases per month. Mailroom clerks in the Of-
fice of Disability Operations25 3 (ODO) select the cases according to
Social Security numbers and forward the files to the Appeals Council
before the ALJ's award is effectuated.2 5 4 The Appeals Council has
sixty days from the date of the AL's decision to decide whether to
take own-motion review. 255 Once a substantial portion of the Ap-
peals Council's docket, own-motion cases have trickled off to very
low levels. In May 1987, for example, the Appeals Council took re-
view of only fifty-nine such cases and reversed only* twenty-three of
those. 256
A special kind of Bellmon Review that proved particularly contro-
versial was "targeted" review, in which ALJs were selected for Ap-
peals Council scrutiny based upon their unusually high award rates
or unusually low productivity. Many ALJs interpreted such targeting
as an assault on their judicial independence and as an attempt to
252. The Bellmon Amendment did not specify a selection routine for own-motion review.
The SSA selected the figure of 15% for random sampling, and intended to take the review
level up to 25% later. The actual percentage of cases taken, however, has been lower: 12.1%
(5736 ALJ allowances) in FY 1986; 14.4% (14,564 cases) in FY 1984. OHA OPERATIONAL REP.
8 (Sept. 30, 1986); OHA OPERATIONAL REP. 4 (Sept. 30, 1984). In February 1987, the figure
was further reduced by the Associate Commissioner to 10% due to Appeals Council workload
considerations.
253. The ODO is a large bureaucratic unit, located near the Baltimore SSA headquarters,
which serves as a processing center for "effectuating" (i.e., calculating the amount of the
award and issuing the checks) in RSDHI disability cases in which the claimant is age 58 or
younger. (This accounts for 80% of all RSDHI disability claims.)
254. The ALJ's "Notice of Favorable Decision" advises a claimant that the Appeals
Council may possibly take own-motion review of the case. A claimant is not notified when the
case has been included in the sample of cases forwarded to the Appeals Council by the ODO.
The claimant is notified only if the Appeals Council elects to grant review of the case.
In a request-for-review case, the claimant is not notified that the Appeals Council has de-
cided to grant review; the first reply the claimant receives is the notification of the Appeals
Council's decision to reverse, remand, modify or affirm.
In an own-motion situation, the claimant is similarly not notified about the Appeals Coun-
cil decision whether to review the case: if review is denied, the file is forwarded for effectua-
tion, and the claimant may never realize that the case had been considered for review. If the
Appeals Council takes review, and decides to remand the case to the ALJ, the claimant's first
notification will be a copy of the remand order. If the Appeals Council takes review with the
intention of modifying or reversing a favorable ALJ decision, it mails to the claimant a notice
of its proposed disposition, and affords the claimant 20 days to comment. Thereafter, the
claimant receives a copy of the Appeals Council's final decision.
255. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.969, 416.1469 (1986). If the Appeals Council does not take own-
motion review of the case, it is returned to the ODO for effectuation. This detour may delay a
case for three to five weeks. When the case is returned to the ODO, its effectuation is expe-
dited so that payment to the claimant is delayed as little as possible.
256. OHA KEY WORKLOAD INDICATORS 10 (May 1987).
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pressure them into denying more claims. 2 7 After 1984, "targeting"
was eliminated. 258
A third category of own-motion review is similar to targeted re-
view, but serves a less controversial function. Under it, the Appeals
Council reviews most or all of the decisions by a new ALJ for consis-
tency with SSA rules and procedures. 2 9 This category of own-motion
review long pre-dates the Bellmon Amendment. The Chief ALJ may
prolong or shorten the usual six-month period of review.
A fourth type of own-motion review involves "protests," which
are assertions by the ODO or another processing center that an ALJ
257. The Appeals Council was not involved in the selection of ALJs to target. The Deputy
Chair deliberately recused himself from those deliberations, to avoid a situation in which the
Appeals Council would help single out ALJs for review and then conduct the review itself.
Symposium on Federal Disability Programs, Cosponsored by ACUS, the ABA Commission
on the Legal Problems of the Elderly, ABA Administrative Law Section, Case Western Re-
serve Law School and the Cleveland Foundation 269 (Oct. 11-12, 1985) (unofficial transcript)
[hereinafter Cleveland Transcript] (comments by Burton Berkley, Deputy Chair of Appeals
Council).
258. The initial Bellmon Review implementation plans called for review of all allowances
by any ALJ who granted benefits 7007o of the time or more. See Disability Amendments of
1980, supra note 251. Entire hearing offices with allowance rates of 7401o or more would also
be fully reviewed. Later, ALJs were targeted according to the frequencies with which the Ap-
peals Council granted own-motion review of their cases; a targeted ALJ could be reviewed
100%, 75%, 50%, or 2507o of the time. An ALJ could be removed from the target list when
only 5% of the ALJ's cases resulted in a grant of review by the Appeals Council. See Social
Security Disability Reviews: The Role of the Administrative Law Judge, Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management of the Senate Comm. on Government
Affairs, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. 14-42 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Hearing] (testimony of Associate
Commissioner Louis Hays).
The operation of the Bellmon Review program was contested in Association of Admin. Law
Judges v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132 (D.D.C.1984), in which Judge Joyce Hens Green held
that the program "was of dubious legality" and tended to produce improper pressure to issue
fewer allowance decisions, but that the plaintiff organization was not entitled to relief in light
of defendant's later modification of the program and an absence of specific harm suffered.
Id. at 1141-43.
On June 21, 1984, the Associate Commissioner for the OHA discontinued the targeted ALJ
portion (by then, referred to as the "selected ALJ" portion) of Bellmon Review, stating that
the program had achieved its objective of narrowing the difference in own-motion rates (the
frequencies with which the Appeals Council acted to correct the ALJ decision) between the
targeted judges and the national random sample. Memorandum from Frank V. Smith III, to
all Administrative Law Judges (June 21, 1984).
In 1987, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the standards for conducting
targeted review were substantive rules (not mere interpretive statements, as the SSA had ar-
gued) and were therefore invalid because they failed to comply with APA rulemaking proce-
dures. Reinstatement of benefits was therefore ordered for claimants who lost when a targeted
ALJ's award was reversed by the Appeals Council. See W.C. v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 1502 (9th
Cir. 1987).
259. For many people, the targeting program was synonymous with the phrase "Bellmon
Review," but the SSA considers both targeted and randomly-selected own-motion review to
be "Bellmon Review."
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decision could not be implemented because of a technical error (e.g.,
lack of RSDHI coverage or failure to incorporate the five-month
waiting period). The ODO and other SSA components have also
made an increasing number of "substantive" protests in cases where
the ALJ's award is challenged as factually or legally incorrect.2 60 In
the past, these protests were rare, but they have increased to approx-
imately 100 to 150 cases per month.
A final category of own-motion review cases arose from the-
Government Representation Project in effect from 1983 to 1986.261
Several local hearing offices experimented with having a government
attorney develop a case as an adversary to the claimant, argue at the
hearing, and cross-examine the claimant's witnesses. 62 The govern-
ment representatives could not formally "appeal" a case but did
260. The ODO and other SSA components detect errors of three basic types. In one,
newly-received evidence that was not available to the prior decisionmaker (ALJ or Appeals
Council) may suggest that the decision should be reviewed. (For example, a new W-2 form
may indicate that the claimant has recently performed substantial gainful activity of which the
AU was unaware.)
The second type of error may be detected when the ODO or processing center's claims au-
thorizer (an expert in the non-medical aspects of disability cases) begins calculating the bene-
fits due under an ALJ award. The claims authorizer picks key dates (onset of disability,
application, expiration of insured status, etc.) from the AU's decision, and may detect incon-
sistencies, omissions, or simple typographical errors. If this error is confirmed by a supervi-
sor, a one- or two-page protest memorandum will be forwarded with the file to the Appeals
Council.
The third type of error is uncovered when the claims authorizer suspects a defect in the
ALJ's medical assessment. (A "reject criteria list" identifies types of cases where errors are
more likely.) The file is forwarded to a disability examiner or a disability specialist who may
identify anomalies in the ALJ's consideration of the medical record. If so, a protest memo-
randum is prepared, bringing the issue to the attention of the Appeals Council.
ODO prepares approximately forty such memoranda per month, about half based on finan-
cial issues and half on medical criteria. Other effectuating components also identify similar
errors, and it appears that an increasing number of these focus on the medical, rather than
"technical," aspects of the disability. Standard procedures call for all these matters to be
directed to the Appeals Council for correction. Occasionally, when the error appears to be
simply typographical, the claims authorizer may telephone the AU to suggest issuing a cor-
rected decision.
If the protest concerns only the onset date and the size of the claimant's initial lump-sum
payment, the effectuating office will begin payment of the current monthly benefits portion of
the ALJ's award and notify the claimant that the retroactive amount is being reviewed. Simi-
larly, in an "old" case (i.e., when the ODO's workload prevents it from delivering a protest
to the Appeals Council within forty-five days of the ALJ's decision), partial effectuation will
begin. Almost all of the ODO's protests are reviewed by the Appeals Council. The ODO also
plays a similar role in reviewing and protesting Appeals Council awards. Errors at this stage
are less frequent, generating perhaps 20 protests per year.
261. See 47 Fed. Reg. 36,123 (1982); 52 Fed. Reg. 4004 (1987).
262. 47 Fed. Reg. 36,117 (1982); see also 20 CF.R. §§ 404.965, 416.1465 (1986); supra
text accompanying note 132.
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have authority to "suggest" that an award decision should come to
the attention of the Appeals Council. 263
3. Standard of Review. Until 1976, the Appeals Council conducted
essentially a de novo review of the ALJ's work, 264 but internal
modifications2 15 made the Appeals Council more of an appellate
body. Current regulations specify five grounds upon which the Ap-
peals Council may grant review of a case: 266 (1) abuse of discretion
by the ALJ, (2) error of law, (3) lack of substantial evidence, 267 (4)
existence of a broad policy or procedural issue that may affect the
general public interest, 261 or (5) presentation of new and material evi-
dence. 26 9 Although the Appeals Council does not maintain statistics
on these five bases for review, assertions of "lack of substantial evi-
dence to support the ALJ's decision," and "presentation of new and
material evidence" are probably the most frequently cited. 270
263. The government representative would transmit the file to the OAO with a detailed
memorandum explaining why the Appeals Council should consider the case. Although the
Appeals Council was not required to accept the government representative's suggestion, it did
frequently take own-motion review in that situation.
264. The departure from de novo review in RSDHI disability cases was made pursuant to
a regulation published at 41 Fed. Reg. 51,588 (1976). The SSI disability program had never
been the subject of de novo review at the Appeals Council level. 39 Fed. Reg. 37,977 (1974).
265. The 1976 change was instigated by an attempt to reduce the workload of the Appeals
Council in order to free the OAO analysts and others who could be dispatched to various local
hearing offices to assist ALJs with their backlog of cases.
266. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404,970, 416.1470 (1986).
267. The "substantial evidence" test is also employed in federal court review. E.g., Ri-
chardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971). Controversy exists, however, on whether the district
judge is to look for substantial evidence to support the decision of the Appeals Council or of
the ALJ. Where the Appeals Council reverses the ALJ on a borderline case, substantial evi-
dence may sustain either a denial or an award. See Parris v. Heckler, 733 F.2d 324 (4th Cir.
1984) (whether decision of Appeals Council, not decision of ALJ, is supported by substantial
evidence); see also Bauzo v. Bowen, 803 F.2d 917 (7th Cir. 1986); Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d
535 (6th Cir. 1986); Fierro v. Bowen, 798 F,2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1986); Parker v. Heckler, 763
F.2d 1363 (11th Cir.), reh'g granted and opinion vacated, 774 F.2d 428 (11th Cir, 1985), en
banc decision issued sub nom. Parker v. Bowen, 788 F.2d 1512 (1 1th Cir. 1986). The ALJ's
findings of fact remain highly relevant to the court's scrutiny of the "substantial evidence"
supporting the decision of the Appeals Council.
In practice, however, reviewing courts typically devote the bulk of their attention to a re-
view of the ALJ's decision and the evidence adduced in connection with the hearing. The
work of the Appeals Council, which constitutes the final action of the Secretary, usually re-
ceives far less scrutiny.
268. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.970(a), 416.1470(a) (1986).
269. Id. §§ 404.970(b), 416.1470(b). To qualify as "material" under current Appeals
Council procedures, the evidence must relate to the time period covered by the ALl's deci-
sion. Id.
270. Claimants also frequently allege unfairness at the hearing, citing the ALJ's behavior
or apparent attitude. Unfairness may be evidenced on the hearing record, or it may require
additional investigation. OHA HANDBOOK, supra note 141, at 5-40-21.
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The extent to which the Appeals Council is constrained by the
grounds for review set forth in the regulations is controversial. It is
unclear whether those five are the only grounds under which the Ap-
peals Council may grant review or whether the list is simply illustra-
tive, allowing review for unstated reasons. To date, circuit courts
have granted the Appeals Council the broader power to take cases
for diverse reasons, rather than confining it to the published list.27 1
4. New Evidence. The administrative evidentiary record in a disa-
bility case is closed after the ALJ's decision. 2 2 This rule was enacted
by statute in 1980 for RSDHI cases2 73 and by regulation in 1986 for
SSI and concurrent claims. 274 This means that the Appeals Council
will consider evidence that was not presented to the ALJ only if the
evidence is new and material and relates to the time period that the
ALJ considered.
Notwithstanding this rule, receipt of additional evidence by the
Appeals Council, before or after the decision to grant review of the
case, has been problematic.275 Generally, new evidence may be con-
sidered in three instances. First, if a claimant who appeared pro se
before the ALJ secures representation at the Appeals Council stage,
new evidence discovered by the representative may be considered.2 76
Second, a recent medical review or treatment secured by the claimant
in the interval between the ALJ hearing and the Appeals Council re-
view may be considered if it has a bearing upon the assessment of the
impairment.2 77 Finally, copies of needed medical records may be con-
sidered if they were unavailable at the ALJ hearing due to a physi-
cian's or hospital's failure to respond to a request for the records.2 71
If the new evidence pertains solely to a condition that has arisen or
271. See, e.g., Bauzo v. Bowen, 803 F.2d 917 (7th Cir. 1986); Parker v. Bowen, 788 F.2d
1512 (1 1th Cir. 1986); Razey v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1426 (9th Cir. 1986).
272. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.970(b), 416.1470(b), 52 Fed. Reg. 4004 (1987). The ALJ may close
the record at the conclusion of the hearing or may keep it open for a specified period of time
to receive a claimant's brief, late documents, or the results of a post-hearing consultative
examination. R. FRANCIS, supra note 251, at § 8:39.
273. 42 U.S.C. § 402(j)(2) (1982).
274. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.970, .976, 416.1470, .1476 (1987).
275. Id. §§ 404.976, 416.1476 (1986).
276. Id. §§ 404.968, 416.1468(a).
277. Id. §§ 404.976, 416.1476.
278. There is a widespread, although undocumented, suspicion that some unethical claim-
ants' representatives may deliberately withhold important evidence from the DDS and ALJ
phases and present it for the first time to the Appeals Council or in federal court. If this
evidence results in a finding of disability, its late submission effectively means delay of the
favorable decision. This delay substantially increases the claimant's eventual lump-sum of ret-
roactive benefits, and the attorney's fees are typically calculated as 25% of this past-due
amount.
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worsened since the ALJ hearing, 279 the Appeals Council will gener-
ally not evaluate it, but will return the evidence to the claimant with
a comment that the documents may be relevant to a new application
for benefits, should the pending one be denied. 20
5. Reopening ALJ Decisions. Related to the evidence issue is the
controversy over "reopening" cases. Regulations provide that disa-
bility decisions may be reopened and revised: (1) within twelve
months, for any reason; (2) within four years, for good cause (e.g.,
new evidence, discovery of a clerical error); or (3) at any time, for a
variety of reasons, including fraud and gross error. 21'
The Appeals Council has frequently exercised its reopening power
in "protest" situations where the case was not randomly selected for
standard own-motion review and the sixty-day own-motion period
has expired, but the processing center discovered some technical de-
fect inhibiting effectuation of the AL's award. The case is then re-
turned to the Appeals Council for reopening to correct the error.
212
279. It is often very difficult to determine whether new evidence relates only to the period
after the ALJ's decision or whether it also supports inferences about the claimant's condition
during the period covered by the current application. The Appeals Council considers itself
relatively expansive in its willingness to receive new evidence, having concluded that if it re-
fuses to accept the new evidence and the claimant then files a civil action, the federal court is
likely to view the evidence more sympathetically and will order a remand for its receipt. See
Weinstein, supra note 95, at 917 ("Iw]hen the new evidence is highly persuasive, the good
cause standard [for a remand from the district court to the Appeals Council] is apt to prove
highly malleable."); OHA HANDBOOK, supra note 141, at 5-38-18B. Many claimants' repre-
sentatives, however, report that the Appeals Council has not been especially liberal in consid-
ering new evidence and that recourse to the courts is frequently required.
280. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.976(b), 416.1476(b) (1986). A new application for benefits may be
filed even before the old one is finally adjudicated. F. BLOCH, supra note 13, at 241. To the
extent that the two relate to the same time period, however, denial of the first claim will be
conclusive unless it is reopened. Id.
A second application that relates to a different time period may be pursued at any time. For
example, an SSI claimant may file an application in 1984 and appeal its denial while simulta-
neously filing a new application in 1986. In effect, the claimant is arguing in the alternative
that the onset date of disability was in 1984 and, if the SSA does not accept that argument,
that the condition further deteriorated so that by 1986 it became disabling. However, if the
new claim is allowed by a DDS or ALJ while the old claim is pending in court, a confusing
contradiction may arise within the SSA about the onset date of disability.
Filing a second application after the first has been denied is not a panacea for the claimant.
An SSI claimant who pursues this course would lose a substantial retroactive award for the
period covered by the first application but prior to the second. A RSDHI disability claimant
could be even more disadvantaged because if the claimant's insurance coverage lapses during
the interval, the second (and any subsequent) application will be denied on the basis of finan-
cial ineligibility, regardless of any deterioration in medical condition.
281. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.987 to .996, 416.1487 to .1494 (1986). Reopening an SSI case "for
good cause" is limited to the first two years after the decision, instead of four years as in
RSDHI disability cases. Id. § 416.1488(b).
282. This reopening could be beneficial or detrimental to the claimant. If the ALJ's deci-
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The Appeals Council has also relied upon the reopening provisions
to consider a case that would have been selected for own-motion re-
view but was not, because the bureaucracy moved so slowly that the
sixty-day limit for own-motion review had expired. 283 In this more
controversial context, the reopening provisions greatly enlarge the
Appeals Council's opportunity to reverse an AL's award and delay
the finality of the administrative process. 214 In response to claimants'
complaints about this expansive application of reopening power, the
First Circuit Court has held that the first category of grounds for
reopening (reopening for any reason within twelve months of the
prior determination) may be exercised only by a claimant, not by the
Appeals Council. 285 The Eleventh Circuit has authorized govern-
mental use of these grounds for reopening, but only by the original
decisionmaker, so only the ALJ could reopen an award.28 6
6. Processing Time. The time required for Appeals Council case
handling varies enormously, depending upon the action taken and
the size of the Appeals Council's current workload. Although the
Appeals Council has adopted internal goals for processing time, 28 7
sion overlooked a technical requirement (e.g., onset date before the expiration of insured
status), correction of it could increase or decrease the size of the award. Sometimes mere
typographical errors may be corrected via a telephone call from the OAO analyst to the ALJ,
who issues a corrected decision. OHA HANDBOOK, supra note 141, at 5-42. An ALJ who
awards substantial retroactive RSDHI disability benefits may omit the technical step of re-
opening and redetermining the claimant's prior adverse, but unappealed, decision on a previ-
ous application. Until it is reopened, a prior decision may stand as a res judicata bar to
payment of benefits for the time period it covers. R. FRANCIS, supra note 251, at §§ 6.20,
8.13. The SSA program service center might discover this problem in effectuating the ALJ's
award, and forward the file to the Appeals Council for resolution.
283. Wilson, Procedural Challenges to Social Security Appeals Council Practices, 20
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 937 (Dec. 1986).
284. Id.
285. McCuin v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 161 (1st Cir. 1987). Contra Munsinger v. Schweiker, 709.
F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1983).
286. Butterworth v. Bowen, 796 F.2d 1379 (11 th Cir. 1986).
287. The internal Appeals Council and OHA processing time goals and performances are
as follows:
On request-for-review cases, the goal is to dispose of all cases within 90 days, measured
from the filing of a request for review until the Appeals Council issues its decision. As of May
1987, the average was actually 96 days, of which 90 days were attributable to OAO and 6 days
to the Appeals Council. If a request-for-review case comes into the Appeals Council from
OAO within 85 days, the members are supposed to dispose of it before the 90th day; they are
rated for merit pay purposes on their ability to do so.
In an own-motion case, the Appeals Council is supposed to decide whether to grant review
before the 60-day Bellmon period expires. This deadline is almost always met; if not, the
"reopening" provisions have been exercised. Effective July 2, 1987, the Appeals Council has
determined that the reopening regulations will not be used to take jurisdiction over an old
Bellmon case. After the decision to grant review, the Appeals Council may take an additional
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and although it regularly monitors conformity to these standards,
numerous complaints about cases languishing for months have led to
proposals for review deadlines of sixty or ninety days. 288
7. Progression of a Typical Case. When a case is delivered to the
Appeals Council, either on the claimant's request for review or
through own-motion review, the file is routed to the appropriate
branch of the Office of Appeals Operations (OAO). There, it is ran-
domly assigned to an analyst who must complete work on it within
ten days.
The analyst reviews the entire file, including the ALJ's decision. A
tape recording of the hearing is included with the file and the analyst
must listen to the tape if: (a) the analyst recommends taking own-
motion review, (b) an allegation of an unfair hearing has been
raised, or (c) a medical or vocational expert has given testimony. 2 9
The analyst therefore listens to the tape in perhaps fifteen to twenty
percent of the cases. The analyst then prepares a report summarizing
the file, highlighting key issues, and recommending a course of ac-
tion for the Appeals Council.
In request-for-review cases, the analyst completes a three-page
"face sheet" form, checking appropriate boxes and filling in blanks
90 days to decide how to dispose of the case.
In court cases, an answer (together with transcript) is to be filed within 60 days of service of
the complaint. This is now successfully accomplished 95% of the time.
When a case is remanded from a court, OHA's goal is a processing time of 42 days before
the case is remanded back to the ALJ. The current performance average is approximately 30
days.
The goal for Appeals Council action on an ALJ's recommended decision in a court remand
case is 45 days. Actual performance in this area has been 84-90 days. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 331-33.
"Aged" cases (over 150 days) are flagged for special handling, and members are supposed
to dispose of them first, within 7 days of receipt.
Every case, regardless of other considerations, is to be resolved within 60 days of arrival at
the Appeals Council.
288. 1986 Hearing, supra note 3, at 77 (testimony of Associate Commissioner Frank
Smith). In 1985, average processing time in request-for-review cases was 116 days, id., but as
of May 1987 it had decreased to 96 days. OHA KEY WORKLOAD INDICATORS 13 (May 1987). In
own-motion cases, the average processing times are 138 days in OAO and 4 days in the Ap-
peals Council, for a total of 142 days. Id.
289. In a request-for-review case, the analyst must listen to the testimony of the medical
advisor or vocational expert to determine whether the ALJ's decision to deny benefits was
based on substantial evidence. The analyst ordinarily does not replay the claimant's testimony
(the Appeals Council is unlikely to reverse an ALJ's decision not to credit the claimant's
testimony) but does need to double-check the sufficiency of the record supporting denial.
In some instances, however, the SSA has discovered, after the case has gone to court, that
the hearing tape is inaudible and no transcript can be prepared. There may be benign explana-
tions for this, but sometimes it means simply that the analyst has not listened to the tape as
required, and the member has not detected the omission.
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to reflect the salient characteristics of the claim and its handling by
the ALJ.2 90 The analyst may also choose to write a one- or two-page
statement describing the case further and justifying a recommenda-
tion in greater detail.291 The analyst then drafts a proposed decision
and appropriate notification letters to the claimant. An analyst
might spend a total of three or four hours on a case file, although
the amount of time varies widely among analysts and cases. 292
In own-motion cases, analysts follow essentially the same proce-
dure, except that where the analyst determines that own-motion re-
view should not be taken, the face sheet is only one page.2 93 If the
analyst concludes that own-motion review is inappropriate, the case
is not reviewed by the Appeals Council; instead, it is forwarded for
effectuation of the AL's award.
When an analyst completes the report on a case, the file is deliv-
ered from the OAO to a member of the Appeals Council. If the ana-
lyst has recommended denying the requested review, then only one
member will be assigned to the case. 294 If that member concurs in a
denial, the file is returned to staff who mail the denial notice to the
claimant. The file is then held in the originating OAO branch for 120
days in case the claimant files a civil action in federal court. If the
290. The face sheet asks, inter alia, which ALJ handled the case, whether the claimant is
represented by counsel, what the basis was for any unfavorable aspect of the decision,
whether the ALJ correctly assessed the claimant's residual functional capacity and other voca-
tional issues, and what legal basis the analyst identifies to support the recommendation.
The face sheet does not call for a narrative of the case or the arguments of counsel; these
are available in the ALJ's decision document or in a brief.
Some claimants' representatives have begun routinely requesting a copy of the analyst's
work under the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982). SSA
policy is that the analyst's notes and the notes exchanged between members of the Appeals
Council in reviewing a file are to be released to the claimant upon request.
291. Analysts, who do not have much time for writing the narratives, are evaluated by the
OAO more on the volume, rather than on the quality, of their work. Members of the Appeals
Council, however, frequently appreciate the greater insights contained in the written state-
ment, rather than the multiple-choice form. Thus, an analyst may be serving two masters,
serving simultaneously as an assistant to a member of the Appeals Council and as a staff
member of the OAO branch.
292. Some analysts regularly complete two to three times as many cases per month as oth-
ers do. Cases in which the analyst intends to recommend a grant of review usually require a
narrative and take longer than cases where review should be denied. One analyst estimated
that processing a standard denial might take from 30 to 45 minutes, whereas a recommenda-
tion in favor of granting review might take from two to three hours. Denying review where
new evidence had been submitted after the ALJ's decision might also require more time.
293. The own-motion face sheet or "effectuation sheet" omits all of the demographic
data of the longer form, and requires that the analyst only check the correctness of the ALJ's
conclusions. If the analyst decides that own-motion review should be taken, a more detailed
form is used.
294. 20 C.F.R. § 422.205(c) (1986); see Chart 3, infra page 322; see also R. FRANcIs, supra
note 251, at § 9.03.
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claimant does not initiate a civil action, the file is deposited for long-
term storage at a federal records center.
If the analyst recommends review and the member agrees-or if
the analyst recommends denying review but the member disagrees-
the case is seen by two members.2 95 The first reviews the file and
sends it to the second member with a note about the proposed out-
come. The second member conducts a similar evaluation. 296 If the
members agree, their decision is final. If the members do not agree,
they meet to discuss the case. 297 If the disagreement persists, the Dep-
uty Chair of the Appeals Council (or a designee) reads the file and
resolves the matter. 298 This tie-breaking procedure is followed per-
haps twenty to forty times per month.
If the members decide to remand the case, the file is mailed with
appropriate instructions to the local hearing office. 299 If the Council
decides to reverse an ALJ's denial and pay the claim, the file is
mailed to the appropriate processing center for effectuation. If the
members decide to grant review, but do not elect to issue a fully fa-
vorable decision immediately (e.g., to hold the case pending further
development, or grant only a portion of the benefits) the claimant is
295. 20 C.F.R. § 422.205(b) (1986). In principle, the members, not the analysts, decide
whether to grant the claimant's request for review. Thus, it is up to the first member to deter-
mine whether the case should be seen by a second member, regardless of the analyst's recom-
mendation. The exception to this principle is own-motion cases where, if the analyst
recommends taking review, the case is seen by two members, even if the first member disa-
grees with the analyst's recommendation.
The method for assigning the two members to a case has become very complex. Formerly,
the first member could "shop around" for another member who might be inclined to take a
similar position. The old system also afforded discretion to office staff in allocating case-
loads.
Now the selection is done randomly, according to the claimant's Social Security number.
The first member is designated from within the appropriate geographic grouping, based on an
even division of numbers among the four to six members of the group. The second member is
selected by allocating cases among all the members (i.e., not just those in the same geographic
group) according to the sixth, seventh and eighth digits of the claimant's Social Security num-
ber.
These patterns, however, are not rigidly applied. Whenever a member is absent from the
office, the computer distributes the caseload for that day among the available alternates.
296. OHA HANDBOOK, supra note 141, at 5-38. Some members, when assigned to a case as
a second member, consider themselves responsible for undertaking a de novo review of the
case, with a level of scrutiny equal to that of the first member. Others approach such a case
with a presumption toward agreeing with the first member's preferences if possible.
297. Most differences between team members are quickly resolved in this fashion, with
informal conversations identifying and resolving differences.
298. 20 C.F.R. § 422.205(b) (1986). Regulations permit the Appeals Council to consider a
case en banc (i.e., with five or more members participating). Id. § 422.205(e). However, this
procedure has been implemented on only one occasion in the past several years, regarding a
non-disability question of SSI.
299. Id. §§ 404.977(e), 416.1477(e).
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notified and afforded twenty days to comment.3°° The file is returned
to the OAO branch to await receipt of the additional information or
argumentation. When completed, the file ultimately returns to the
same analyst, and to the same two members who saw it the first time
around, for a final decision.
Regulations permit oral argument before the Appeals Council,30'
but this practice has atrophied because of transportation costs and
time concerns. 02 In the past several years the Appeals Council has
heard oral argument in only a half-dozen Social Security cases, none
involving disability. 303 Appeals Council action is thus entirely a paper
review.304
An Appeals Council decision is supposed to be written to conform
in substance to the standards governing ALJ opinions.3 5 The Ap-
peals Council is required to explain the evidence relied upon, the
central legal authority, and, if the Appeals Council overturns a find-
ing by an ALJ,30 6 the considerations that led to the outcome. 0 7 Dur-
300. Id. §§ 404.977(d), 416.1477(d).
301. Id. §§ 404.976(c), 416.1476(c).
302. For an oral argument, the SSA would either pay for Appeals Council members to
travel to the claimaht's place of residence or pay the claimant's expenses for coming to Ar-
lington, Virginia. Id. §§ 404.999(a) to .999(d), 416.1495 to .1499. Oral argument requires a
panel of at least three members. Id. § 422.205(b).
303. To warrant oral argument, there must be a significant issue of law or policy within
the competence of the Appeals Council. Id. §§ 404.976(c), 416.1476(c).
304. It is striking how frequently claimants and their representatives report that they have
never had any contact with Appeals Council members or OAO analysts while cases are pend-
ing before the Appeals Council. Many express considerable frustration at the inability to en-
gage the decisionmakers, or even to contact them by telephone. They say they have even
experienced great difficulty in locating the responsible officials to check the status and future
timetable of a case; they unanimously report to us an image of the Appeals Council as a
hidden, isolated institution that is unresponsive to outside inquiry. See also R. FRANCIS, supra
note 25 1, at § 9.13.
305. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.953, 416.1453 (1986).
306. Appeals Council members agree with the analysts' recommendations regarding the
ultimate outcome of the case in a very high percentage of claims. Interestingly, however, the
exact percentage of such agreements is unclear.
OAO analysts reported to us that members accepted their recommendations as often as 98%
of the time, while members said they rejected analysts' conclusions 10 to 20% of the time. We
are not certain why there was such a wide difference in perceptions: perhaps we interviewed
unrepresentative individuals from each group (unusually able analysts, unusually idiosyncratic
members); perhaps each group's professional self image encourages it to promote its own per-
spective (e.g., analysts stress agreement, to demonstrate that they are serving the members
well, while members stress disagreement, to underscore the Appeals Council's independence,
as an organization not "captured" by its staff).
A similar disparity arose when we asked how often "write-backs" occur (i.e., instances
where a member returns the file to the analyst for correcting a decisional document or letter,
even though the ultimate outcome of the case was not being changed). Analysts said this oc-
cured in perhaps 10% of the cases; members estimated 20 to 35%.
307. E.g., Parker v. Bowen, 788 F.2d 1512 (1lth Cir. 1986); Beavers v. Secretary, 577
F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1978); Combs v. Weinberger, 501 F.2d 1361 (4th Cir. 1974); Bohr v.
Schweiker, 565 F. Supp. 610 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
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ing the past two years, the Appeals Council has attempted to
improve the caliber of its opinions, making them more responsive to
the evidence and to the claimant's contentions. Notices about denials
of review are still composed largely of "boilerplate" language, but
Appeals Council decisions on the merits are expected to be more in-
dividualized.30
An Appeals Council member, like all other decisionmakers within
the SSA claims system, must cope with the pressures of the caseload.
Recent caseloads have reached 500 cases per member per month; this
means that each member receives two or three dozen cases per day.309
A member, therefore, typically spends only ten to fifteen minutes
reviewing an average case. Agreement with an analyst's recommen-
dation to deny review is often very quick, while decisions to grant
review may take much longer. Council members virtually never listen
to the tape recording of the hearing; 10 instead, they usually review
the analyst's report, read the ALJ's decision, and examine the rest of
the file to decide whether the analyst's recommendation is correct.3"'
A case might stay on a member's desk from a few days to a few
weeks.
3 1 2
308. See OHA HANDBOOK, supra note 141, at 5-38-18 B-4. Claimants and their representa-
tives, however, report that Appeals Council decisions occasionally still appear to be boiler-
plate, and that even when a degree of individualization has been undertaken, the opinions are
still conclusory, incomplete, and not fully comprehensible.
ALJ opinions, too, have been criticized as relying too heavily upon standardized boilerplate
and rote recital of medical history, without sufficient analysis or elaboration of rationale.
Heaney, supra note 96, at 11.
309. It is difficult to compute a meaningful statistic for how many cases an Appeals Coun-
cil member might work on in a month, because it is debatable what should count as a separate
case when the same file is worked on more than one occasion, and by more than one member.
One member explained that, although the Appeals Council statistics might report an average
of only 500 cases per month, the true figure would be 750 to 800 cases per month if one
included cases worked by two members.
310. Hearings before Social Security ALJs are not routinely transcribed, unless the case
goes to court; therefore, the only way to access the record of events before the ALJ is to listen
to the tape recording. OHA HANDBOOK, supra note 141, at 5-43. Members may do so, but
only in rare instances do they take the time. Typical was one member's report that she had
listened to a hearing tape only three times in six years, on cases where the claimant alleged
that the ALl's tone and manner had created an unfair hearing environment.
Moreover, ALJs are now using new four-track recorders, but the Appeals Council members
still have only older two-track machines; thus, members are not able to play hearings without
sending them back for conversion.
In a close case, a member might send the file back to the OAO with instructions to the
analyst to listen to the tape again and prepare a better abstract.
311. A member might telephone the analyst to have a more detailed conversation about a
particular case. These consultations are rare, however, because a substantial amount of time
might elapse between the analyst's and the member's respective reviews of the file; the analyst
will have forgotten details by then.
312. The high volume of cases is in striking contrast to the number handled elsewhere. For
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b. New Court Filings
The Appeals Council decision constitutes a final action by the Sec-
retary of HHS. 113 At this point, the claimant has exhausted available
administrative remedies and may file a civil complaint in federal dis-
trict court. 14
When a claimant initiates a civil action,315 the HHS Office of Gen-
eral Counsel exercises the lead responsibility for managing the gov-
ernment's role in the litigation, but the Appeals Council may have a
major involvement, too. First, the OAO Division of Civil Actions
(DCA) obtains the claims file from the OAO branch that initially
handled the case.3'1 6 A DCA analyst determines whether the court
complaint was timely, '1 7 arranges for transcription of the tape re-
example, while an SSA ALJ might average 30 cases per month, ALJs in other agencies carry
caseloads of less than one-tenth that size. 1983 ACUS REPORT, supra note 2, passim.
In our observation, members of the Appeals Council are snowed under with files. Every
member's office is jammed with case files stacked on every available flat surface, and huge
laundry hampers full of case files are waiting in the corridors. Whenever we entered a mem-
ber's office for an interview, a familiar routine transpired: the member would lift a stack of
files off the couch to clear a place for us to sit and then look helplessly around the office for
an empty spot to deposit them.
Other observers have noted the huge stacks of files within OHA:
Space constraints were evident in each component in the various buildings. Folders
were lying in neat piles on the floor in aisles in the different sections of the D&F
[Docket and Files] Branch. In DCA [Division of Civil Actions], hampers filled with
folders sat in the corridors while other folders rested on the floor in large piles
blocking an aisle awaiting placement on shelves in a holding area. Elsewhere, large
numbers of full folder boxes were lying on the floor wherever space was available
while waiting to be shipped to the Glebe Building.
Process Review and Engineering Branch, Div. of Management Studies and Analysis, Office of
Management Planning and Analysis; Office of Management, Budget and Personnel, Review
of Folder Movement in the Office of Hearings and Appeals 4 (Apr. 1984) [hereinafter Review
of Folder Movement].
313. PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 32, at 55. For an illustration of the case-flow process,
see Chart 4, infra page 323.
314. Id.
315. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1987).
316. The Division of Civil Actions (DCA) of the OAO is separated into seven geographic
branches. Each DCA branch is responsible for all cases in its area that proceed to federal
court (except for a few experimental modules in other OAO divisions). Recently proposals
have been made to move the DCA out of the OAO and make it a litigation unit within the
Office of the Associate Commissioner.
The SSA has experienced a substantial problem with lost or misplaced case files, delaying its
response to new court filings in a number of instances. Sometimes the file is truly lost and
must be reconstructed from other sources. More often, however, a failure occurs in the system
for storing cases within the OHA and tracking their movement from one office to the next.
Review of Folder Movement, supra note 312, passim.
317. If the court complaint is not timely (i.e., it was filed more than sixty days after re-
ceipt of the Appeals Council's denial, and no additional time had been requested), the DCA
analyst may seek a court dismissal by preparing an affidavit of the Branch Chief, stating that
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cording of the ALJ hearing,3"" and helps assemble a completed file.
If new evidence was submitted after the Appeals Council's first
consideration of the case but before the filing of the court com-
plaint, the DCA analyst makes a recommendation as to whether the
Council's original decision should be reversed in light of the new evi-
dence.31 9 If new evidence does not effect a reversal, the case proceeds
in court.320
The attorney for the government (an HHS regional attorney3 21 or
local U.S. attorney) may then ask the Appeals Council to conduct a
"supplemental review." This may occur when the litigator concludes
the file reflects untimely filing. This type of case action is not reviewed by any member of the
Appeals Council.
The Appeals Council has the authority to extend the sixty day period for filing a court
complaint, if the claimant so requests in writing and demonstrates good cause for the addi-
tional time. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.982, 416.1482 (1986). The current practice is liberal with respect
to requests for extensions. An analyst may grant up to an additional sixty days without a
member's approval. OHA HANDBOOK, supra note 141, at 5-68-10.
318. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.974, 416.1474 (1986). Transcription service is usually provided by
private consultants, who have not always been reliable. The Contracts Staff of the OAO tran-
scribes tapes when time is insufficient for sending it to an outside contractor, or where the
contractor has already returned a transcript with an indication that much of it is inaudible.
SSA has also experienced frequent, severe problems with the quality of the tape recordings of
ALJ hearings. If the tape is inaudible, no transcript can be prepared, the case cannot be de-
fended in court, and a new hearing is ordinarily required. SSA recently purchased a fleet of
new high-quality four-track tape recorders for all ALJs in an attempt to rectify this problem.
A recent study by the Office of Audit of the HHS Inspector General revealed that major
problems arose with the audibility, storage, and retrieval system for tape recordings of ALJ
hearings, and that the recent automated upgrading of that system had been disastrously inef-
fective. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Social Security Admin., Office of Inspector
General, Office of Audit, REVIEW OF OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS AUTOMATED MASS
STORAGE AND RETRIEVAL SYSTEM (1984).
319. See R. FRANCIS, supra note 251, at § 10.06.
320. A transcript and answer must be filed within sixty days of the complaint. Only a few
years ago, the SSA was missing this deadline as often as 90076 of the time, and contempt
citations from district courts were common. In response, the HHS Office of General Counsel
moved some attorneys and reprographics staff from Baltimore to Arlington, Virginia, to work
more closely with OHA. At the same time, OHA file and tape storage systems were improved.
Now approximately 950 of the answers and transcripts are filed on time. OHA OPERATIONAL
REP. 18 (Sept. 30, 1986).
321. A "Regional Chief Counsel" is HHS's chief litigator in each of the several regional
offices around the country and is primarily responsible for handling all of that region's de-
partmental litigation, of which SSA disability cases constitute the overwhelming majority.
Some regional attorneys are designated as Special Assistant U.S. Attorneys, and all interact
closely with the Department of Justice litigation staff.
The Office of General Counsel (OGC) of the Department of Health and Human Services,
especially that segment of OGC that serves as chief counsel to the SSA, also handles some of
the disability litigation. The Baltimore headquarters staff is most likely to become involved in
major test cases, class actions or appellate level work, where the Department of Justice's Of-
fice of the Solicitor General may also participate.
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that the case is indefensible in court, 22 even if it was correctly denied
under SSA standards. The litigator may thus recommend that the
agency take back the case on a Secretary's motion for remand to pay
the claim, bolster the evidentiary record, or enhance the written ra-
tionale for denial.
In a supplemental review case, the Appeals Council follows an ex-
pedited procedure in order to respond in a timely fashion to the de-
mands of the court's calendar. The litigating attorney sends a
memorandum to the Appeals Council outlining defects in the case,
the difficulties in defending it, and the reasons for a possible re-
mand. The memorandum and case file are returned to the DCA ana-
lyst, who prepares an oral presentation for a panel of two Appeals
Council members,3 23 usually including one who participated in the
initial review. These two members choose either to seek a remand
from the court or to insist on defending the case.32 4 This type of
panel review occurs quite frequently, perhaps thirty to forty times
322. The SSA used to win the overwhelming majority of its federal court cases. In both
1978 and 1979, the SSA was affirmed 87qo of the time and reversed only 130o of the time. The
SSA's winning percentage began to fall in 1980, dropping to as low as 430 in 1984, before
recovering to 54% in 1985 and 6206 in 1986. (Figures do not include remands.) Gonya, supra
note 152, at 2. As recently as 1983, some observers noted that federal court decisions generally
upheld SSA's management practices and "also reflect a high degree of judicial confidence in
the competence of the SSA." Liebman, supra note 21, at 1960. For additional information,
see the SSA videotape Bradley Speaks (1987) (remarks by OHA Associate Commissioner Ei-
leen Bradley saying "we can't be that bad" [as court loss statistics would suggest] and asking
why SSA cases are overturned so often).
323. The analyst may also need to undertake some legal research, and will typically pre-
pare a short "panel memorandum," highlighting key facts and attaching salient exhibits.
From the time of receipt of a telecopied version of the regional attorney's memorandum,
OAO and the Appeals Council have five days in which to respond.
324. In one sense, a panel's decision to take a case back for further administrative action
is an admission that the Appeals Council erred in denying review (or in denying benefits) the
first time. In another sense, however, a voluntary remand might not be a confession of error;
new evidence might have been provided that alters the nature of the case.
Even more significantly, the supplemental review in effect adds a possible new criterion for
an award of disability benefits: the indefensibility of the case in court. This is the first time in
the administrative ladder that this factor has been explicitly addressed, and it introduces a set
of considerations independent from the medical and vocational factors of the listings or grids.
This factor of practical litigation policy is otherwise strikingly absent in the SSA claims
adjudicative hierarchy. Most other government agencies have, and regularly utilize, the au-
thority to settle or compromise cases, or to elect not to prosecute a matter for tactical reasons.
SSA exercises a comparable power only very late in the process-after administrative remedies
have been exhausted and a federal court case has been filed. See NAT'L CENTER STUDY, supra
note 134, at 131-32. The SSA flexibility, moreover, is not really a power to settle or compro-
mise a claim-only rarely is there a discrete issue (such as onset or termination date of disabil-
ity) over which bargaining is possible. More typically, SSA is able to exercise only the
discretion to abandon its position and pay the claim entirely.
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per week, with a typical panel meeting lasting from fifteen to thirty
minutes.325
If the panel decides that the case should be pursued in court but
the litigating attorney still believes that a remand is more appropri-
ate, the attorney may request an additional review before a "super-
panel." This panel is composed of one member from the original
panel, the Deputy Chair of the Appeals Council, and a third member
designated by the Deputy Chair.3 26
Similar procedures are followed for the analyst's oral presenta-
tion. A super-panel is quite rare, occurring only sixty-nine times in
the two years following the procedure's inauguration.3 27 An Appeals
Council super-panel has resisted the regional attorney's urging for a
remand on only ten occasions.
3 21
c. Court Decisions
The Appeals Council does not regularly monitor a disability case
after it goes to court. In fact, the Appeals Council is not directly
notified of the courts' decisions, and members learn of the outcome
in most cases only haphazardly, if at all. Even if a case is remanded
325. In 83% of the 1507 cases brought for supplemental review during 1985 and the first
half of 1986, the Appeals Council panel agreed upon a remand. OHA OPERATIONAL REP. 8
(Sept. 30, 1986).
326. SSA regional attorneys vary widely in their use of protests to Appeals Council panels
and super-panels and in the vigor with which they assert the SSA position in court. Sometimes
a regional attorney will not even file a brief, irritating members of the Appeals Council who
feel that their position has been undercut. Weinstein, supra note 95, at 926.
Similar tensions occasionally arise with respect to appeals of cases lost in the district court.
Regional attorneys or Department of Justice litigators have not always been as keen as Ap-
peals Council members on fighting to sustain SSA positions. The attorneys, on the other
hand, may feel that the SSA is at fault for failing to appreciate the difficulty and the growing
professional responsibility considerations of pursuing an unjustified case. Id.
327. Prior to the institution of the super-panel procedures, a regional attorney disap-
pointed by a panel's decision to pursue the claim could protest directly to the Deputy Chair of
the Appeals Council and ultimately to the Associate Commissioner for OHA or to the SSA
Chief Counsel.
Some favor a return to that system, based on the judgment that super-panels consume a
substantial amount of members' and analysts' time, especially since the Deputy Chair (who
sits on all super-panels and appoints one of the other members) is likely to have the last word
on remand anyway.
328. Under the 1980 amendments, the Secretary must show "good cause" to support a
remand order. Disability Amendments of 1980, supra note 251. A claimant's attorney might
resist a remand, concluding that the SSA would use the additional processing time only to
bolster its weak case. Nevertheless, the Secretary's motion for remand is almost invariably
granted. But see Larkin v. Heckler, 584 F. Supp. 512 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (denying Secretary's
motion for remand where good cause was not shown and it appeared the government was
seeking a remand merely to delay the case).
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from the court to the Appeals Council, the individual members who
worked the case initially receive little personal feedback.32 9
The Appeals Council may play a major role in a case remanded by
a federal court with instructions to conduct a new hearing or to com-
pile new evidence. If the court's directive is sufficiently clear, the
Council uses a "fast track" procedure, and the file goes directly to
the appropriate local hearing office so that an ALJ may carry out
the court's orders. In other instances, the Appeals Council will sup-
plement the court's remand order with interpretation or additional
guidance before sending the case to an ALJ.330
In a case remanded from a court, the ALJ does not issue a final
decision as would be done in the usual adjudication. " ' Instead, the
ALJ prepares a "recommended decision," which is forwarded to the
Appeals Council. A copy of the recommendation is also provided to
the claimant, who has an opportunity to respond before the Appeals
Council considers it. The Appeals Council may then adopt or modify
the recommendation.3 2 Rarely, the Council may reremand a case for
329. Because Appeals Council members deal with so many cases, they retain little special
interest or curiosity about those that might be resolved months or years later in court. Mem-
bers also believe that often little can be learned from reviewing court actions: if the district
court judge is simply re-weighing the administrative findings of fact, there is nothing of an
important precedential nature in the feedback. For an illustration of procedures following
remand, see Chart 5, infra page 324.
In 1987 the SSA recently created a Litigation Strategy Task Force to review SSA litigation
policies and procedures and make recommendations regarding improvements. The Associate
Commissioner for the OHA chairs the Task Force, and three Appeals Council members serve
on it. Memorandum from Eileen Bradley (Sept. 14, 1987).
330. The reliance upon "fast track" remands has resulted in some controversy. It is un-
doubtedly quicker to forward a court order to the ALJ directly, without occupying the inter-
vening time and attention of an Appeals Council member, and OAO analysts have sometimes
been given the authority to make the decision whether to use this fast track. Some people,
however, feel that analysts are not always able to discern the cases that require additional
Appeals Council commentary or instruction before release to the ALJ. Some members there-
fore prefer that the Council see all remand orders, even those that will clearly not require any
elaboration beyond the "short form" that an analyst would use.
Where the Appeals Council does elaborate on the court's remand order it typically does so
to resolve an apparent conflict between the order and a Social Security Ruling or to instruct
the ALJ to update the medical evidence in the record. The Appeals Council may also seek an
appeal, a reargument, or a clarification of the court's remand order, but it does so only
rarely.
The historical record reveals wide variation on whether court remands are processed by the
Appeals Council itself, or are referred to ALJs. For example, in FY 1965, 13.2% of the court
remands were retained by the Appeals Council and were never further remanded to an ALJ;
comparable figures for other years are: FY 1966, 26.601o; FY 1967, 47.4%; FY 1968, 23.3%;
FY 1969, 16.9%; FY 1970, 36.5%; and FY 1971, 43.5%. DEP'T OF HEW, BRIEFING PAMPHLET
FOR THE BUREAU OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 24 (June 30, 1971).
331. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.983, 416.1483 (1986).
332. Id. §§ 404.977, 416.1477. The SSA is interested in expediting this process, and has
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further work by the AL. The final decision is sent out over the sig-
nature of two Council members.333
In evaluating these recommended decisions, the Appeals Council
does not follow the "substantial evidence" test used in evaluating
ordinary ALJ decisions; instead, the Appeals Council relies on some-
thing akin to a "preponderance of the evidence" test, and is more
willing to revise an ALJ's work. OAO analysts and Appeals Council
members typically devote much more time and attention to review of
an ALJ's recommended decision in a remand case than they would
to an ALJ's final decision in a standard "review level" case.
The Appeals Council is also occasionally involved in SSA actions
following a court decision, and may be consulted about the feasibil-
ity of appealing an adverse decision or of seeking clarification of its
terms. These litigation decisions involve many other components of
the SSA, as well as litigators from the Departments of Justice and
HHS.
6. Other Appeals Council Functions
In addition to reviewing disability cases, the Appeals Council per-
forms a variety of other functions. For example, it hears a small
number of nondisability cases (e.g., survivor's claims where the rela-
tionship is contested, and Medicare services providers' claims).334
Although the vast bulk of Appeals Council decisions are fact-
based, rather than interpretive or policymaking, the Council helps
formulate SSA policy in several ways.335 The Council highlights deci-
issued a proposed rule, 52 Fed. Reg. 38,466 (1987), under which an ALJ could issue a conven-
tional decision, not merely a recommended decision, in remand cases. Instead of automati-
cally coming before the Appeals Council, the case would be subject to request-for-review or
own-motion review, as are other ALJ decisions.
333. An ALJ decision in an ordinary case becomes "final" if nothing is done'to review it.
In a court remand, however, the recommended decision does not become final unless the Ap-
peals Council adopts it. The Appeals Council and DCA devote far more time and attention to
remanded cases than to others.
If the Appeals Council is not satisfied with the work of the ALJ, it may order a second
remand. F. BLOCH, supra note 13, at 291. In rare cases, even a third remand may be required,
although internal procedures require the approval of the Director of OAO before an analyst
recommends a third remand, and the approval of the Deputy Chair before a member orders
one.
334. Disability cases account for approximately 95% of the Appeals Council's docket.
Medicare cases are in the process of being transferred to a new cadre of ALJs and a new
appellate body within the Health Care Financing Administration of HHS. See Kinney, The
Medicare Appeals System for Coverage and Payment Disputes: Achieving Fairness in a Time
of Constraint, 1 ADMIN. L. J. 1 (1987).
335. The position description for a member of the Appeals Council as far back as 1960
included the role of "participating in the formulation of substantive and procedural policies,"
and "participating in the planning and preparation of all necessary rules and regulations relat-
ing to fair hearings." See C. Horsky & A. Mahin, supra note 196, at 300b.
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sions that might usefully be converted into Social Security Rulings
(SSRs), for example, and refers those matters to the Office of Regu-
lations, which prepares SSRs.336 Deciding the rare case that breaks
new ground in construing Social Security law in new circumstances is
another policymaking step.337
A third policy-related role is the occasional assigned study,
through task forces, of the impact of newly proposed disability stan-
dards. When the Office of Management and Budget evaluated regu-
lations for the new mental impairments listings, for example, it
asked the Appeals Council to examine the possibility that large num-
bers of cases would be decided differently under the new stan-
dards.33 Individual Council members have also participated in SSA
task forces asked to review and recommend changes in major SSA
policies such as those involving severity or medical improvements.
Council members have similarly served on OHA committees study-
ing internal reorganization possibilities.33 9
"Policy" is also made whenever members consult about shared
problems and reach mutually acceptable solutions that might be ap-
plied in future cases, even if these results do not strictly govern sub-
sequent decisions.3 40
336. New SSRs can come from many sources. One official we interviewed suggested that
one of the most valuable current functions of the Appeals Council is its occasional role as a
forum for ALJs and members to identify recurrent problems in implementing SSA policies
and practices, some of which may be corrected by SSRs. The Appeals Council may also have
the opportunity to comment on the evolution of other expressions of SSA policy and law,
such as draft regulations or internal circulars.
337. For example, in an SSI disability case a few years ago the Appeals Council granted
review because of a "broad policy or procedural issue that may affect the public generally,"
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.970(a)(4), 416.1470(a)(4) (1986). In that instance, the Appeals Council de-
cided as a matter of first impression that Bureau of Indian Affairs' payments to a Navajo
tribal entity, which then passed the funds to a group of approximately 150 individuals, should
count against the ultimate recipients' SSI income and resource ceilings.
338. To conduct this study, Appeals Council members examined hundreds of "dead"
cases (i.e., ones in which mental impairment claims had been raised and ultimately resolved)
and prepared alternative evaluations, pursuant to the existing and the proposed standards.
When the study revealed that the new mental impairment listings were unlikely to result in a
large increase in the number of awards made, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
approved the new regulations. Similarly, members of the Appeals Council devoted a substan-
tial amount of time to participation in the studies culminating in the BELLMON REPORT, supra
note 173.
339. These ad hoc review bodies were chartered in response to public criticisms of particu-
lar SSA policies. The Appeals Council members were asked to participate, based on their
perspectives as reviewers of a large number of cases, by identifying recurrent issues or prob-
lems.
340. The full Appeals Council holds monthly meetings, and members may place substan-
tive items of this type on the agenda, but they have rarely done so recently. Informal consulta-
tion among members of a geographic grouping, between the members assigned to a particular
case or among others, occurs on a daily basis.
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The Appeals Council previously played a larger role in making
SSA policy. Council members in earlier years frequently discussed
substantive policy matters at regular en banc meetings. The Council
would then vote and record its policy agreements in short minutes
that were disseminated as guidance within OHA. These minutes were
not binding on other components of the SSA, but they served as no-
tice within the adjudicatory process on how the Appeals Council
would handle a particular question, thereby hinting what DDSs and
ALJs might do in order to have their decisions affirmed.14
7. Costs of the Appeals Council
The more subjective costs and benefits of the Appeals Council are
reviewed below. Even the calculation of the organization's objective
financial costs is not straightforward because SSA accounting is not
ordinarily performed in a fashion that permits separate cost assess-
ments of discrete bureaucratic units.
At the time of our original report the best information available
for FY 1987 costs associated with the operation of the Appeals
Council was:3 42
OAO Salaries and Benefits $26,570,742
Other OAO Costs 1,946,384
OAO Subtotal $28,517,126
Appeals Council
Salaries and Benefits 2,805,251
Other Appeals Council Costs $ 347,981
Appeals Council Subtotal 3,153,232
Total for OAO and Appeals Council $31,670,358
II. CURRENT AND POTENTIAL GOALS OF THE APPEALS COUNCIL
A determination of the Appeals Council's proper role within the
bureaucracy must begin with an articulation of its organizational
goals. Goal identification for a subunit of a complex department is
not easy where many conflicting issues compete for attention. None-
theless, we have identified six related functions that the Appeals
Council performs or should perform: (1) policy development, (2) im-
341. The OHA Law Reporter is the Office of Hearings and Appeals' quarterly summary
of selected actions by ALJs, the Appeals Council, and other bodies relevant to the SSA. It still
contains an entry for a section on Appeals Council minutes in its table of contents, but this
section has had nothing to report for several successive quarters.
342. Letter from William Taylor, supra note 155 (based on actual figures through May
1987 and estimates for the entire year).
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provement of factual accuracy, (3) assurance of program integrity,
(4) consistency in decisionmaking, (5) improvement of system-wide
efficiency, and (6) fostering of greater public acceptance.
A. Policy Development
The primary function of most administrative review bodies is par-
ticipation in the development and implementation of agency pol-
icy.343 Whether this appellate authority resides in the head of the
agency or in some lesser body, the traditional scheme of administra-
tive law generally places responsibility for generating policy at the
top of the appellate pyramid. 3"
Policy functions may be executed by precedential case adjudica-
tion, by generating prospective rules, or by a mixture of methods.3 41
Whatever the method, however, it is important that the appellate au-
thority look past case-by-case determinations to extrapolate gener-
ally applicable policy.3 46
The Appeals Council has largely abandoned this traditional
model. All members of the Appeals Council report that they now
function almost exclusively as case handlers, not as policymakers.
They define their role as reviewers of ALJ decisions, processing an
incessant run of cases and having little time to participate in broader
343. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (1982) ("on appeal from or review of the initial decision, the
agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may
limit the issues on notice or by rule .... "); see also ACUS RECOMMENDATION 68-6, DELEGA-
TION OF FINAL DECISIONAL AUTHORITY SUBJECT TO DISCRETIONARY REVIEW BY THE AGENCY
305.68-6 (1968).
344. An agency head may, if he deems it proper, reverse the ALJ on any ground so
long as there is a reasonable basis for the ultimate decision, a requirement that
would obtain in all events. In reviewing adjudications or in adjudicating matters
himself, the agency head necessarily is sensitive to the political considerations that
informed the policy decisions. Indeed, it is his capacity, unique within the agency,
to evaluate those considerations that prompted the APA's crafters to retain agency
review of adjudications; wholly independent adjudications, lacking the agency
head's sensitivity to factors not easily captured in rule form, might produce policies
at odds with those the agency, acting within its delegated power, seeks to advance.
1983 ACUS REPORT, supra note 2, at 122; see also J. FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 126-27, 134-
37. But see Strauss, Rules Adjudication and Other Sources of Law in an Executive Depart-
ment: Reflections on the Interior Department's Administration of the Mining Law, 74 COLUM.
L. REV. 1231, 1264 (1974).
345. A hearing officer often makes policy interstitially by helping agency standards evolve
in individual cases. Nonetheless, the underlying distinction remains: in most agencies, the
hearing level is for finding facts, while the appellate level is for generating and overseeing
policy.
346. See C. KOCH, supra note 2, at §§ 6.73, 9.3.
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policymaking.3 4 7 SSA leadership officials agree that the Appeals
Council operation resembles a factory assembly line.3 4 The job de-
scription of the Appeals Council as an entity has been defined, for
practical purposes, as "getting the cases worked," paying attention
to the particular file in front of the Council at a particular time,
without much participation in the policy process.
Why has this transformation occurred? The Appeals Council, af-
ter all, is the only entity within the SSA that regularly reviews cases
as they leave the administrative levels and again as they are re-
manded by the courts. Why does the Council not use its special per-
spective to contribute more to agency policy? Three reasons are
apparent.
First and foremost is the crush of the cases. Over the past several
years the Appeals Council has been swallowed whole by its docket.
When 40,000, 60,000 or 80,000 case files per year stack up in the
Appeals Council mailroom, the entire bureaucracy must be mar-
shalled to process them. When a member of the Appeals Council is
confronted by thirty cases each day, aware that a failure to dispatch
any of them means that sixty files will require action tomorrow,
there is precious little time for reflection, for the pausing from
chaos, to generate mature policy recommendations. When the Ap-
peals Council is so driven to process its files, it is not surprising that
all its institutional resources will be bent to that purpose, and all
other possible functions will atrophy.
Second, the Appeals Council's policy function has been degraded
further by the evolution of alternative mechanisms for creating pol-
icy through rulemaking.3 49 The SSA has developed a complex system
347. J. MASHAW, supra note 154, at 105. "[Tlhe [Appeals Council] is not the principal
policy arm of the [Slecretary or the [C]ommissioner with respect to the [RSDHI] program."
Id. Burton Berkley, Deputy Chair of the Appeals Council, stated: "We [the Appeals Council]
are not a policymaking body. We adjudacate (sic) cases that come along but we adjudacate
(sic) them in accordance with published policy." Cleveland Transcript, supra note 257, at 27 1.
348. As an exception, however, members have occasionally identified areas appropriate
for future rulemaking, and individual members have been assigned to participate in agency-
wide policy-review bodies.
349. Rulemaking and adjudicating are partially complementary, partially competing,
methods of enunciating agency policy. The Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative
Procedure Act (1947), intended to advise agencies on compliance with the APA, observed:
[T]he entire Act is based on a dichotomy between rule making and adjudication
.... Rule making is . . . essentially legislative in nature, not only because it oper-
ates in the future but also because it is primarily concerned with policy considera-
tions. The object of the rule making proceeding is the implementation or
prescription of law or policy for the future, rather than the evaluation of a respon-
dent's past conduct.
Id. at 14.
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of making policy pronouncements. Formal regulations promulgated
through APA rulemaking procedures, less weighty interpretive stan-
dards of Social Security Rulings (SSRs), and numerous internal pol-
icy statements, circulars, and manuals demonstrate the SSA's ability
to make policy without substantial Appeals Council input.5 0 Many
of these various mechanisms are ponderously slow, incomplete, or
inconsistent, but they show that the SSA has not waited for the Ap-
peals Council to act. The process of policy-generation has had to
continue, and SSA has developed systems for propounding policy in
a variety of forms, even without the usual sort of assistance provided
by appellate administrative review bodies.
This process suggests a third factor contributing to the decline of
the Appeals Council's policy role: geography. Located in Arlington,
Virginia, and separated from the Baltimore headquarters of the SSA
and from the Washington, D.C., headquarters of HHS, the Appeals
Council has been insulated from partisan interference. This distance,
however, has made communication with the SSA and HHS head-
quarters more difficult. 51 It is simply less convenient to rely upon
the Appeals Council for policy input when its members are not phys-
ically present in the arena where policy is being made.
The Appeals Council, therefore, has been almost entirely excluded
from SSA policymaking, though not through a deliberate ploy of
power politics. On the contrary, SSA officials revealed in conversa-
tions with the authors that they want and need greater policy input
from the Appeals Council and that they have been disappointed at
not hearing more from that source. At the same time, Appeals
350. It is difficult to achieve a balance among regulations, SSRs, and the less visible policy
devices. On the one hand, considerations of speed, ease, and flexibility will incline an agency
toward the less ponderous devices-and the SSA has a particularly tough time producing for-
mal regulations efficiently. On the other hand, the public's right to know about, and to influ-
ence, the content of the standards governing claims adjudication will create pressures to adopt
the more formal mechanisms. Additionally, the SSA as a public service entity designed to
implement broad remedial statutes, has a special responsibility to avoid the creation of "secret
law."
We note that Congress has pressed the SSA to publish more and to rely less upon internal
policy pronouncements that are not generally available to the public. See Social Security Disa-
bility Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-460, § 10, 98 Stat. 1805 (1984). We also observe
that the agency seems to be retreating somewhat from reliance upon SSRs. It is beyond the
scope of this Article, however, to attempt to delineate a proper dividing line between various
policy tools.
351. In addition to its physical removal, the OHA has been bureaucratically aloof from
the rest of the SSA, prizing a direct bureaucratic link to the Commissioner or to the Secretary,
outside the usual action channels. This, too, supports the aura of independence in adjudica-
tion, but it simultaneously deprives the Appeals Council of a voice in policymaking.
Even within the OHA, distance is maintained. The Appeals Council is not located within
the same building as the Associate Commissioner or the Chief ALJ.
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Council members were generally surprised to learn from us that SSA
officials would welcome their input on policy. The image emerges of
a communications conduit between the Appeals Council and the Bal-
timore headquarters that has become clogged by the Appeals Coun-
cil's case responsibilities and has consequently fallen into disuse.
Until the Appeals Council caseload can be thinned out appreciably,
there is little hope for reactivation of a policy link between Arlington
and Baltimore.
An important ramification of the Appeals Council's case-handling
role is the question of member accountability. Traditionally, Ap-
peals Council members have been ordinary SSA civil service employ-
ees, evaluated for performance and eligible for merit pay, unlike
ALJs, whose independence is secured by APA protections.
This structure is based on the legal fiction that the Appeals Coun-
cil acts as the "head of the agency" in the Secretary's stead, to carry
out policy decisions. Indeed, in many agencies this model of policy
review by non-APA-protected officials after neutral fact-finding by
independent ALJs seems to make sense.352 In the context of the SSA,
however, this legal fiction is a hindrance. The Appeals Council is not
the "alter ego" of the Secretary; it never meets with the Secretary,
the Commissioner, or even the Deputy Commissioner. Those offi-
cials have little awareness of or input to the Appeals Council's daily
work. The Appeals Council does not carry out the will of political
appointees and members have stressed that they would resent any
attempt to influence their decisions. The members feel instead that
they are bound by precisely the same legal standards and policies
that ALJs follow.
Moreover, Appeals Council members today enjoy de facto protec-
tion. They are as "accountable" as ALJs, no more or less prone to
ignore policymakers' direction, and equally subject to agency disci-
pline. 53 Furthermore, the selection process and the qualifications for
352. "Thus, officials insulated from outside contacts and internal controls might be more
concerned with the accuracy of ALJs' factual determinations, while policy-sensitive officials
are more concerned with the effect of ALJs' decisions on particular parties or policies." Allo-
cation of Authority, supra note 2, at 28.
353. We do not undertake here to assess the extent and effectiveness of the APA protec-
tions accorded to Social Security Administration ALJs. Some have concluded that the Merit
Systems Protection Board apparatus is so rigid that effective discipline of aberrant ALJs, even
for important transgressions, is a practical impossibility. Others have contended that SSA
actions have, in fact, produced changes in ALJ behaviors, through indirect pressures and the
creation of a particular "adjudicative climate." In any event, it is clear that the legal protec-
tions-as distinguished from the de facto protections-enjoyed by the ALJs are stronger than
those accorded to the members of the Appeals Council.
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membership in the Council more closely resemble those of ALJs
than those of SSA policymakers.
This combination of de facto protection but de jure vulnerability
seems anomalous. If members of the Appeals Council perform es-
sentially ALJ-like functions, and if their mission is strictly case re-
view, then the relationship between ALJs and the Appeals Council
should parallel that between federal district courts and circuit courts.
Equivalent job protection and status for both tiers seem logical. Why
insist on the maintenance of de facto independence but resist making
it de jure? On the other hand, if the function of the Appeals Council
is more policy oriented, why should not members discard their par-
tial and misleading trappings of independence and become frankly
political?
This question, too, boils down to the issue of caseload. If the Ap-
peals Council is so burdened that it does little other than review ALJ
decisions, it seems futile to pretend that the Appeals Council is per-
forming a "Secretarial" function requiring direct accountability.
That administrative model may be sensible in other agencies where
the smaller number and greater importance of the cases make inter-
vention by the agency Secretary possible. It is simply not, however,
an accurate portrait of today's Social Security Administration.
B. Factual Accuracy in Case Handling
Inasmuch as the Appeals Council has relinquished a major role in
formulating agency policy, the next leading or potential goal of an
appellate review body might concern correct administrative action on
individual claims. This is, in fact, what members of the Appeals
Council identify as their current concern: reviewing individual cases
to catch errors made by ALJs.
1. Identifying and Measuring Accuracy
Accuracy in a disability case is extremely difficult to define, let
alone measure or achieve. No one we spoke with was able to articu-
late a workable definition of "accuracy." Previous studies of and by
the SSA have similarly foundered upon this point.35 4 Lack of an ob-
jective definition has often resulted in conflating this goal with
other, only slightly less subjective program goals such as "unifor-
mity" or "consistency," which we elaborate below.
354. See NAT'L CENTER STUDY, supra note 134, at xx ("Investigation of the accuracy of
the [Bureau of Hearings and Appeals] hearing process . . . leads very quickly to the realiza-
tion that there is no accepted external standard for evaluating accuracy."); Allocation of Au-
thority, supra note 2, at 15; D. COFER, supra note 5, at 86.
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Why is it so difficult to define and measure accuracy? Part of the
problem lies in the complexity and subjectivity of the underlying var-
iable itself: disability.355 The human organism is marvelously com-
plex; the impairments that can affect it are diverse and protean.
Disability, moreover, is not exclusively a medical concept; rather, it
is a vocational measurement that draws upon variations in economic
conditions, social mores, and the political climate.
Rigid rules are neither possible nor desirable in adjudicating disa-
bility cases. They are impossible because of the vast array of circum-
stances to be found in the claims. One ALJ estimated that some 3000
variables affect disability adjudications and that these variables may
interact in a nearly infinite variety of combinations. Objectifying the
correct melding of all these factors would be impossible.
Even if objectification were possible, excessive reliance upon rigid
rules would be undesirable for institutions of broad remedial pur-
poses such as the disability program . 5 6 Even the relatively discrete
categorizing rules already in the system are not slavishly applied. The
Listings of Impairments, for example, may be "equaled," rather
than precisely "met"; 35 7 even the "age" category of the grids (which
is the least susceptible to manipulation) is not to be applied "me-
chanically in a borderline situation." 358
Accuracy, however, is not an empty term; the statutory definition
of disability must be honored, and SSA regulations attempt to trans-
late it into operational terms.3 9 The adjudicatory system is based on
the idea that only subjective judgment can integrate all the variables
to give the closest approximation of decisional accuracy. Accuracy,
therefore, is "in the eye of the beholder."
2. Some Erroneous Measures of Accuracy
Lack of a simple definition of "disability" and "accuracy" has
led to experimentation with substitute standards of accuracy, all of
which we find deficient.
355. As noted, the Appeals Council handles other types of cases, but disability appeals
constitute 95% of its caseload. Significantly, the other types of cases (where age, survivorship,
etc., are in issue) pose far fewer concerns over the concept of accuracy. See Kinney, supra
note 334, at xx.
356. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969). "Rules will not suffice. Rules must be sup-
plemented with discretion . . . . For many circumstances the mechanical application of a rule
means injustice; what is needed is individualized justice, that is, justice which to the appropri-
ate extent is tailored to the needs of the individual case." Id. at 19.
357. 20C.F.R. § 416.911 (1986).
358. Id. §§ 404.1563, 416.963. In fact, the flexibility contained in many of these provi-
sions is rarely exercised. SSA adjudicators, for example, infrequently take advantage of their
ability to apply the "age" categories other than mechanically.
359. See id. § 404.1520.
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a. The Last Word
The most commonly used standard of accuracy seems to be that
whoever speaks last, and effectively affirms or reverses earlier deci-
sionmakers, is deemed to be the most accurate authority. Thus, the
Appeals Council is said to check the accuracy of ALJ determina-
tions, the various quality assurance reviewers within the SSA evalu-
ate the units they monitor, and federal courts correct administrative
errors. While we believe these cross-unit variations are significant,
we do not consider them to be particularly indicative of accuracy,
for several reasons.
First, a disability case constantly evolves throughout the review
ladder. Subject to the rules of evidence,160 new material may be
added to the file as the case progresses from DDS to ALJ to the
Appeals Council and even to federal court. Therefore, subsequent
authorities may not actually be second-guessing the earlier adjudica-
tors; the case may be different at each step.
Second, the review process is asymmetric. DDSs typically assess
paperwork only; ALJs see the claimants face to face and can assess
their credibility directly. Although the Appeals Council has access to
the tape recording of the hearing, it has little time to do more than a
paper review. That different administrative levels make different de-
cisions under these circumstances is not surprising, but it does not
make sense to conclude one is "more accurate" merely because it
comes chronologically later.
Additionally, substantive standards vary with the different review
levels. The ALJ. hearing is explicitly de novo,3 6' and in fact, ALJs
seem to demonstrate no deference whatsoever to DDS conclusions.
The Appeals Council and the reviewing courts are supposed to be
bound by a "substantial evidence" test, 62 yet many contend that the
next level often simply substitutes its own judgment or personal pref-
erence. That is, Appeals Council members believe that federal court
reversals are sometimes based more upon sympathy for the claimant
than on a dispassionate analysis of the evidence supporting the ear-
lier decision. Ironically, ALJs often feel the same way about the Ap-
peals Council-that its reversals often result from different opinions
on the merits rather than from a true "substantial evidence" assess-
ment. 3
63
360. See supra text accompanying notes 272-80.
361. 20C.F.R. §§ 404.946, 416.1446 (1986).
362. E.g., Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971).
363. See infra text accompanying notes 452-54.
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Finally, the reviewers' perspective about accuracy is bound to be
affected by their familiarity with the cases reviewed. Federal courts,
for example, see a highly skewed selection: only denials or termina-
tions, and then only when the claimant and a representative can as-
semble a colorable case. Moreover, each federal judge sees only a
few cases per year, not the vast outpouring of SSA work. The
courts' perspective thus naturally inclines toward that of a champion
of the downtrodden faced with a callous bureaucracy. Federal judges
may not appreciate that court action is itself aberrational: of the an-
nual total of awards made in all disability cases, approximately 79%
come at the initial level, 8% on reconsideration, 12% at the ALJ
stage, and 0.207o by the Appeals Council. Courts account for only
0.40 of all awards.3 6
4
The difficulty of relying upon "who speaks last" as a definition of
accuracy is underscored by a 1982 study mandated by Congress and
conducted by the SSA as part of the Bellmon Amendment. 65 For
this study, 3600 randomly selected ALJ decisions were presented for
review by three groups: other ALJs, Appeals Council members, and
quality control monitors for the SSA's Office of Assessment. After
studying the files, the Appeals Council group reported agreement
with only 630 of the original ALJ awards. The Appeals Council
also disagreed, however, with 21% of the ALJ denials. 66 Even wider
disparities were reported among the ALJ and Office of Assessment
groups,3 67 suggesting a conclusion that "accuracy" in decisionmak-
ing, even when review is confined within relatively standardized lim-
its, remains highly subjective.
b. The Fifty Percent Solution
If the notion of an ultimate, "superior" arbiter of accuracy is in-
valid, how can one judge the propriety of SSA appeals adjudication?
Focusing upon crude statistics, as if the reversal rates by themselves
demonstrate the accuracy of a particular adjudication, is not a valid
answer. Thus, we reject the notion that the 17% allowance rate at
reconsideration3 6 and the 5% allowance rate at the Appeals
Counci 69 are per se too low, and the approximately 50% award rate
at the ALJ3 70 and federal court stages3 7' too high.
364. 1987 BACKGROUND MATERIALS, supra note 66, at 69.
365. BELLMON REPORT, supra note 173, passim.
366. Id. at ii.
367. Id. at i.
368. 1987 BACKGROUND MATERIAL, supra note 66, at 41.
369. OHA OPERATIONAL REP. 24 (Sep. 30, 1986).
370. Id. at 27.
371. Gonya, supra note 152.
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Our skepticism about the validity of any crude statistical test for
accuracy is supported by comparisons with other contexts. Studies of
general civil litigation have concluded that controversies going to
court tend over a long run of cases to result in a roughly even split
between plaintiffs and defendants.3 72 Multiple reasons explain this
50% phenomenon, but they center upon the litigants and their attor-
neys symmetrically assessing the costs and benefits of litigation, as
suggested by evolving precedent. If these observations were applica-
ble to the SSA, then it would be possible to establish plausible statis-
tical benchmarks for appellate reviewers. That is, if litigants
appealed only the close disability cases to a higher level, then a 50%
reversal rate at each appeals stage would not be surprising nor indic-
ative of gross error. As the easy cases were weeded out of the system,
(by paying those obviously disabled and by convincing obvious ineli-
gibles of the futility of further pursuit of the claim) the system would
continuously pass for appellate review only those cases that were suf-
ficiently close to the dividing line that reasonable adjudication could
go either way.173 Our observation of the SSA review tiers, however,
suggests that it is wrong to assume that only the close cases work
their way up the appellate hierarchy.
The "open record" aspect of disability cases, noted above, is one
of the reasons why this assumption is fallacious. A case may progres-
sively improve with age, as subsequent adjudicators receive new
data. Second, the factor of litigation costs, which is vital to Priest's
study of the courts, is distorted in this administrative setting, where
the costs vary substantially from stage to stage. Filing an initial ap-
plication for disability benefits requires some effort by the claimant,
and perhaps some badgering of doctors and hospitals to produce
copies of medical records. Reconsideration, on the other hand, is
virtually free in most cases; it only requires signing an SSA form.
The ALJ stage is probably the most costly, involving time, patience,
and usually the services of an attorney. 74 The next step, presentation
to the Appeals Council, may require a small amount of the represen-
tative's time, though usually nothing from the claimant. Finally, fil-
ing in federal court is much more difficult and requires a substantial
372. Priest & Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. OF LEGAL STUD. I
(1984); Priest, Reexamining the Selection Hypothesis: Learning from Wittman's Mistakes, 14
J. OF LEGAL STUD. 215 (1985). But see Wittman, Is the Selection of Cases for Trial Biased?, 14
J. OF LEGAL STUD. 185 (1985).
373. J. MASHAW, supra note 154.
374. Attorneys and other representatives who accept fees for services in disability hearings
usually do so on a contingency basis, and the claimant does not make any out-of-pocket ex-
penditures that might serve as disincentives to proceed with the case.
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court fee. An even more important hurdle against a civil action,
however, is finding an attorney who will take the case pro bono or
for a contingency fee. The costs and effort involved in discovery,
preparations, and trial, on the other hand, are far less than in most
litigation.
Finally, SSA cases are different from most court cases studied by
Priest in that the SSA has virtually no authority to compromise or
settle. Indeed, SSA has little scope for negotiation and must basi-
cally choose to defend its denial of benefits (even if the case against
paying benefits is uncertain) or abandon its position altogether (even
if SSA might be sustained in court).
In short, there is no reason to expect that a 50°%0 award rate-or
any other fixed rate-would be "correct" for SSA disability adjudi-
cations. The formulae that might suggest such an outcome elsewhere
are not applicable here. The substantial variation in disability award
rates among the various tiers of review is certainly provocative and
important, but the statistics themselves cannot be interpreted as con-
clusive measures of accuracy.
3. The Actual Costs of Inaccurate Decisions
Even if inaccuracy is difficult to define and measure, we know
that it exists. Indeed, inaccurate decisions are inevitable in a system
as large as the SSA. Even if each level of review could avoid substan-
tial error in ninety percent of its cases, hundreds or thousands of
appeals would still take place. The gross numbers alone suggest the
importance of identifying errors and deciding who should bear the
costs.
In a system where claimants are categorized as either "disabled"
or "not disabled," two kinds of errors are possible: an eligible
claimant may be improperly denied benefits, or an ineligible claim-
ant may be wrongly granted benefits. Both types of errors are to be
avoided, but measures designed to minimize one type of error may
inadvertently increase the incidence of the other.
Relevant to the assessment of accuracy is the question of process-
ing costs. The administrative costs of the SSA are substantial, and
the overhead costs of the disability program are more expensive than
those of the other components of RSDHI. Even at this level, how-
ever, processing costs remain relatively low. Mashaw points out that
the cost of benefits is roughly sixty times the cost of adjudicating
eligibility,3 75 suggesting that increases in accuracy are likely to be jus-
tifiable on cost effectiveness grounds.
375. J. MASHAW, supra note 154, at 81-82.
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One side of the coin concerns the errors of "false denials,"
wrongly rejecting truly disabled claimants. Failure to provide disabil-
ity benefits to those entitled to them results in both individual and
social costs. The first such cost is the failure to support those who
are incapable of supporting themselves through remunerative activ-
ity. Although some of these claimants may have other resources or
be eligible for other social welfare programs, for many disabled peo-
ple federal benefits provide the primary bulwark against abject pov-
erty.
A second cost of erroneous denials is dissatisfaction among the
needy and deserving, who will feel that the SSA system has failed
them in a time of great need. Moreover, many claimants are seeking
RSDHI benefits that they "bought" through compulsory SSA insur-
ance. In essence, those wrongly denied are being deprived of benefits
they paid for over the years.
Third, erroneous denials undercut the disability program as an ex-
pression of the generosity and goodwill of the American people. If
the system is inaccurate and unreliable, the beneficent purposes of
this social legislation are frustrated, eroding our self-image as a car-
ing community. Finally, erroneous denials also hurt the productive
members of society by generating insecurity about their fate, should
disability strike them. Skepticism about an important social institu-
tion such as the SSA will inevitably create widespread dissatisfac-
tion.
On the other side of the coin are the costs of erroneous awards.
The most obvious cost of an incorrect determination of eligibility is
the removal of a potentially productive worker from the work force,
with consequent losses in tax revenues and GNP. The magnitude of
the loss is hard to calculate, particularly for an "almost disabled"
worker. Especially in periods of substantial unemployment, the clai-
mant's lost contribution to the economy may be small.3 76
Removal of a productive person from the work force, however,
also imposes a hidden, insidious cost upon the recipient of unwar-
376. The SSA does not regularly monitor or compile statistics about claimants who are
denied or terminated from disability benefits, so it is not possible to estimate how many of
them may later successfully return to the competitive economy. Anecdotal evidence and a few
studies, however, suggest that those who consider themselves to be sufficiently disabled that
they apply for disability benefits are generally unlikely to return to productive work, even if
their applications for benefits are denied. If they do attempt to work, their wages tend to be
low and intermittent. See Bound, The Health and Earnings of Rejected Disability Insurance
Applicants, Dep't. of Economics, Harvard Univ. (Dec. 1985), reprinted in Nat'l Bureau of
Economic Research, Working Paper No. 2816 (Jan. 1989); Linden, Delays in Processing Ben-
efits to Disability Claimants, 21 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 357, 365 (1987).
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ranted disability benefits: it may serve to entrench the person in a
disability lifestyle, underscoring a self-image of powerlessness that
can degenerate into a life of despondence, immobility and self pity
that is far less rewarding than maintenance of even marginal employ-
ment would be.
Erroneously granted benefits also create public dissatisfaction.
They tend to bring all of the SSA-indeed, all of the government's
social programs-into disrepute, undercutting public sympathy for
assistance programs for the truly needy. Finally, erroneously granted
benefits impose direct costs upon the intended beneficiaries of the
system because claimants compete with each other for public funds.
The greater the aggregate of mistaken awards, the smaller the pool
available for distribution among the truly disabled. Given a political
climate inhospitable to proposals to increase the funding of disability
programs, a mistaken award imposes an opportunity cost of lost op-
tions to pursue other social goals.
It is important to note that error costs, regarding both false posi-
tives and false negatives, are long-term rather than transitory, be-
cause the SSA system has difficulty in efficiently correcting its
mistakes. For example, erroneous awards may generally be corrected
only by a termination action. Massive terminations in the early 1980s
demonstrated how traumatic that process can be. The revised rules
regarding "continuing disability reviews" (CDRs) have been greatly
tempered in response to that experience, and it is possible that the
new definition of "medical improvement" will make removal from
the rolls more difficult. Thus, an award of benefits, correct or incor-
rect, tends to be an action with long-term consequences.
An erroneous denial too is difficult to reverse. Even though an
improperly denied claimant could file a new application, reapplica-
tions may be viewed with less objectivity. Moreover, unless an adju-
dicator who rules favorably on the later application takes the
unusual action of reopening and revising the earlier denial, benefits
will not be paid for the intervening time period.3 17 In addition, the
claimant's financial eligibility for RSDHI may expire before the new
application is filed. To that extent, an erroneous denial carries per-
manent costs.
4. An Approximation of Accuracy
The difficulty of defining and measuring accuracy inclines us to-
ward offering a "second-best" solution: skew the likely errors into a
377. 20 C.F.R. § 404.987 to .989, 416.1487 to .1493 (1986).
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relatively tolerable pattern. 378 By "second-best" we do not mean a
compromise with perfection. Having concluded that perfect accuracy
is unattainable and that efforts to pursue it directly will result in
poorer system performance, we suggest a more modest two-pronged
alternative: (a) that the SSA adjudicatory system be less concerned
with accuracy in close cases on appeal and more concerned with ac-
curacy in easy cases early in the process; and (b) that the SSA adjudi-
catory system be more concerned with correcting or anticipating
erroneous denials rather than erroneous awards.
We derive the first principle-less focus on the marginal cases-
from our conclusion that "accuracy" is most elusive and the costs of
error are lowest in close cases. Furthermore, greater subjectivity and
variability among adjudicators are likely to be found in borderline
cases. Higher levels of the claims review process in these circum-
stances may not so much correct errors made by the lower levels as
simply substitute judgments based on disagreement with the previous
decision. Successive review, therefore, does not necessarily improve
accuracy; rather, it may produce only a series of disagreements as to
whether the case is marginally on this or that side of a not-so-bright
line.
Given the strictness of the statutory disability standard, indivi-
duals even close to meeting the eligibility criteria may have little to
contribute to the economy. Moreover, the primary cost of erroneous
denials falls upon an individual least financially able to bear the bur-
den. The primary cost of an erroneous award, on the other hand,
falls upon an insurance program created precisely to pool risks and
spread them over all participants in the plan.
Close cases are not only the most difficult ones, they are the least
important. An erroneous award of benefits to a claimant who is im-
paired enough to be almost eligible is an inexpensive error. The costs
of the mistake are likely to be low when the claimant's greatest possi-
ble contribution to the work force would be minimal in any event.
Similarly, an erroneous denial in a close case, where the claimant is
only barely eligible, and is almost capable of performing substantial
gainful activity, is less expensive than in a case of extreme disability,
where the wrongful withholding of benefits leads to economic depri-
vation of the claimant.
378. The concept of the "second best" was apparently first developed by R.G. Lipsey and
K. Lancaster in their studies of macroeconomics and the efforts to attain perfect competition
in the marketplace. It has been borrowed frequently for application in the analysis of a variety
of public policy problems. See DICTIONARY OF ECONoMics 368 (1984).
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Although errors in close cases are less socially expensive, they are
not less time-consuming for the SSA and the claimant. All cases pro-
gress through the same steps on the appellate ladder; cases with bla-
tant errors receive no accelerated treatment. Accurate decisions,
particularly accurate awards made earlier in the process, would expe-
dite the payment to the claimant and reduce the volume of cases pre-
sented for subsequent review.
We conclude that a "second-best" solution to the inaccuracy
problem would place greater emphasis upon early adjudication, espe-
cially where awards can be granted quickly, even at the expense of
more fine-grained review at later stages. Although later review may
change the outcome in many cases, close cases generally do not bene-
fit from multiple review. We believe, therefore, that the Appeals
Council should not screen cases for yet another analysis. That proce-
dure promotes accuracy only slowly and at high cost; more impor-
tantly, it often provides second guessing rather than error
corrections. Instead, the Appeals Council should devise a system
that avoids or corrects errors, especially wrongful denials, at the ear-
liest possible point in the system. Improving the accuracy of DDSs
will require additional resources at the initial stages of case evalua-
tion. We recommend that the Appeals Council establish a primary
goal of improved accuracy and efficiency in the early stages of case-
work so that fewer errors are passed along to ALJs, the Appeals
Council, and the federal courts.
C. Policy Integrity
The Appeals Council currently attempts to play a major role in
promoting system-wide uniformity. We have identified two related
aspects of uniformity: "policy integrity," discussed here, and "con-
sistency," considered below. "Policy integrity," means that the ap-
plicable law is followed by all players in the bureaucracy, and that
those in authority in SSA are able to carry out their management and
policymaking functions effectively.
3 79
Policy integrity is espicially important for SSA, because the
sketchy statutory framework for the disability program has resulted
in an immense need for administrative regulations. Although these
regulations have a limited scope, elected officials and their designees
379. See D. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986). "Law as integrity asks judges to assume, so
far as this is possible, that the law is structured by a coherent set of principles about justice
and fairness and procedural due process, and it asks them to enforce these in the fresh cases
that come before them, so that each person's situation is fair and just according to the same
standards." Id. at 243.
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enjoy an unusually broad range of discretionary power and policy
alternatives through which the political element finds legitimate ex-
pression and control.
One important function of responsible leadership, therefore, is
maintenance of the system's internal law. The Appeals Council is
well-situated to play a major role in promoting policy integrity. The
Appeals Council is the only unit of the SSA that regularly adjudi-
cates a wide variety of cases, including those processed by the admin-
istrative bureaucracy and those remanded from the courts. The
geographic and bureaucratic diversity of the Appeals Council's cases
should enable it to assess policy adherence nationally.
The Appeals Council has been fairly successful in promoting pol-
icy integrity. The current members of the Appeals Council are well-
versed in the applicable laws and SSA policies and they are active in
implementing them. The Appeals Council also has succeeded in iden-
tifying aberrant case handling and in remanding appropriate cases to
ALJs or DDSs with correcting instructions. The Appeals Council
seems comfortable spotting deviations from established law and cor-
recting or remanding for greater compliance.
In four areas, however, the policy integrity role has experienced
problems: (1) promulgation of SSA laws; (2) non-acquiescence in
court rulings; (3) discipline; and (4) balancing flexibility and policy.
Three of these areas are beyond the scope of this Article, but the
fourth is fundamental to the structure and operation of the Appeals
Council.
1. Promulgation of SSA Laws. The first area concerns the variety
of procedures for setting forth Social Security law and policy. The
SSA has relied upon APA notice and comment rulemaking, informal
Social Security Rulings (SSRs), internal policy statements, circulars,
and manuals.
Regulations, unless deemed arbitrary or improperly promulgated,
are binding upon all levels of adjudication-including the federal
courts. 8 0 SSRs, on the other hand, and, a fortiori, the internal
guidelines of lesser status and lower visibility, are not open to public
participation and are not binding upon reviewing courts. Their effi-
cacy within the SSA system remains controversial because SSRs pro-
claim themselves to be binding on all levels of adjudication," 1 but
many ALJs have systematically maintained that they are bound only
by formal regulations, not unilateral SSRs.
380. See 1 H. KOCH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 3.13 (1985).
381. S.S.R., Preface (Cum. Ed. 1982).
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It is beyond the scope of this Article to attempt to reconcile this
difference, or even to recommend practices to circumvent it. The
balance among factors such as legal dignity, speed, flexibility, pub-
licity, etc., is a difficult one. However, as long as this conflict en-
dures, with ALJs insisting that they may overlook policy documents
that SSA insists with equal vigor are binding, then the Appeals
Council's role in ensuring policy integrity inside the Social Security
system will be incomplete and frequently frustrated.
2. Non-acquiescence. A similar factor, cited by many observers
and participants, has been the problematic nature of SSA's approach
to decisions of the federal circuits. Again, the recent changes in
SSA's acquiescence practices may have largely mooted this contro-
versy,38 2 and it is beyond our mandate to address it directly, but we
must observe the occasional consternation it has generated inside the
SSA and the difficulties it has posed for the Appeals Council's at-
tempts to achieve policy integrity.
Put simply, when the law is in disarray, when the policies of dif-
ferent legal authorities are not well-integrated, then obviously the
Appeals Council's power to impose order upon the internal mechan-
isms of the bureaucracy will be severely limited.
3. Discipline. A third problem in implementing policy integrity
concerns discipline. The SSA's disciplinary authority is starkly lim-
ited. The major sanctions-action against an ALJ through the Merit
Systems Protection Board or federalizing the functions of a DDS-
are so cumbersome and expensive that they are not effective deter-
rents.
However, too much SSA authority to discipline lower-level deci-
sionmakers might permit abuse. The independence accorded to ALJs
and, to a lesser extent, DDSs, carries both costs and benefits. One
benefit is opportunity for creativity and autonomy; one cost is re-
duced opportunities for program integrity. Independence, especially
for ALJs, should be considered a virtue of the system and a price
worth paying to preserve integrity and a sense of propriety.
4. Balancing Flexibility and Policy. The virtues of policy integrity
should not obscure complementary virtues of flexibility and innova-
tion.3"3 A sound mass-justice process must allow some discretion.3 84
382. SSA and Department of Justice decisions about which cases to appeal, and which to
accept, however, remain problematic, sustaining many of the same questions and concerns as
did the prior policy of non-acquiescence.
383. J. MASHAW, supra note 154, at 121-22; K. DAVIs, supra note 356, at 17.
384. C. KOCH, supra note 2, at § 9.22[2].
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The "street-level bureaucrats" '385 or implementing decisionmakers
need space to make adjustments in the rules and add sensitivity to
the administrative process . 8 6 The SSA has provided such space for
discretion in its rule structure. The key problem lies in defining who
should be responsible for exercising this discretion, and what role the
Appeals Council should play in fostering innovation and experimen-
tation.
Both the DDSs and the ALJs should be allowed more creativity
and scope for experimentation in organizing and processing the
cases. At the ALJ stage, highly competent and experienced adjudica-
tors review a large number of cases. They should be granted ade-
quate flexibility in making individualized judgments on cases not
fully covered by existing rules. Discretion for handling the disability
caseload in potentially improved ways should be exercised more fre-
quently.
The function of the Appeals Council here should be twofold.
First, the Appeals Council should ensure the fundamental guarantees
of due process-claimants should not be disadvantaged in the name
of casual experimentation. The individualized discretion of the ALJ
should remain within legal boundaries, and the Appeals Council
should require continued compliance with principles of basic fair-
ness.18 7 Second, the Appeals Council should also evaluate these dis-
cretionary actions and publicize successful results and techniques.
The Appeals Council's broad perspective permits it to make useful
comparisons across the national range of ALJs and DDSs, infusing
successful innovations into new localities. Rather than merely correct
individual errors, the Appeals Council should play a positive role in
fostering system-wide improvements and in exploring potential areas
of innovation.
D. Consistency
Another goal related to policy integrity is decisional consistency.
This function of the Appeals Council is already important, and we
have found both notable successes and shortcomings in the present
level of performance.
385. M. LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: THE DILEMMA OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUB-
LIC SERVICE (1980).
386. J. MASHAW, supra note 154. "The error costs from over generalization may here
outweigh the gains from error avoidance. The adjudicator's feel for this type of case may
often be better than any rule." Id. at 108.
387. Koch, Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 469,
471-78 (1986).
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Consistency in case adjudication indicates respect for the individ-
ual claimant and ensures that the benefit system is above political or
other partisan manipulation. As a national program, the SSA should
provide the same system of benefits to claimants wherever they re-
side.
The goal of consistency has special relevance where accuracy re-
mains elusive. Even if we are unable to measure or even define the
"correctness" of an adjudication, we may be able to appraise its
"similarity" to comparable cases. If a mistake is repeated in like
cases, perfect accuracy is not achieved, but a sort of fairness results;
and fairness may be the most that is attainable in a second-best
world.
We discern two dimensions of consistency. "Vertical consistency"
is achieved when decisionmakers evaluate a case according to the
same procedures and legal standards at each tier of the appellate re-
view ladder. It requires harmony among all the adjudicatory levels
regarding standards for case handling, definitions of eligibility, and
interpretations of policy. "Horizontal consistency" refers to the sim-
ilarity of decisions in different venues. Claimants in Michigan, Geor-
gia and New Mexico, for example, should receive similar treatment
from their local DDSs, similar hearing procedures before their ALJs,
and, if their cases are substantially the same, similar outcomes on
their applications. The data, however, reveal wide variations in both
horizontal and vertical consistency.
Vertical consistency is hard to evaluate. ALJ hearings, Appeals
Council reviews and federal court actions may produce widely diver-
gent award rates for many reasons. As long as the ALJ remains the
only adjudicator to confront the claimant face to face, for example,
the system should expect many reversals at that tier. 88
Other causes of vertical inconsistency are less acceptable. The
DDSs have operated under different law from the ALJs-not just
procedural differences, but substantive differences, such as instruc-
tions to adhere to all or only some of the listings at the expense of
the grids. The 1982 Bellmon Report, too, strongly suggested that
cases are resolved differently by adjudicators at different levels, even
when they are presented with identical case files.
Horizontal inconsistency is even more manifest and alarming. 89
The award rates among DDSs have varied widely from state to state
388. D. COFER, supra note 5, at 12-13; 1986 Hearing, supra note 3, at 28 (statement of
Eileen P. Sweeney, Staff Attorney, National Senior Citizens Law Center).
389. See NAT'L CENTER STUDY, supra note 134 at xxi; see also Capowski, supra note 75, at
343.
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virtually since the inception of the disability program. The ALJs,
too, vary in their award rates; some ALJs award benefits in only
one-quarter of their cases, while others consistently find eligibility in
three-quarters of the claims. 90
This inconsistency is created partly because different federal
courts evolve different rules in their respective jurisdictions. More
inconsistency, however, flows from the lower adjudicative levels, as
different locales generate starkly different success ratios for their
claimants. Thus, national uniformity in SSA adjudication has always
been illusory and there is little evidence of ongoing improvement.
1. Role of the Appeals Council
The Appeals Council should be uniquely helpful in achieving an
acceptable level of consistency. The disability system includes ap-
proximately 1300 SSA district offices, 700 ALJs, and 900 federal dis-
trict judges, but only one Appeals Council-it is the one location
where cases from all regions and administrative tiers are adjudicated.
The Council is aware of its unique position, and its members take
seriously their responsibility for maintaining nationwide consistency.
If the statistics do not reflect much success, one can only speculate
how much more inconsistency would exist without a single entity at
the top of the pyramid attempting to reconcile divergent views.
The Appeals Council itself, however, is no paragon of uniformity.
Indeed, with its current twenty members, the Council may be too
large to speak with one voice. The current case handling routines
further contribute to inconsistency. A case is ordinarily assigned to
only one or two members; rarely do three members confer upon a
case, and virtually never will more than three members address a
matter together.
Moreover, Council-wide discussion of shared problems remains
quite rare. Plenary meetings are held approximately monthly, but lit-
tle of this time is devoted to solving common case-handling prob-
lems. Although the members' regional groupings could provide some
uniformity, the groupings are not used much for this purpose. Mem-
bers told us of daily consultation with each other on novel or tricky
issues, but we were not persuaded that this collegiality was able to
produce much of a shared outlook.3 9' We observed (although the sta-
390. See D. COFER, supra note 5, at 85.
391. As far back as 1940, the Social Security Board recognized the importance of collegi-
ality among the members of the Appeals Council:
To set up such a Council may seem a somewhat expensive means of conducting the
hearing and review system. The review of cases and their just decision requires qual-
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tistics are difficult to marshal) that members differ in their products;
some, for example, grant review of cases at least twice as often as
others do. As a result, the Appeals Council, potentially the best ele-
ment in the network for attaining consistency, operates more as a
collection of individuals than as an organized unit of a national bu-
reaucracy. 392
In assessing the Appeals Council's opportunities for promoting
uniform decisionmaking, we recognized two categories of consis-
tency: procedural and substantive. Procedural consistency is the eas-
ier one to pursue. It is not difficult for a central reviewing body to
insist that ALJs and DDSs adhere to an established sequence of steps
in developing and evaluating claims. The accumulation of records,
the taking of testimony, the proper elaboration of mental impair-
ment allegations, and the sequential evaluation process are all funda-
mental steps that the Appeals Council can monitor. These steps
should not vary geographically, and the danger is small that stan-
dardized procedures would jeopardize decisional independence.
On the other hand, substantive consistency-like cases being re-
solved alike-is far more difficult to achieve. Any attempt to harmo-
nize decisions of ALJs inevitably raises concerns about
compromising the APA protections necessary to their integrity. Lit-
tle can or should be done by the various tiers of the SSA to enforce a
substantive uniformity upon ALJs; the danger of manipulation is
too great.
Recent history suggests that ALJs will fiercely resist any reforms
perceived as challenges to their autonomy.3 93 The SSA should never
return to being "at war with itself," and OHA in particular cannot
endure the tension and resentment that, to some extent, still charac-
terize relations among ALJs, Appeals Council members, and policy
officials.
2. Improving Consistency
Perfect consistency is unattainable. ALJs will continue to vary and
will continue to assert their independence. The Appeals Council
ities of a high order, however, and their review is likely to be better than the initial
decision which is adequate in the great bulk of cases only if several minds collabo-
rate in the process.
BASIC PROVISIONS, supra note 194, at 38.
392. A decade or so ago, there were proposals (partially implemented at that time, but just
as quickly abandoned) to "regionalize" the Appeals Council by breaking its members into
district groups that would physically sit in various regional headquarters and handle cases on-
site. We would not support that type of compartmentalization, preferring instead greater inte-
gration of the Appeals Council as a national entity. That regionalization could be so seriously
considered is itself an indicator of the lack of cohesion among the Council.
393. D. COFER, supra, note 5, at 170-76.
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should not challenge this reality, but should endorse it as part of the
price to be paid for the benefits of an independent quasi-judicial
corps. Although disparity in reversal rates is greater than it should
be, a direct assault on the problem is bound to be futile and destruc-
tive. Instead, the Appeals Council might adopt less overt and less
contentious but perhaps ultimately more successful approaches in its
pursuit of consistency.
One such measure begins, as do many of our other recommenda-
tions, with the Appeals Council re-asserting control over its docket.
Only when the Appeals Council is able to exercise some selectivity in
the cases it reviews will it be able to play a more important role in
pursuing consistency. As we elaborate in the final section of this Ar-
ticle, we propose that the SSA bring far fewer cases before the Ap-
peals Council. The categories of cases to be reviewed should be those
most likely to contain errors, those which would benefit from sys-
tematic scrutiny, or those in which inconsistency has been the great-
est problem.
Once the caseload is reduced, the Appeals Council should write
opinions that are not simply conclusory boilerplate, but that care-
fully analyze the evidence and the arguments and explain the out-
come in detail. Current decisions do not contain this elaboration and
are not, therefore, especially compelling in logic or citation. As a
result, they do not inspire consistency at the lower levels.
In this context, it is disturbing that the Appeals Council does little
to disseminate and publicize its decisions. The Council is ignoring
the opportunity to promote consistency through promulgation of its
most significant decisions, together with an appropriate index. The
absence of a direct feedback mechanism is striking. ALJs and DDSs
do not regularly track the progress of their cases and are not in-
formed of appellate corrections, unless pure happenstance brings a
remanded case back to the ALJ or DDS staffer who handled it ini-
tially. Thus, the Council lacks effective mechanisms that would have
the greatest impact on national consistency. Consistency is difficult
to attain solely on a case-by-case basis; ALJs and DDSs require more
systematic guidance. The Appeals Council should take advantage of
one opportunity to promote consistency within all tiers of the system
by publishing the proper and improper ways of handling particular
types of claims.
Other procedures that could enhance consistency are currently un-
derutilized. For example, little interaction takes place between ALJs
and Appeals Council members. The Appeals Council has virtually no
budget for travel to local hearing offices and the "visiting AL"
program (under which ALJs were assigned for one-month temporary
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duty as Appeals Council members) has been terminated. Further-
more, training or continuing legal or medical education activities
that might bring ALJs and Council members together seldom take
place.
Similarly, most Appeals Council members have virtually no regu-
lar contact with DDS or district office personnel. Few attempts have
been made to explore the ways in which direct meetings among per-
sonnel from various tiers of review could be arranged to enhance
understanding of the program and consistency in its application.
E. Efficient Government
Cost effectiveness cannot be ignored in a program that costs mil-
lions of dollars to administer. The Appeals Council should be in-
volved in improving the efficiency of its own process and that of the
entire disability system.
The size of the SSA's disability operation is staggering: over two
million applications are processed each year3 94 over one million ap-
pellate reviews are conducted. 95 Many cases involve highly complex
medical and scientific matters. Whether by choice or by the pressure
of events, the SSA has been near the cutting edge of modern devel-
opments in psychiatric impairment, pain, and AIDS cases.
In 1987, a budget of approximately $650 million for administra-
tion of the disability portion of RSDHI was allocated to these SSA
disability operations.3 96 The SSA calculates that the costs of adminis-
tering the disability provisions of the law is 3.4% of their annual
income. 97 This figure may seem modest, but it was also four times
the corresponding figure for the administration of the retirement and
survivors portions of RSDHI, where the intricacies of disability de-
termination are not at play. 398
A 1983 study estimated that the average cost of a disability deter-
mination was approximately $500 and the lump sum value of an
award was about $30,000, generating a processing cost only one six-
tieth of the total cost.3 99 We suspect that this ratio has become even
more favorable over the years, as benefit levels rise faster than over-
head costs.
394. 1987 SSA REPORT TO THE CONORESS, supra note 11, at 29, 31.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 30.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 29, 31. These figures exclude the costs of administering the SSI disability pro-
gram for which general revenues, rather than the SSA trust funds, are tapped.
399. J. MASHAW, supra note 154, at 81-82.
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This apparent efficiency, however, does not imply that the SSA
can be indifferent to costs-indeed, the substantial reduction of the
agency's manpower pool (shrinking from 74,600 permanent staff in
1983 to 66,700 in 1987) 400 demonstrates that productivity remains
highly prized. Moreover, the 60:1 ratio does not mean that any
greater spending on administrative processing would necessarily be
cost efficient. That is, the value of an "accurate" disability decision
(if one could be defined) is not the full $30,000; rather, it is the dif-
ference in aggregate social utility between having those funds in the
hands of taxpayers or in the hands of a proper disability recipient. A
correct decision is valuable, but it is not worth anywhere near the
full sum of the payments.
Focusing on the Appeals Council, the question is whether this
fourth tier of administrative decisionmaking is worth its cost. Cur-
rently, the Appeals Council changes the result in only about 5°06 of
the cases it reviews.40 ' Remands for further action account for per-
haps another 10%. 402 This contribution is far from trivial; on an an-
nual Appeals Council docket of 50,000 cases, it means that 7500
cases receive substantial alteration. But the Appeals Council and its
affiliated support unit, the Office of Appeals Operations, also con-
sume substantial SSA resources: almost $32 million per year, and
several hundred relatively high-graded employees.
The timeliness cost of the Appeals Council, moreover, is substan-
tial: even if the system improves to the point that all request-for-
review cases are disposed of within ninety days, the claimant is still
forced to wait three months with little expectation of favorable ac-
tion. Additionally, Appeals Council reopenings can substantially de-
lay administrative finality and prolong the wait for access to court.
1. Sources of Inefficiency
Although it is difficult to assign rigorous costs and benefits inside
a complex organization such as the SSA or a subunit such as the
Appeals Council, we identified several factors that prevent the Ap-
peals Council from achieving optimal productivity.
The first factor is the Appeals Council's current system for pro-
cessing words and data, tracking files, and compiling statistics. The
computer hardware, software, and support services are at best primi-
400. 1987 SSA REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 11, at 34.
401. OHA OPERATIONAL REP. 27 (Sept. 30, 1986).
402. Id.
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tive. 40 For example, members cannot directly make changes or cor-
rections in their own letters or decisions; even typographical errors
require returning the entire file to the OAO for reprocessing. Fur-
thermore, the Appeals Council has only a rudimentary statistical
base; the categories for recording various types of case actions are
anomalous and poorly understood. Even the telephone system is an-
tiquated.
The kindest conclusion one could draw from the Appeals Coun-
cil's stunted computational capacity is that the situation must have
been far worse not long ago when even the current equipment was
unavailable. The promise of better systems, including computer inte-
gration with SSA headquarters, always looms on the horizon, but
that relief will not arrive soon without outside pressures.
Another source of inefficiency is the Appeals Council members'
lack of personal staff support. When cases arrive at the Appeals
Council from the OAO, no one pre-screens them to sort the pedes-
trian from the significant. The members are thus forced to spend too
much time on purely ministerial duties, hardly an efficient use of
their talents.
We also observed considerable inefficiency in the organization and
location of OAO analysts. They are spread through several build-
ings, making communications and simple file transfers difficult. The
OAO branches do not parallel the members' geographic groupings;
an analyst might send cases to many different members and each
member may conversely receive work from thirty analysts. The ana-
lysts and Council members, therefore, never become familiar with
each other's strengths, weaknesses, styles and preferences. 4
2. Protecting Judicial Resources
One asserted justification for the existence of the Appeals Council
is its ability to screen cases before they reach the courts, paying the
more deserving claims administratively and thereby protecting the
district judges from a potential flood of litigation4 °5 This protection
of judicial resources is important: claimants, the SSA and the federal
judiciary all benefit if claims can be resolved prior to filing a civil
403. Despite representations that the Appeals Council's word processing equipment would
be "state of the art," 1983 Hearing, supra note 258, at 246 (testimony of Louis B. Hays,
Assoc. Comm'r for Hearings and Appeals), the OHA has, in fact, supplied the Appeals Coun-
cil with only inadequate, obsolete hardware.
404. We understand that the SSA is currently undertaking measures to redress this prob-
lem by combining OAO and the Appeals Council under one administrator and by matching
one OAO branch with one Appeals Council member.
405. See, e.g., Cleveland Transcript, supra note 257, at 274.
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action. The strain upon federal courts is already substantial: 15 to
20% of the federal civil cases filed against the United States are SSA
disability contests. 4 6 (Because these cases tend to be resolved expedi-
tiously, however, they may account for only 2% of the federal
courts' actual work.40 7)
The sheer size of the SSA caseload suggests that even minor per-
turbations in the SSA's rate of resolution of disability claims could
cause major disruptions for a federal judiciary not equipped to han-
dle that volume of traffic. Of the annual two million new disability
cases, perhaps 10,000 (.5%) will wind up, years later, in court. Thus,
if the SSA were able to dispatch only 99°0, instead of 99.5%, of the
cases administratively, the burden of federal actions would double.
The Appeals Council now receives approximately 50,000 cases per
year. Of these, perhaps 10,000 will result in federal court actions.
How much protection of the federal docket is provided by the action
of the Appeals Council, and how much is more properly attributable
to other factors?
We conclude that the Appeals Council itself now contributes rela-
tively little to the protection of the federal docket. It does, of course,
pay some claims and remand others to ALJs who may rule in favor
of the claimant. But the Appeals Council itself does little to appease
denied claimants or persuade them not to litigate. Council decisions
are so standardized and nonresponsive that they "convince" no one;
the review proceedings are so opaque that few claimants accept this
process as a satisfying day in court.
The real deterrent to court action is not the Appeals Council; the
cost, red tape, and delay involved in federal litigation are the more
likely deterrents. Typically, the claimant must find a representative
willing to invest time and money either pro bono or for a contin-
gency fee and then must endure a long period of uncertainty while
receiving no benefits. Even if the court is sympathetic, a remand for
a new hearing-is the most likely outcome, rather than an outright
award of benefits. These factors would operate just as powerfully
without the Appeals Council guarding the courthouse door.
There is one mechanism through which the Appeals Council does
directly reduce the volume of cases going to court, but it is a factor
that is even more unsettling. Sometimes the Appeals Counsel does
succeed in exhausting claimants with its delay and impassivity. Far
from persuading the claimants that their claims are without merit,
406. Flanders, What Do the Federal Courts Do? A Research Note, 5 REV. OF LITIGATION
199, 206 (1986).
407. Id.
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the Council engenders a sense of defeat, a belief that the benefits are
not worth the battle against a vast bureaucracy. This process does
keep cases out of court, but only at the price of justice denied.
F. Acceptability
Acceptability of the adjudicatory process among various constitu-
encies is vital for the SSA. Public confidence is necessary to the per-
formance of its primary missions, Congressional support is essential
for its survival, and a reputation for fairness and competence among
other groups is important to its operations.
As the apex of the SSA adjudicatory bureaucracy, the Appeals
Council can foster greater acceptability of the program in a variety
of ways. However, the Appeals Council has either ignored this re-
sponsibility altogether or actually aggravated existing poor public
appraisals of the SSA.
1. Acceptability with Claimants and the Public
The most direct and difficult target for building greater acceptabil-
ity of the Appeals Council is the group of disability claimants and
their representatives. These are the bureaucracy's clients; their satis-
faction is an important element of a mass justice system. 4 8
Obviously, those who are denied benefits are going to feel some-
what dissatisfied no matter how much sensitivity and care are dem-
onstrated by the system. A program as large as the SSA, moreover,
will inevitably make mistakes, including some egregious ones, even
when it operates in good faith with modern management tools. Even
if the error fate were statistically quite low, the raw number of erro-
neous denials and the incidence of callous bureaucratic treatment
would be significant.
Even discounting these problems, though, claimant satisfaction
with the SSA and the Appeals Council is low. Clairymnts can distin-
guish between being denied and being badly treated, and can respect
an organization even after it rejects their claims, if they feel its han-
dling of their cases is fundamentally fair. In the disability appeals
process, however, claimants and their representatives frequently ex-
press two critical areas of dissatisfaction.
408. See generally J. MASHAW, DuE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985). An
emerging school of thought, which Mashaw labels as proponent of a "dignitary theory," has
as its "unifyirig thread. . . the belief that the ways in which legal processes define participants
and regulate participation, not just the rationality of the substantive results, must be consid-
ered when judging the legitimacy of public decision making." Id. at 161-62.
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The first source of unhappiness concerns delay. 40 9 The Appeals
Council takes too long to affect too few cases. In request-for-review
situations, the Appeals Council is perceived as a mere way-station
that must be visited before proceeding to federal court, where the
chances for victory are greater. In own-motion review cases, claim-
ants see the Appeals Council not only as a delaying factor, but
worse, as a threat to the benefits they won at the ALJ level. 410 In
court cases, the Appeals Council is also perceived as a source of un-
warranted delay. The Secretary's motion to remand weak cases that
would otherwise proceed in court is often interpreted by the claimant
as covering up, rather than redressing, ALJ errors. Finally, when it
does take cognizance of a case, the Appeals Council is twice as likely
to remand as to reverse, 41' resulting in subsequent proceedings before
an ALJ, entailing further delay and perhaps another full hearing.
Claimants' second major complaint about the Appeals Council
concerns the remoteness and the impersonality of the process. Claim-
ants never see an Appeals Council member or OAO analyst, and
even high-volume representatives report little or no personal contact.
The prevailing impression is that the Appeals Council is aloof and
impassive. Representatives confess that they know and care little
about the Appeals Council. The organization is so arcane that they
rarely take it seriously.
This perception of the Appeals Council as a "black box," with a
mysterious internal composition and operation, generates a sense of
arbitrariness-no one knows why the decisions come out as they do.
Representatives relate incidents of egregious ALJ errors that the
Council blithely overlooked, as well as weak, almost casual requests
for review that the Council granted.
No claimant ever feels that he or she has had "a day in court"
before the Appeals Council. Few could feel satisfied that the case
was fairly heard and carefully scrutinized. Few-regardless of the
outcome of the cases-come away from the encounter with the Ap-
409. Of course, the Appeals Council is hardly responsible for all of the delays that mark
the Social Security system; it is merely the latest administrative source of delay. See 1986
Hearing, supra note 3, at 25-26 (statement of Arthur S. Flemming, Co-Chair, Save Our Secu-
rity Coalition); Linden, supra note 376, at 357 (summarizing results of court-ordered study
conducted by the SSA regarding processing times for current and retroactive payments).
410. Our interviews revealed that claimants' representatives believe own-motion review to
be a major portion of the Appeals Council workload. In fact, the OHA now receives only a
small number of own-motion cases (perhaps 300 to 400 per month) and the Appeals Council
grants review in only 60 to 80 per month. Thus, even well-informed claimants' representatives
lack an understanding of the most important aspects of the Appeals Council operation.
411. See OHA OPERATIONAL REP. 27 (Sept. 30, 1986).
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peals Council feeling that their dignity as claimants has been ac-
knowledged and respected by the process.
This sense of remoteness results partly from Council review that is
entirely on paper, with no possibility of a hearing. 41 2 The curtness of
the Council's mailed notifications and decisional documents, as well
as its self-imposed restraint regarding travel or public appearances,
augments this remoteness. With a few exceptions by the Deputy
Chair, Appeals Council members do not attend conferences, offer
workshops, or deliver speeches to groups of claimants' representa-
tives.
The "invisibility" of the Appeals Council is even more apparent
among the public at large. 41 3 Few people outside the disability proc-
ess have ever heard of the Appeals Council, and only those currently
or formerly associated with the OHA have even a rudimentary un-
derstanding of its operations. At a time when public confidence in
the Social Security Administration seems to be in jeopardy, it is
striking how little has been done to utilize the resources of the Ap-
peals Council to help redress the problem.
2. Acceptability with ALJs
The appellate function inherently creates certain tensions between
tiers on an appellate ladder, but in most contexts, the customary dis-
agreements about cases or practices may be handled civilly and colle-
gially.
We have observed, however, that the expectation of mutual re-
spect has not prevailed within SSA. ALJs feel a profound disrespect
for the Appeals Council as an institution. Even ALJs who have had
personal experience with the Appeals Council, and who appreciate
the capabilities and sincerity of at least some of its members, have
little faith in the organization as a whole. ALJs complain that Ap-
peals Council members are merit system employees, not APA pro-
tected, and are therefore susceptible to political pressures. ALJs
assert that it is improper for bonus-eligible employees to review
quasi-judicial decisions on such fact-based cases. ALJs have repeat-
edly battled the OHA leadership over productivity and performance
ratings, and have argued that their own statutory independence is an
essential guarantee of fairness; they have little use for less-secure em-
ployees in an appellate role.
41 4
412. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.976(c), 416.147(c) (1986).
413. See Koitz, Social Security: Legislation to Create an Independent Agency 7 (1986)
(prepared for Congressional Research Service); J. MASHAW, supra note 154, at 144.
414. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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ALJs also resent having their decisions subjected to review by
members whose qualifications and capabilities are no greater than
their own. The present job qualifications for Council members and
ALJs are substantially the same. Indeed, a number of ALJs have
joined the Appeals Council. Non-lawyers, however, have served on
the Appeals Council in the not too distant past, and many ALJs be-
lieve that some non-lawyers still are serving. Moreover, most Coun-
cil members have never attended, let alone conducted, a real
disability hearing. 415 Because the two jobs are graded and paid at the
same level, the best ALJs have little incentive to climb the appellate
ladder. More than one current member of the Appeals Council, in
fact, expressed a preference for moving in the other direction, taking
an appointment as an ALJ, if one could be arranged for the Wash-
ington, D.C., or Baltimore area.
In short, ALJs generally do not see the Appeals Council as a legiti-
mate appellate body. They suspect that it is subject to political mani-
pulations and believe that it has been forced into over-reliance upon
the work of non-lawyer OAO analysts. ALJs have little opportunity
to interact with Appeals Council members and, therefore, little occa-
sion to dispel any myths. Within OHA, then, as among the claimants
and general public, acceptability of the Appeals Council is a genuine
problem.
3. Acceptability with the Courts and Congress
The SSA disability process has experienced considerable judicial
distrust. Frequently, the federal courts have looked past the actions
of the Appeals Council to dissect the work of the ALJ. Even in the
eyes of the reviewing tribunal, the Appeals Council is often deemed
irrelevant to the process and the results of the hearing level.4 6
The Appeals Council has attempted to become more responsive to
court activity. It has revised the prior "harmless error" policy and
now grants review over more ALJ denials, re-writing even correct
decisions to make the procedure and rationale more acceptable to the
courts. 41 7 It has also streamlined Secretarial remand procedure on se-
lected cases, providing further administrative work-up on difficult
415. The original plan for establishing the Appeals Council envisioned a great degree of
fungibility between its members and hearing examiners: "Members of the Appeals Council
will be authorized to serve as referees and should exercise such authority from time to time as
a means of keeping them in touch with the problems connected with conducting hearings and
developing the records." BASIC PROVISIONS, supra note 194, at 39.
416. See supra note 329 and accompanying text.
417. 8 Soc. SECURITY F. 1 (Feb. 1986).
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cases. In fact, the Appeals Council may be becoming too preoccu-
pied with court actions at the expense of its other roles, because re-
sources directed at court actions cannot be utilized for minimizing
administrative errors early in the process.
The SSA's programs-and the Congress' purse strings-are sub-
ject to the vicissitudes of politics. In an era of budget deficits and
belt-tightening, proposals to increase domestic spending, including
disability, have poor prospects for success. Whether this phenome-
non relates to Congressional acceptability, however, is difficult to
assess.
The OHA has certainly received more than its share of scrutiny in
recent years. Most of this attention, however, has been lavished on
the ALJ stage and the controversies over productivity and reversal
rates. The Appeals Council has attracted far less notice-it is no
more prominent in the attention of Congressional representatives
and staff than among other sectors, and is little noticed by them.
Even legislative proposals that would abolish the Appeals Council
altogether do so indirectly, almost as an afterthought, such as
through the creation of a new federal Social Security Court. 4 s Con-
gressional staff familiar with the Appeals Council have little to say
in support or opposition. They perceive the Appeals Council as po-
tentially valuable institutionally but not notably successful in carry-
ing out a particular mandate. Thus, the Appeals Council has little
impact with the Congress and little success in fostering program ac-
ceptability.
III. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Appeals Council is-or should be-an important institution.
It alone issues final administrative adjudications on the thousands of
disability cases pouring in from ALJs and DDSs around the country.
It alone sees the full panoply of court cases, and it alone can call
upon the talents of members and OAO analysts with such a special
bureaucratic perspective.
Having investigated the purposes, structure and operation of the
Appeals Council and having assessed its institutional performance
and potential, we conclude that four options are available to im-
prove the functioning of the Appeals Council: (1) Retain the Appeals
Council essentially as it stands; (2) Abolish the Appeals Council en-
tirely, redistributing its responsibilities and resources elsewhere; (3)
Modify the Appeals Council to optimize its performance as a case-
418. See, e.g., 1986 Hearing, supra note 3, at 3 (statement of Representative Archer).
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handling entity; or (4) Reform the Appeals Council, emphasizing its
role in promulgating improvements in the adjudicatory bureaucracy.
Each of these options deserves serious consideration and has certain
merits. For reasons spelled out in this section, however, we strongly
prefer Model (4) and recommend its immediate adoption.
A. Model (1): Retain the Appeals Council Essentially As It Stands
Maintenance of the present system without major alterations is a
legitimate possibility. One should not rush to dispose of a govern-
ment institution that has weathered bureaucratic storms for almost
half a century. In fact, the Appeals Council has managed to do its
job with some success, has helped to promote several important SSA
objectives, and has managed to churn out 50,000 cases per year. Ad-
herents of the "if it ain't broke, don't fix it" school might argue
that the organization, for all its flaws, does something useful and
that radical change promises no greater success.
Our review convinces us, however, that something in the system is
broken. The Appeals Council fails to achieve its goals because of
deep, permanent flaws in its structure and in the selection of its
goals. Despite the best efforts of some very capable people, the rec-
ord of the Appeals Council is wholly unsatisfactory. Several areas
require fundamental changes.
The Appeals Council's present goals are important but also com-
plex and difficult. Some of those goals, such as enhanced policy de-
velopment, have been abandoned because of the crush of the
caseload. Others, such as attaining decisional accuracy in the closest
cases, are too ambitious. Achievement of other goals has been sub-
verted by failures in the organization or operation of the Appeals
Council. Moreover, current operations of the Appeals Council im-
pose unacceptable costs upon the disability program. These costs
(money, diverted resources, delay, and public image) are substantial
and, we believe, avoidable.
Therefore, we reject Model (1). The existing structure of the Ap-
peals Council is supported by nothing more than bureaucratic iner-
tia. The time has come for profound change.
B. Model (2): Abolish the Appeals Council
The converse of Model (1) is Model (2), a proposal for outright
elimination of the Appeals Council. This action has been recom-
mended repeatedly by many claimants' representatives and several
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scholars. 419 Congressional legislation that would accomplish this ob-
jective is regularly introduced 20
Valid reasons exist to support abolition. Appeals Council review is
now largely superfluous. It changes the results in only 5074 of the
cases, 421 a statistic that may constitute a prima facie case for aboli-
tion. The Appeals Council does not contribute appreciably to the in-
stitutional goals of the SSA, and few factors suggest that a fourth
tier-a fourth bite at this particular apple-is worthwhile.
The Appeals Council, moreover, is expensive. It consumes mil-
lions of dollars, employs talented people who could be used produc-
tively elsewhere, and wastes time, delaying the finality of the
adjudicative process and eroding the support and confidence of the
claimants.
These problems and the difficulty of adequately restructuring the
Appeals Council suggest that a clean break may be wise. The Ap-
peals Council might be considered outdated in an era when stream-
lining government is important. Teaching this old dog new tricks
may not be a sound use of resources.
Abolition of the Appeals Council would not be difficult. Its per-
sonnel could be redistributed within the agency. Temporary displace-
ments would no doubt occur, but the talents of members and OAO
analysts could be put to good use in other niches. Similarly, the ves-
tigial functions of the current Appeals Council could be handled
elsewhere. OAO and other SSA service centers, for example, could
send their "protest" cases 422 back to the originating ALJ. Technical
errors could be efficiently corrected at the source through a reopen-
ing. The quality-assurance role of the Appeals Council could be
served by a quality assurance staff that could provide on-the-job
training for new ALJs in conjunction with the SSA's national Chief
ALJ. The Bellmon Review 423 function could be statutorily removed
or performed by other units.
One factor operating against Model (2) is that following abolition
of the Appeals Council, ALJ decisions would become final agency
actions and immediately reviewable in court. While this arrangement
would be a departure from the common structure of administrative
law (another post-hearing administrative stage usually exists prior to
a court appeal), we find the arrangement plausible.
419. See D. COFER, supra note 5.
420. See, e.g., supra note 4.
421. OHA OPERATIONAL REP. 27 (Sept. 30, 1986).
422. See supra text accompanying note 238.
423. For a general discussion of Bellmon Review, see supra note 258.
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The Model (2) scheme is consistent with the APA, which implicitly
permits an Appeals Council but does not require it.124 ALJs are le-
gally competent to have the last word for the agency. As a practical
matter, ALJs now deliver the last real word in most cases because
the Appeals Council caseload prevents it from effectively interven-
ing.
Once freed from the specter of Appeals Council review, ALJs
would not necessarily become more aberrational, independent, or
generous. The ALJs would likely perform as they have in the past.
Since the Appeals Council contributes little to ALJ discipline, aboli-
tion would not remove any of the system's important checks.
Most importantly, abolition of the Appeals Council would not im-
mediately flood the federal courts with massive increases in disability
filings. Compared to the various other barriers to entry into the fed-
eral courts, including cost, delay, exhaustion, and the need for an
attorney, the factor of Appeals Council review is negligible. Its re-
moval would not make an appreciable difference to the system.
We have a great deal of sympathy for this course of action. The
present operation of the Appeals Council is seriously wanting, and
remedial actions are not likely to occur. Nevertheless, our skepticism
about the institution's effectiveness does not obscure our respect for
its potential. Therefore, we do not recommend abolition at this time.
On the other hand, should our preferred recommendations or sim-
ilar measures not be accepted and implemented, we would endorse
the abolition option. The Appeals Council cannot continue as it is. If
the recommended improvements are not promptly forthcoming, or if
they prove inefficacious, the Appeals Council should be abolished.
C. Model (3): Improve the Appeals Council's Case-Handling Role
The next alternative is a restructuring of the Appeals Council to
improve the accuracy, consistency, and efficiency of the case-han-
dling process. Under this alternative, the Appeals Council would
continue to pursue its leading current objectives, but would be reor-
ganized to perform more efficiently.
Model (3) is based upon the principle that the most important
function of appellate administrative review is the scrutiny of individ-
ual cases. The Appeals Council can correct ALJ errors before a
wrongly-denied applicant is forced to litigate or before a wrongly-
allowed applicant is put on the disability rolls. Even if perfect accu-
424. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(b)(1), 1383(c)(1) (1982).
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racy is elusive, the Appeals Council could still do much to interdict
blatant errors .425
The Appeals Council could also improve consistency within the
program. Treating like cases alike is fundamental to due process,
and the absence of central control may result in even greater incon-
sistency among the lower decisionmaking levels. Although the Ap-
peals Council has not been notably successful in generating national
uniformity, modest reforms would enhance its performance. By han-
dling individual cases more purposefully and by developing addi-
tional feedback procedures that address vertical and horizontal
inconsistency, the Appeals Council may be able to pursue these goals
more effectively.
However, Model (3) has several disadvantages. First, as discussed
above, decisional "accuracy" is undefinable and unmeasurable. Dis-
ability cases are too subjective and variable; appellate reviews too
often substitute one authority's judgment for that of another. Even
if accuracy were not so elusive, exquisite accuracy in close cases is
not so valuable that we would oppose stopping at three, rather than
four, levels of administrative adjudication.4 26
Consistency, too, is important. However, we question whether
consistency can be achieved by reviewing and correcting individual
cases. Even if the Appeals Council could improve its capacity for
enforcing consistency, the amount of uniformity that could be
achieved solely by working the cases is limited.
Finally, the Appeals Council imposes other costs upon the system,
such as delay and reduced public acceptability, that would not be
mitigated merely by refining its present routines. Even if the Appeals
Council were streamlined, its greater efficiency would not justify its
lofty position in the bureaucracy.
Enhancing the Council's case-processing role would require impor-
tant changes. Essentially, the Council would become a more court-
like body designed to handle its docket expeditiously and carefully.
While we do not recommend adoption of Model (3), it deserves seri-
ous attention and the contrast between it and Model (4) will help
explain our preference for Model (4).
Model (3) would incorporate the following six features:
(1) Legal and Bureaucratic Protection for the Members. Under
Model (3), the Appeals Council would be serving as a true appellate
reviewer of the work of ALJs, and it would be inappropriate for
425. See supra text following note 331.
426. Id.
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Council members to lack the protections that ALJs enjoy. 427 If the
relationship between the ALJ level and Appeals Council should ap-
proximate the relationship between a district and circuit court, then
both tiers would need the same measure of APA independence. The
fiction of the Appeals Council performing a "political" act, in the
name of the Secretary, is utterly inapplicable to the high-volume,
fact-intensive world of Social Security disability. The reality is that
Appeals Council members, like ALJs, perform a quasi-judicial func-
tion, not a quasi-political one; formal guaranties of independence
are important for propriety and for the appearance of propriety.
With this enhanced status under Model (3) would come a change
of title from "member" to "administrative appeals judge," and
from "Deputy Chair" to "Chief Judge." We assume that the Asso-
ciate Commissioner's position would remain but it would no longer
carry an ex officio seat on the Appeals Council.
The Appeals Council, along with the corps of ALJs, would be re-
located outside the SSA hierarchy. Supervision by political officials
such as a commissioner, deputy commissioner, and associate com-
missioner would be inappropriate for a judicial body. Instead, the
adjudicators would be physically and administratively insulated from
the SSA. The Office of Hearings and Appeals, therefore, would be
moved to the Office of the Secretary of HHS or, better still, to an
independent adjudicatory agency.
(2) Less "Second-Guessing" of ALJs. The Appeal Council's stan-
dard of review consists of a check for "substantial evidence" to sup-
port the conclusions of the ALJ.428 However, it is difficult to believe
that this standard is always honored. Instead, the Appeals Council
(like the federal courts that review it) often substitutes its own judg-
ment for that of the prior adjudicator (finding a witness not credible
or the evidence unpersuasive, for example). This examination con-
sumes too much time, undercuts respect for the ALJ, and favors sec-
ond-hand assessments of demeanor and credibility.
One solution could be greater restraint on the part of Appeals
Council members. A more concrete step would be a revision of the
standard of review. For example, the Appeals Council's power to
reverse could be limited to ALJ decisions that are found to be "arbi-
trary." Under Model (3), the Appeals Cbuncil would reserve its at-
tention for the most egregious ALJ errors, and we conclude that
such an "arbitrariness" standard would be appropriate for handling
the cases expeditiously.
427. See supra text accompanying note 138.
428. See supra text accompanying note 267.
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(3) Time Limits. The most frustrating aspect of appellate review
for claimants and their representatives is the long period of uncer-
tainty they face while waiting for the Appeals Council to act or,
more often, to decline to act. 429 Under Model (3), the Appeals Coun-
cil would have to improve its efficiency. it could follow fixed time-
tables and allow claimants to proceed directly to court if these
timetables were not honored. Reopening powers could not be exer-
cised as a way of extending the Appeals Council's time for review.
(4) Broaden the Caseload. The Appeals Council would not be con-
fined to claimants' requests for review. It would again take a sub-
stantial volume of "own motion" cases: both ALJ awards and
unappealled ALJ denials. 4 0
The appropriate volume of cases for a Model (3) Appeals Council
is a trickier question. Ideally, an administrative appellate body
should review all ALJ decisions to promote accuracy and unifor-
mity. On the other hand, even an enhanced Appeals Council could
not effectively consider a four-fold increase in the current caseload.
Some selection process would have to be continued.
(5) Close the Record After the Hearing. As an appellate body, the
Model (3) Appeals Council would not receive new evidence. It would
review a closed record. Only the trial (ALJ) level could consider peti-
tions for reopening for new evidence. 43 1
(6) Improved Support System. The Appeals Council does not have
adequate space, personnel, or computers. These work elements
would have to be upgraded.
Although Model (3) is feasible, it would require a substantial en-
hancement of the current Appeals Council to improve its ability to
handle prodigious volumes of cases expeditiously. Model (3) focuses
exclusively on the goals of accuracy and consistency. If the Appeals
Council were transformed into this highly specialized entity, its per-
formance could be appreciably upgraded at a modest cost.
On the other hand, we do not consider this option wise and do not
recommend its adoption for two reasons. First, reviewing cases once
again for accuracy and consistency is not of overwhelming value in a
system as large and subjective as the SSA. It would not be worth-
while and it would risk hypertrophy of what should be one of the
system's lesser capabilities. Second, the disability bureaucracy has
other needs that the Appeals Council is uniquely suited to address.
429. See supra text accompanying note 288.
430. See supra text accompanying notes 248-63.
431. See supra text accompanying notes 280-85.
1990]
302 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW [Vol. 17:199
Model (3) would seriously waste a potentially valuable asset to the
disability system.
D. Model (4): Optimize for System Reform
We support the final option, which would redesign the Appeals
Council as a different entity. The Appeals Council would still handle
individual cases and correct errors, but it would function principally
in a "systems reform" capacity, discovering, elaborating and imple-
menting changes in the entire disability adjudication system that
could lead to earlier, more accurate, decisionmaking.
In this scheme, cases would provide raw data for system reform
analyses. In Model (4), the cases (although far fewer of them) would
still be the primary input into the operation of the Appeals Council;
its primary output, however, would be clarifications of policies or
ideas for change, rather than a mass of corrected adjudications.
We begin with the premise that the Social SecurityAdministration
needs more assistance in policy development and program integrity.
The Appeals Council is admirably suited for providing some of this
assistance. It retains an experienced corps of senior officials with ac-
cess to a steady stream of diverse cases. The Appeals Council is the
only place in the bureaucracy where such rich data may be efficiently
processed and important lessons extracted for the benefit of the en-
tire system.4 32
Moreover, in the long run, no trade-off occurs between the error-
correction function and the systems-reform function. If this plan
works, the entire SSA adjudicative bureaucracy will operate more ef-
ficiently, making more accurate decisions and making them earlier.
Fewer errors would reach the Appeals Council stage, and fewer
wrongful administrative denials would have to be pursued in court.
There are some disadvantages to Model (4). Under it, the Appeals
Council would handle fewer cases and catch fewer errors. Therefore,
those whose claims are now denied by ALJs but granted by the Ap-
peals Council would be disadvantaged. They would have to abandon
their claims altogether or appeal them in court. The number of
claimants in this category might be considerable and produce a sig-
nificant cost of transition to the new system.
It is also possible that some of the current members of the organi-
zation might not adapt well to their new roles. They were not se-
lected for this function and their training and experience have largely
emphasized other values. Our observation of current members, how-
432. See supra text accompanying note 350.
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ever, convinces us that they are well-suited to the suggested work and
can be retrained. In recent years, the SSA has not emphasized sys-
tems reform opportunities for Appeals Council members, but we are
confident that the current membership could make a substantial con-
tribution and that successors selected with this role in mind could do
even better.
Model (4) differs in important ways from the "case-handling" of
Model (3). In many respects, however, the reforms are similar. Some
of the recommendations made in this section parallel or expand the
comments made above. Other recommendations reflect the unique
demands of an organization dedicated to systems reform. We have
identified seven basic changes that this model would require:
1. Control the Caseload
This is the critical starting point for many of our recommenda-
tions. The Appeals Council must regain control over its docket. As
long as it labors under the weight of 50,000 or more cases per year,
its members will not have time for anything else. 433 The cases have
consumed all the resources of the organization, usurping any oppor-
tunity for policy reflection or innovation.
We do not know precisely the "right" number of cases for the
Appeals Council to accept under the recommended plan, but we esti-
mate that 5,000 to 10,000 cases per year at the review level (i.e., 10
to 20076 of the current caseload) would be appropriate. The Appeals
Council should always handle a substantial number of cases so that
it does not become just another policy body divorced from the real-
ity of the adjudication process.
In addition to regulating the volume of its cases, the Appeals
Council must also control the types of cases it reviews. These cases
should be selected by the Appeals Council itself, not by disappointed
claimants or mailroom clerks. The Appeals Council should develop a
strategy for identifying cases appropriate for scrutiny, and the cate-
gories could change frequently. We envision at least three general
types of cases that the Appeals Council could consider through care-
ful sampling.
(a) New Issues. The Appeals Council might select for review a
fixed number of cases implementing new and potentially difficult re-
gulations or procedures. It could, for example, concentrate on recent
mental impairment cases, on AIDS-related cases, 43 4 or on cases that
433. See supra text accompanying note 309.
434. See S.S.R. 86-20 (Cum. Ed. 1986).
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raise some particularly novel issue of the new medical improvement
standards. Thus, the Appeals Council could provide feedback about
the ways in which the field offices and ALJs are processing new mat-
ters and promptly identify areas needing further clarification or
training.
(b) Problem Areas. The Appeals Council might also focus on
longstanding SSA disability issues with difficult regulations. Allega-
tions of disabling pain unaccompanied by corresponding physical
findings, for example, or assertions of disability through substance
abuse, are recurring problems. The intersection between SSA cases
and the decisions of a particular federal court in an acquiescence sit-
uation might be another example.
The Appeals Council might also develop a profile of cases in
which an ALJ or DDS is more likely to err. It might be observed, for
example, that accuracy is particularly troublesome in cases that raise
transferability-of-skills disputes, or in cases where the claimant's
physician and the SSA consulting physician disagree on the diagno-
sis. Mistakes are not distributed randomly throughout the SSA case-
load, and the Appeals Council could conveniently determine the
sources of repeated errors.
Targeting particular ALJs, instead of particular types of cases, is
more difficult. 435 We would not recommend Appeals Council focus
on "error-prone" ALJs. The trauma of targeted Bellmon Review
was very destructive for the system and very damaging to the rela-
tionship between the Appeals Council and its clients. We note, how-
ever, that the dispersion of award rates among ALJs is greater than
the system can comfortably tolerate. It is possible that review,
guided at least in part by the track record of specific ALJs or offices,
could be beneficial.
In this vein, the Appeals Council should also accept cases "certi-
fied" by ALJs uncertain about the application of a particular policy
or standard. The Appeals Council moreover could invite certifica-
tion on selected matters, to determine which types of cases are prob-
lematic.
(c) Random Review. Although we are uncomfortable using chance
in the selection process since the concept smacks of justice by lot-
tery, we would permit the Appeals Council to review a number of
cases at random. Careful review of random cases might suggest
which problems warrant intensive scrutiny. 436 Random selection
435. See supra text accompanying note 259.
436. Observers in other administrative contexts have supported the value of these "fishing
expeditions." J. FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 153.
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probably will not be an important part of the Appeals Council's
docket in the near future but it might ultimately become a vehicle for
identifying additional categories for review.
The Appeals Council should adjust its own jurisdiction and
change the makeup of the categories from time to time, thereby re-
maining flexible enough to uncover new areas where it could contrib-
ute to the policymaking process.
The Appeals Council should review both allowances and denials
and should analyze the work of both the "best" and the "worst"
ALJs and hearing offices. Part of the Council's proposed role is to
discover what procedures work well, what attributes allow the best
ALJs and offices to excel, and how their successes can be replicated
throughout the system.
2. Expand the Appeal Council's Role in Formulating Policy
The Appeals Council should offer assistance in the policymaking
and policy-implementing process. The underlying purpose of its case
review would be to provide a database through which the members
could advise and assist the SSA officials making policy decisions.
This purpose could be realized in three ways.
First, when the issue concerns important areas of policy, the Ap-
peals Council can serve in an advisory capacity. The Council should
conduct independent studies of its caseload and offer its conclusions
and recommendations directly to policy officials. The Council mem-
bers should also serve on various agency-wide ad hoc study groups
designed to propose new policy. The Appeals Council's perspective
should provide an important source of information for these com-
mittees.
The Appeals Council already has experience in these capacities;
members have occasionally served on SSA study groups and have
suggested new SSRs. 43 7 We propose that this activity be greatly ex-
panded and made the centerpiece of the members' activities, to tran-
scend the individual cases and recommend regulations, SSRs, and
other policy changes that could lead to improved disability adjudica-
tion. 438
Second, the Appeals Council should play a larger role regarding a
range of smaller policy questions-those that do matter in processing
437. See supra text accompanying notes 334-40.
438. Administrative appellate boards are frequently charged with this type of role in poli-
cymaking: "The [intermediate review] Board is expected to contribute through its work to the
formulation, rather than the mere application, of agency policy." J. FREEDMAN, supra note 2,
at 138.
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the cases, but do not rise to the level of a regulation or SSR. Here,
the Appeals Council should directly exercise leadership through care-
fully articulated case decisions and policy pronouncements that
would have precedential impact on future deliberations. Two vehi-
cles are already available for this purpose: case decisions and Ap-
peals Council "minutes." Most disability cases are so fact-specific
that occasions for issuing forward-looking decisions are rare. The
Appeals Council should seek out these occasions, however, and seize
the opportunity to promote uniformity by publicizing successful ap-
proaches. Similarly, the Appeals Council can pursue the same goal,
outside the context of any particular case, by returning to its former
practice of issuing minutes that reflect its posture on case matters.43 9
This practice, too, would upgrade the entire claims adjudication
process by providing improved mechanics that can be relied upon
nationally.440
The Appeals Council should also publicize its cases and minutes
throughout the disability system. It should ensure that ALJs, DDSs,
district offices, and claimants' representatives are familiar with con-
sistent procedures and standards. The Appeals Council would
thereby promote uniformity and integrity, in contrast to the some-
what arbitrary current system. While this practice would not require
publication of all Appeals Council decisions, the Appeals Council
should publish more noteworthy cases as a foundation for consistent
and equitable decisions. The current OHA Law Reporter offers only
a small fraction of the publication and indexing we consider neces-
sary for a comprehensive and useful compilation of decisions. 4 1
A third avenue for participation in the policy process is experimen-
tation. The various DDSs, district offices and ALJs have a wealth of
experience in handling claims, but these resources are largely un-
tapped. The Appeals Council should study the lower tiers, discover
innovative improvements, refine those improvements, and export
them to other units. Although the substantive definitions and stan-
dards for eligibility should remain consistent throughout the coun-
439. See supra text accompanying note 341.
440. Policies derived from careful scrutiny of actual cases, rather than solely from ab-
stract theorizing about the agency's needs, are particularly likely to be useful and valid. See
Capowski, supra note 75, at 376.
441. Other observers have also noted that an appellate body can play a useful role in the
agency, promoting consistency in decisionmaking, by advising the lower tiers about which
adjudicative processes will be ratified on appeal, and which are likely to be rejected.
"[H]earing examiners have learned that the Review Board's success in the predictable applica-
tion of standards has increased their opportunities to make decisions that will not be appealed
or that will stand upon appeal." J. FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 149.
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try, the implementing procedures need not remain rigid. Local
experiments, supervised, encouraged and studied by the Appeals
Council, might create greater efficiency in the future.
442
3. Revise the Case-Correction Role
Although the main objective of the Appeals Council should be sys-
tem reform, it would still review many individual cases. Various sub-
sidiary matters arise in this context.
Our concept of a reformed Appeals Council is that of an appellate
body with sufficient time to give each case a thoughtful, careful in-
spection. We also envision an organization that operates more colle-
gially, with members collectively analyzing cases. The members
should discuss cases, compare ideas, and seek common solutions.
Greater reliance should be placed upon panel decisions. These panels
could be composed of perhaps three members, and meetings en banc
would become more frequent as the crush of cases is reduced.
We also recommend making greater use of the claimants and their
representatives. The Council should hold oral arguments more fre-
quently to identify precedential aspects of the cases and to raise ideas
for management initiatives. It should also notify claimants about is-
sues under consideration and encourage them to respond with de-
tailed arguments. Whenever the Appeals Council changes the
mixture of cases and the types of problems to be addressed, it should
inform claimants' representatives and invite them to submit amicus
briefs. Considerable expertise and knowledge is available in the
claimants' bar; the Council should draw upon it regularly.
The Appeals Council should slow the decisionmaking process to
allow for more thoughtful consideration. The process of deciding
cases within an average of fifteen minutes must be discontinued.
Council members and analysts should evaluate cases more thor-
oughly, debating their implications and listening to tapes of the hear-
ings if necessary.
Finally, the Appeals Council will have to substantiate its written
opinions if they are to have precedential impact and carry due weight
among the ALJs and street level bureaucrats. The Appeals Council
442. The preservation of this type of individualized discretion is essential for a complex
administrative structure such as the SSA. The lower tiers must be accorded the opportunity to
work the cases with intelligence and sensitivity, not just with blind adherance to policies that
are inevitably styled with the standard situations foremost in mind. This is not to deny the
importance of rules, nor to justify extreme departures from them, but we do maintain that the
role of human judgment must be sustained. See Capowski, supra note 75, at 354, 372 (discre-
tion for ALJs is essential and inevitable for the SSA); ELLIS, supra note 2, at 166-67.
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should draft opinions that are clear, responsive, forward-looking
and individualized-in other words, free of mindless boilerplate or
rote summaries of the documentation.
(a) Role in Correcting the Cases. When the reformed Appeals
Council moves more slowly and carefully through its cases, three
possibilities for error correction are feasible. First, the Appeals
Council might play no role in correcting errors. Even when it discov-
ered mistakes, it could leave the AL's work undisturbed, since the
focus of the Appeals Council would be on the system as a whole, not
on any one output of it. A second model would permit the Appeals
Council to remand the errors to the ALJ with a commentary explain-
ing what problems have been identified and suggesting that the ALJ
might reopen and revise the case. Finally, the Appeals Council might
retain its current capacity for correcting or remanding any case it
deems flawed, while still devoting most of its attention to policymak-
ing.
Each of these variants has advantages. The first two would enable
the Appeals Council to concentrate upon formulating policy without
the distraction of effectuating individual cases. The second would
also ensure that errors are not totally overlooked.
We consider the third variant the most desirable. Under it, the Ap-
peals Council could focus primarily upon reform without sacrificing
entirely its current case-handling role. The Council could detect er-
rors, prevent them from slipping through the system, and use the
occasion of error as an opportunity to instruct the bureaucracy per-
sonally through prompt, focused feedback. By correcting, or re-
manding, the errors that it sees, the Appeals Council would be
forced to stay in intimate contact with the cases-its legitimate
source of expertise for a policy role-and assist claimants, ALJs,
and others directly.
The mere fact that a serious question may be raised about the Ap-
peals Council role in case correction is itself instructive. It demon-
strates that the primary role of the Council should be to transcend
the adjudication of individual cases, in order to generalize from
them and identify the larger issues they present. The question also
suggests that the reason for the Council to act upon ALJ errors is
not simply to forestall a losing court battle. Instead, the Appeals
Council should inquire into all types of errors to determine how they
can be more efficiently prevented, and how deserving claimants can
be identified and paid more quickly and easily.
(b) Standard of Review. When it inspects and corrects cases, the
Appeals Council should become less "interventionist." Two differ-
ent standards of review are required. First, regarding ALJ determi-
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nations of fact, the Appeals Council should be bound by a standard
of "arbitrariness," rather than the current "substantial evidence"
test. As noted earlier, 443 the "substantial evidence" criterion is
breached too often. This criterion also encourages the Appeals
Council to attempt to achieve an excessively subtle degree of accu-
racy. Rather, the Appeals Council should correct substantial devia-
tions from established standards and use its experience for larger
policy purposes. It should not second-guess an ALJ in close cases.
Secondly, regarding ALJ interpretations of law, the Appeals
Council should show less deference. An ALJ who misunderstands
the governing principles of a case or misstates the law should be cor-
rected. The distinction between "factual" and "legal" issues may be
subtle; nevertheless, it is one that reviewing courts traditionally must
make, and should be an Appeals Council responsibility too.
(c) Close the Record After the ALJ Stage. The case record should
be closed before the file is transmitted to the Appeals Council.4" The
system should encourage claimants to submit all probative evidence
to the ALJ. It is often difficult for claimants to assemble all the po-
tential evidence quickly, and where an ongoing condition continues
to deteriorate, selecting a cutoff date for closing the file seems arbi-
trary. Orderly litigation and respect for administrative judgments,
however, suggest the importance of segregating trial- and appellate-
level functions more strictly. If new evidence arises, the claimant
may seek a remand and submit a motion to reopen the case. Absent
good cause for reopening, the additional evidence should be submit-
ted with a new application. The Appeals Council should not receive
new evidence; its review should be appellate, on a closed record.
(d) Timeliness Standards. The problem of Appeals Council delay
would be greatly mitigated under Model (4); most cases would not
require Appeals Council review to exhaust administrative remedies.
Those few that did would receive quicker consideration as an adjunct
of a reduced caseload. Nevertheless, timeliness standards might be
advantageous at the outset and the Appeals Council should be re-
quired to adjudicate cases within a specified, short, time frame.44
443. See supra text accompanying notes 264-71.
444. See supra text accompanying notes 272-80.
445. The OHA leadership recognizes the imperative of improving the agency's perform-
ance on timeliness. Eileen Bradley states:
There are two themes in terms of overall OHA concerns that I will strike repeatedly,
sound consistently, and they are: service to our claimants. We need to assure that
the claimants in this country get their day in court as expeditiously as possible.
Justice delayed, in my view, is no justice at all. Irrespective of the validity of the
claimant's claim, that claimant believes he or she is entitled, and we have a right
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Under Model (4), the Appeals Council should be able to decide
within thirty days of the ALJ's decision whether the case meets one
of its current profiles. It could then have an additional sixty days to
work the case, or more if commentary or other input from the claim-
ant were necessary. Furthermore, the Appeals Council should not re-
open a case merely because it has missed the ordinary deadline. Only
factors such as fraud, clerical error, or obvious mistake should dis-
turb the finality of the ALJ decision.
(e) Final Agency Action. Under this system, as in Model (2), the
vast majority of ALJ decisions would become final agency determi-
nations, allowing prompt payment of awards and immediate review-
ability of denials in federal court. This arrangement is certainly
unusual for modern administrative practice in that most departments
provide for some degree of administrative review between the hear-
ing level and the judiciary." 6 Neither the APA nor sound principles
of SSA management, however, require a fourth administrative tier.
We find nothing compelling about a "Secretarial" review that has
long been quasi-judicial anyway. 447 Therefore, little is lost by claim-
ants or the SSA if the final administrative word comes from the
ALJ, rather than after a cursory review by an over-burdened Ap-
peals Council.
We do not believe that this model will result in a surge of federal
court actions. As noted above, other inhibiting factors, such as cost
and delay, will continue to retard frivolous recourse to the court.
These factors, rather than the current Appeals Council, have win-
nowed civil actions. Moreover, the reformed Appeals Council should
actually be able to reduce substantially the burden on the judiciary,
as the administrative process becomes more accurate, efficient, and
reliable.
and an obligation to respect that belief. I find it unconscionable that a claimant
must wait 365 days to know where he or she stands with respect to a benefit pack-
age. We have got to do better. [The second "theme" is protecting the trust fund.]
SSA videotape Bradley Speaks, supra note 322.
446. In child labor civil penalty cases, the Secretary of Labor has delegated to ALJs the
authority to make final agency decisions. 29 C.F.R. § 580.32 (1986). In addition, the Board of
Contract Appeals makes final agency decisions in government contracts cases. 31 U.S.C. §
1304 (a)(3)(C) (1982).
447. The theory of administrative reviewers performing a "Secretarial" function may
have some validity in situations where ALJs handle cases involving important aspects of eco-
nomic regulation of key industries or corporations. Today, however, the vast majority of
ALJs, including those in the SSA, are concerned instead with "micro" decisions, such as
public benefits in which political factors are irrelevant. See Lubbers, A Uniform Corps of
ALJs: A Proposal to Test the Idea on the Federal Level, 65 JUDICATURE 268 (1981).
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4. Improve the Status of Appeals Council Membership
Changes made in the personnel policy of the Appeals Council
should allow it to carry out the systems reform mission more effec-
tively.
(a) Upgrade the Position. Members of the Appeals Council, like
Social Security Administration ALJs, are now graded at the GS-15
level. Members of the Appeals Council should be ranked one step
higher. Providing a GS-16 rating for the Appeals Council has two
immediate advantages. First, in a world where pay and status are
inevitably linked, the promotion would carry a prestige that would
underscore the new role and importance of the Appeals Council. 44 It
would symbolize the growth of the institution and SSA's commit-
ment to it.
Second, and more importantly, the promotion is essential to at-
tract the most qualified people. Membership on the Appeals Council
is not now a financial step up for an ALJ; little else is available to
induce the best and brightest of the hearing corps to aspire to mem-
bership on the Appeals Council. Money is only one factor in an indi-
vidual's career decisions, but it is undeniably an important one and
it is the most visible short-term fix that can be made. Over time, the
reputation of the Appeals Council should grow, and ALJs would
seek appointment to it as the pinnacle of a career. For now, the most
immediate means of elevating the institution is to dedicate a few su-
pergrade or Senior Executive Service slots to it. 49
(b) Upgrade Job Prerequisites. As the job of Appeals Council
member becomes more attractive, the selection process can become
more selective.4 10 The senior ranks of the ALJ corps should be seen
as a fertile source of new members, and recruitment from this group
should be encouraged. The ALJs' hearing experience and perspective
on the cases are unrivaled. The Appeals Council would gain in stat-
ure by attracting the cream of the ALJ crop as members, giving it
greater credibility among the courts, the public, and the SSA leader-
ship.
448. Other observers have noted the importance of ensuring that an administrative review
panel have superior status. J. FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 143.
449. Upgrading the status of Appeals Council members to GS-16 would not cost the
agency much money, because most of the current members are already paid near the federal
salary cap and because we propose reducing the number of Council members. The symbol,
however, would carry considerable importance.
450. "There can be no compromise with [the principle of first-rate appointments] if the
Review Board is to win respect or acceptance from hearing examiners, the agency staff, and
the practicing bar." J. FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 143.
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We would not, however, make AU experience an absolute prereq-
uisite for membership on the Appeals Council. Many other people,
including current members, are capable of playing important roles in
the Appeals Council even though they may have received their back-
ground training in other parts of the system. The Appeals Council
should establish membership requirements based upon individual tal-
ents and character traits, not solely experience. In short, we recom-
mend a strong, but not absolute, preference for drawing new
members from the ranks of the ALJs.
(c) Member Independence. Appeals Council members should have
the same high level of independence guaranteed to ALJs by the
APA. It is true that the primary function of the Appeals Council
under Model (4) would be promotion of policy and program integ-
rity, and we recognize that as a result of their association, Council
members and SSA senior officials might form a strong bond. The
APA independence necessary in Model (3), where the members func-
tion exclusively as appellate judges, might therefore not seem so nec-
essary here.
Nevertheless, we believe that under Model (4) the gains from APA
protection would outweigh the losses. Independence will enhance
status and allow the members freedom to suggest novel policies for
efficient and equitable case handling without political risk. Further-
more, members would continue to review cases and issue binding de-
cisions; this is a quasi-judicial function that should be acknowledged
with APA independence.
We do not believe that members would abuse their APA-protected
status by irresponsible deviation from SSA procedure. Historically,
the Appeals Council has been faithful to SSA policy; the selection
criteria and the proposed role of the members should serve only to
reinforce this tendency.
(d) Council Size. The current Appeals Council has grown to its
present size of twenty members because of the mushrooming case-
load. A smaller Appeals Council would improve cohesion and pro-
vide greater integration and consistency. A group of approximately
eleven members seems appropriate. It would be large enough to han-
dle a significant volume of cases, yet small enough to sit comfortably
around a table, discuss members' observations, and develop a shared
outlook and policy.
We envision an Appeals Council that emphasizes internal consul-
tation and collaboration, meets frequently en banc, and thoroughly
analyzes problems in order to develop a consensus on policies or re-
commendations. To reach this degree of harmony, the Appeals
Council must be smaller.
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(e) Title and Location of the Organization. Under Model (4), the
Appeals Council would no longer take "appeals." It would establish
its own docket, accepting cases that present important policy consid-
erations. A new title, such as "Review Council," therefore seems
more appropriate. "Members" could retain their current titles, al-
though we recommend that the Deputy Chair be renamed "Chair"
to clarify who actually presides over Council matters. This new name
would also emphasize the organization's independence from the As-
sociate Commissioner, who would no longer hold an ex officio seat.
Under Model (4), the Council will need direct access to the agen-
cy's top policymakers, the ALJs, and lower-level claims processors.
The Council would act as liason among them, with enough inde-
pendence to adjudicate cases and with enough cohesiveness to affect
policy. This relationship requires bureaucratic relocation. Placement
of the Appeals Council under a Deputy and Associate Commissioner
is logically inconsistent with the role here outlined. Conversely, re-
moval of the Appeals Council (as contemplated in Model (3)) to the
Office of the Secretary or to an independent agency also seems
wrong; the Appeals Council must be closer to the action.
Accordingly, we recommend that the Appeals Council be relocated
within the Office of the Commissioner. 4 1 The Council's unique man-
date should enable it to assume this special placement. Its diverse
roles, moreover, would most consistently fit at the top of the SSA
hierarchy, outside the purview of any line office.
5. Enhance the Appeals Council's Role in Court Cases
The greatest opportunities for improvement of the Appeals Coun-
cil may be found at the review level; however, the Appeals Council
also plays a major role in shaping the SSA's response to cases in
litigation, and this role represents an important source of experience
for the systems reform mission of Model (4).
We recommend that the Appeals Council continue its current
court interface work essentially as it has been doing. Supplemental
review has an odd aura about it; it is peculiar that the SSA should
have a fifth chance to consider a case and to improve the documen-
451. There have been proposals to remove ALJs still further from agency politics and the
appearance of sensitivity to agency pressures by creating an independent, integrated corps of
ALJs available to serve all federal agencies. See Lubbers, A Unified Corps of ALJs: A Pro-
posal to Test the Idea at the Federal Level, 65 JUDICATURE 266, 266-276 (1981). The same
could be imagined for all federal appellate review boards. This strategy has considerable logi-
cal appeal under Model (3), where Appeals Council members function exclusively as judges,
but it is less applicable under Model (4), where the members are to focus on policy matters
and a close connection to the agency is essential.
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tation justifying a denial, rather than defend it as it stands or pay the
claim. This practice has also introduced for the first time in the
claims evaluation process a new awards standard authorizing pay-
ment of a "sympathetic" case, even if it does not quite fit the legal
standard of disability. Supplemental review may also be used im-
properly as a crutch, suggesting that careful early claims work is less
necessary because erroneous denials can be corrected later, if the
claimant has the tenacity and resources to proceed to court.
Rather than litigation, we favor alternative dispute resolution
techniques to negotiate or settle cases. The SSA, however, really has
little room for negotiation or compromise. The disability program
should not pay benefits to claimants merely because they are evoca-
tive litigants in court; if lawful eligibility criteria are not met, eligi-
bility should be denied.
On balance, we have no clearly better alternative strategy to pro-
pose. We note that supplementary review provides the Appeals
Council with a valuable window to the world of federal litigation,
complementing its perspective on the administrative processing of
claims.
For similar reasons, we endorse the current operation of the Ap-
peals Council in court remand situations.452 Although some internal
adjustments should be made (for example, less reliance upon "fast
track" remand and better guidance to the ALJ), we think the Ap-
peals Council can serve usefully as an intermediary in cases re-
manded from the courts, whether or not the Council saw the case
prior to litigation in court.
The Appeals Council also should be more involved in advanced
court litigation strategy. 453 This area of practice is complicated and
frustrating; lawyers from HHS and the Department of Justice fre-
quently disagree over whether appeals are tactically wise, legally jus-
tified, or sufficiently important. These differences will undoubtedly
continue, but the Appeals Council should have a voice in discussing
them. The Appeals Council's special bureaucratic perspective should
not be ignored in appellate planning. 454
452. See supra text accompanying notes 331-33.
453. Id.
454. SSA officials acknowledge that litigation strategy decisions are complex, and that the
current process for making them is sometimes tumultous.
I'm interested in litigation management. I think SSA, and OHA, is [sic] getting
beaten over the head unnecessarily, that we are losing cases we should be winning
and that we are appealing cases we shouldn't even appeal or touch and we need to
have an SSA strategy with OHA making a significant contribution to that whole
judicial process. That is also the Commissioner's priority, at least in terms of the
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The Appeals Council should also begin to monitor disability cases
as they proceed through court. Members should track their cases,
studying court actions for future guidance. We hope that the federal
courts will support the SSA improvements under Model (4). The
SSA's recent performance in the federal courts has been abysmal,
and the agency's reputation has fallen so low that little deference
from the courts can be expected. Perhaps this disrepute has bot-
tomed out, and perhaps the worst incidents-the initial wave of Con-
tinuing Disability Reviews (CDRs) and the targeted Bellmon
Reviews-that triggered the animosity no longer exist. Nevertheless,
federal courts may be reluctant to retreat promptly to the "substan-
tial evidence" standard of review. The courts see a skewed sam-
pling-only denials where a good argument can be made that the
claimant has been wronged-and federal judges might naturally see
themselves as the champions of the disenfranchised, failing to recog-
nize that the SSA pays 99.607o of the awards without judicial inter-
vention.
As the reorganized Appeals Council improves the administrative
review process, the SSA's success rate in court should begin to im-
prove, too. We hope that the lag between the two changes will not be
great and that courts will acknowledge the systematic improvements
in the disability adjudication process.
6. Improve Support Systems
The Appeals Council will require assistance to support the im-
provements called for in Model (4).
We envision a somewhat smaller operation in the OAO, since
fewer analysts will be needed to handle the smaller caseload. This
reduction, however, will be largely offset by greater attention to the
remaining cases. The OAO should be reorganized into teams of ana-
lysts and support personnel, each affiliated with a small panel of Ap-
peals Council members. These units should become more coherent
and more mutually supportive than the present organization of the
OAO.
Merging the OAO and the Appeals Council into a single unit is
another possibility, although this is a closer question in Model (4).
Because members would work primarily for system reform, a greater
functional distinction might emerge between members and analysts.
SSA part of it. I would like to see us improve our relationships with the court so
that they have a better understanding about what SSA law is about.
SSA videotape Bradley Speaks, supra note 322.
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Although this distinction might suggest less need to integrate the two
groups, it would still be preferable to organize these work units
tightly. In the future, OAO could focus on recruiting analysts skilled
at both reading the claims files and assisting the members with their
other functions. Accordingly, we recommend merging the OAO into
the Appeals Council.
Members of the Appeals Council should also have personal law
clerks. These positions would be only a modest expense for the bu-
reaucracy but a significant asset in organizing the work. Hiring law
clerks should increase Council efficiency and productivity, allowing
the members to concentrate on their primary obligations.
The data processing and word processing capabilities of the Ap-
peals Council need major improvement. The current hardware is de-
ficient and obsolete. The software is far below standards in the field,
and the Appeals Council is unable to perform many necessary func-
tions. Staff support is virtually nonexistent; indeed, even the current
level of performance would not be available but for the ingenuity of
a single, self-taught staff member. 41
We also recommend changes in the members' office arrangements.
The OHA is now scattered over five buildings in Arlington, Virginia.
It should be consolidated in one location, preferably within the SSA
headquarters complex in Baltimore. We think the principle of using
physical remoteness to underscore the judicial independence of the
members is valid, but it bends before the greater value of having the
455. The needs of the Appeals Council do not demand the highest technology, but a solid
computer network would be a major asset. Clearly each member should have word processing
capacity. The time savings for minor corrections alone would be substantial and would be
even greater if SSA analysts were brought into the modern world.
The data processing system must also be updated. The Appeals Council is now barely able
to track the files. Indeed, the system is so unreliable that index cards are used as a backup.
Yet, the statistical base of Appeals Council operations is important and it would become far
more so under Model (4), as the Appeals Council attempts to extract policy generalizations
out of individual adjudications. The data processing capability of the Appeals Council is
wholly inadequate and immediate upgrading is necessary.
All Appeals Council and ALJ decisions are now produced by a word processor, but the
record of each decision is ordinarily erased as soon as it is issued in order to save storage
capacity. We recommend that this practice be halted immediately and that the full text of all
OHA adjudications be retained indefinitely. The Appeals Council could use these closed cases
as part of its research on error prone or otherwise problematic cases. Claimants' representa-
tives might use them, with identifying details removed, to research precedents. Other uses may
appear with current or future data search techniques.
The Appeals Council, or the OHA on behalf of the ALJs as well, should seek the advice of
qualified systems engineers who specialize in the storage and retrieval of such material. Con-
sulting experts in this field are frequently relied upon by private industry and law firms; the
SSA, too, could benefit from their ability to evaluate the institution's needs and match them
with the available technology.
APPEALS COUNCIL
Appeals Council sit nearer the policymakers it assists. Under Model
(4), the Appeals Council and the whole of the OHA should play a
greater part in the policy process, requiring a headquarters location.
7. Increase the Appeals Council's Visibility
Mashaw wrote of the Social Security claims procedure in general
that "[t]he internal workings of the process that might inspire confi-
dence ...are invisible. ' '1 5 6 Nowhere is this more true than for the
Appeals Council. Most people know little about the nature and oper-
ation of the organization, and its members and activities are largely
shrouded from view. This invisibility may result in part from a de-
gree of defensiveness or reluctance to publicize the facts about low
reversal rates and the high volume of cases per member per day. Ob-
scurity, however, has been costly in terms of public acceptability.
We recommend a change in this respect.
We recommend in particular that the Appeals Council publicize
itself and conduct outreach activities designed to enhance the pub-
lic's and the claimants bar's knowledge about its work. Claimants
and their representatives have much to say about the operation of
the disability adjudication system; the Appeals Council can be one
point of contact. We do not expect greater interaction to result in
conformity of views or harmony of interests, but we do think that
the worst aspects of the Council's image of arbitrariness and futility
can be ameliorated. Furthermore, it should become easier for claim-
ants or their representatives to contact the Appeals Council to learn
the status and scheduling of their cases.457
456. J. MASHAW, supra note 154, at 143.
457. The current SSA mechanism that a claimant follows in order to inquire about the
status of his or her case pending before the Appeals Council is one of Rube Goldberg com-
plexity:
For example, if a claimant were to inquire regarding the status of an appeal, he
would normally direct his questions through the local district office (DO). The DO
employee would initially obtain an HA04 query from the OHA Case Control Sys-
tem (CCS) and call OHA's Congressional and Public Inquiries Staff (CPIS).
The CPIS employee would record the message and obtain another HA04 query to
identify which OAO branch was acting on the claimant's request for review. The
CPIS employee would contact the appropriate branch control section.
The OAO contact would then record the request and institute a manual search of
the branch to determine which analyst had been assigned the case. The OAO "con-
tact" would then obtain the last known status of the case and inform CPIS.
The CPIS employee would record the response and reply to the DO employee for
further communication to the claimant. This practice has not only been time con-
suming, but it also demands involvement of many more personnel than are neces-
sary.
OMAPI REPORT, supra note 229, at 26.
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We also believe that Appeals Council members should make more
public appearances, participate more in bar activities, and write
about their work to enhance public acceptability. They should meet
with federal judges to discuss disability matters in general and case-
handling in particular.
Inside the SSA, the members of the Appeals Council should build
bridges to the ALJs and to other parts of the organization. To this
end, the "visiting ALF" program should be reinstated. At least one
seat on the Appeals Council should be reserved for ALJs as a tempo-
rary assignment to test whether they would like to apply for member-
ship, to infuse new perspectives into the Appeals Council, and to
enhance the corps' appreciation for the work of their reviewers.
Conversely, we think that there should be traffic in the opposite
direction. Appeals Council members should take occasional assign-
ments as ALJs, conducting hearings in the field. Even those mem-
bers who have "graduated" from the ALJ corps could benefit from
an occasional refresher.
Similar interaction and exchange programs should be instituted
with the other components of the SSA, such as the district offices
and the state disability determination services. Because Model (4)
calls for the Appeals Council to participate in enhancing the opera-
tions of the entire disability adjudication operation, the Council
should have regular contact with the lowest tiers. Thus, the Appeals
Council might be able to come to grips with the operations of the
bureaucratic behemoth and help formulate system-wide improve-
ments.
Most importantly, the Appeals Council will require greater visibil-
ity within the higher echelons of the SSA. The Appeals Council has
been isolated for too long; it must now re-establish itself as a force
with direct channels to the leadership. The "policy development"
role can succeed only if the policymakers support it; they must ac-
cept the Appeals Council members as participants and must con-
sciously alter existing routines in order to admit a new set of
perspectives.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have observed that the Appeals Council is composed of tal-
ented and dedicated individuals, pursuing in anonymity a set of di-
verse tasks that we consider exceedingly important but virtually
impossible to accomplish. The size of the current caseload defies ef-
fective management, despite the Appeals Council's efforts to dis-
patch it with diligence and compassion. Although the purposes and
capabilities of the Appeals Council are impressive, we find the insti-
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tution's functioning unsatisfactory. The Appeals Council is not ef-
fectively achieving its goals, and will not likely perform much better
in the future. Accordingly, we recommend comprehensive modifica-
tions in the objectives, composition, and operation of the Appeals
Council.
Having considered four models for future Appeals Council opera-
tions, we conclude that: (1) the status quo of the Appeals Council is
too deeply flawed to be sustained and the present structure is not
performing to anyone's satisfaction; (2) the Appeals Council should
not be abolished, at least not before one more effort at serious re-
form; (3) a "case correction" role could be expanded and improved,
but pursuing a chimera of accuracy would prove unsatisfactory and
waste the Appeals Council's real potential; and (4) the role of system
reform-suggesting new policies, developing new practices, and im-
plementing new experiments-is the most valuable role for the Ap-
peals Council, enabling it to put its case-handling experience to the
best use and empowering it to aid the SSA in the most valuable way.
The systems reform role for the Appeals Council and the specific
implementation steps we have outlined are not easy or inexpensive,
nor is success guaranteed. Effectuation will require deliberate meas-
ures by the SSA leadership, including the personal attention of the
Commissioner. We are confident, however, that the proposal is fea-
sible and that it would be highly advantageous. The Appeals Coun-
cil, as it now stands, is both over- and under-utilized. It is buried in
case files and unable to marshal its unique expertise or perspective.
We appreciate the potential of the Appeals Council and despair of its
wastage; the Social Security Administration can and should do bet-
ter.
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Chart 1
SSA's Sequential Evaluation Process for Assessing Disability
Preliminary Step: Is the claimant financially eligible
for RSHDI (fully insured and disability insured status)
or for SSI (low income and resources)?
I yes
Step 1: Is the claimant performing "substantial gain-
ful activity?"
yes B t
] yes
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Chart 2
Partial SSA Organization Chart
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Chart 3
OHA Workflow -Review Level
Reverse AU denial , ., affirm AU denial
or affirm ALJ award or reverse AU Award
File may be returned to OAO at any stage for further workup or rewriting decisional documents.
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Chart 4
OHA Workflow -New Court Cases
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Chart 5
OHA Workflow-Court Remands
Fast track
by analyst
R I I
To effectuating center to pay
or denial letter to claimant
